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ANDOVER REVIEW

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
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VOL. X. — JULY, 1888. — No. LV.

SCHOPENHAUER AS A CRITIC OF RELIGION.

IN a recent work by Dr. Martineau,¹ the story is told of an eminent English Positivist, that, listening to an account of the argument in Mr. Fiske's "Destiny of Man," he gave silent attention until the inference was being drawn of personal immortality, when he broke in with the exclamation: "What! John Fiske say that? Well; it only proves what I have always maintained, that you cannot make the slightest concession to metaphysics without ending in a theology!"

Whatever truth there may be in the opinion thus expressed that metaphysics culminates, by a logical necessity, in theology, it is certain that every system of metaphysics is bound, by the very nature of its pretensions, to assume some definite attitude towards religion. For religion and metaphysics both concern themselves, in the last resort, with essentially the same objects, having both alike to do with ultimate reality and human destiny, on which profoundest of themes each, in its own way, professes to give to man the profoundest views attainable. Rightly, therefore, will the question be put to metaphysics which Marguerite put to the philosophic Faust, "What thinkest thou of God?" and rightly, too, will metaphysics pronounce judgment on religion, and declare *its* views of things to be true or false or uncertain.

A comparison of religious ideas with the results of a given philosophy not only makes clear the spirit and temper of the latter, but may also be of no small advantage to religion; for whether the views in question substantially agree or widely differ, in any case, the serious consideration of the free criticisms and subtler apprehensions of philosophy can hardly fail to clarify and

¹ *A. Study of Religion.* Macmillan. 1888.

deepen faith, or at least to stimulate to a more thorough investigation of its grounds. It is in view of these advantages that I have attempted, in what follows, an examination of some "religious aspects" of the philosophy of Schopenhauer. No system of modern times assumes a more definite or hostile attitude towards religion than this brilliantly expounded metaphysics, half pantheistic, half atheistic, of the great German pessimist. The reason for this lies in the intensely practical outcome of the whole speculation, which was clearly designed as a philosophy of redemption to take the place, at any rate among the educated, of the fast disappearing beliefs of religion. The matter is not without a timely interest. Just a hundred years after the birth of its author,¹ the philosophy of the "World as Will and Idea" celebrates its triumphs as probably the most influential system of German metaphysics since the breaking up of Hegelianism. Such a system the friends of religion cannot well afford to ignore.

I shall confine myself chiefly to the opinions "On Religion" collected together in the fifteenth chapter of the second volume of "Parerga and Paralipomena." The first and most important section of this chapter contains, in the form of a dialogue, a general examination and criticism of religion much after the manner of Hume. One of the speakers, Demopheles, undertakes to defend religion for the masses on practical grounds. His principle is utility, and the ends which religion attains in the practical sphere completely outbalance, he urges, any theoretical exceptions which might be taken to the means. These ends are: first, the satisfaction of man's metaphysical need, the need "which arises from the pressing problem of our existence, and from the consciousness that there must be, beyond the physical of the world, somehow a metaphysical, an unchangeable, serving as the basis for continual change." Religion meets this need, bringing to men truth, yes, the deepest truth, in a form adapted to the common apprehension, allegorical, mysterious, overawing, therefore, and with an authority secured by antiquity and tradition, as is necessary to its practical effectiveness. In the second place, it appeals to the ever-present moral consciousness of men, affording to it that external support and confirmation, "without which it could not easily maintain itself in the struggle with so many temptations." In thus restraining violence, and wisely controlling conduct generally, religion forms the very bulwark of the social order, while Christianity in particular holds forth ideals which

¹ Schopenhauer was born February 22, 1788.

reveal the true ethical import of human life in all its depth and seriousness. Finally, religion brings to man, amid great and innumerable sorrows, comfort and consolation, in death especially unfolding to him the whole of its beneficent power. Accordingly, it "is like one who takes a blind man by the hand and leads him, . . . the great thing is, not that he himself should see everything, but that he should reach his destination."

These points are developed, with repetitions and varying emphasis, now here, now there, according to the occasions presented by the free movement of the dialogue.

Philaethes, the other speaker, represents the theoretical and philosophical consciousness. His motto is: "*Vigeat veritas et pereat mundus*." He objects to religion as a popular metaphysics, because, while presenting the truth allegorically, everything has to be taken (as Demopheles also allows) *sensu proprio*. But *sensu proprio* the doctrines are false. The friend of truth, therefore, must reject and condemn them. But the naked truth, stripped of its allegorical dressing up, would be philosophy, and no longer religion. If the principle *simplex sigillum veri* is here unavailing, and the common people cannot be made to understand the profound truths of philosophy, they can at least be brought to so much better insight as to see that what they now regard as true is false, and so be saved from error; and this gain fully justifies the attacks which philosophers and men of science are constantly making on the popular creeds. In regard to the second point, the influence of religion on morals, it is admitted that, in some respects, such influence is both powerful and good. It is not, however, by any means, as has been claimed, the bulwark of civil order, which is much more dependent on the law and the magistrate than on motives of religion. "Suppose," says Philaethes, "that now suddenly, by public proclamation, all criminal laws were declared null and void: I think that neither you nor I would have the courage, under the protection of religious motives, to go home alone only from here. But if, in like manner, all religion were declared to be untrue, we should continue to live as before, without any particular increase of our cares and precautions, under the protection of the laws only." Moreover, the principle contended for is false. It is not true that the end justifies the means. From the standpoint of truth, the *fraus* is to be reprobated, no matter how *pia*. Nor, surely, does moral worth ever belong to deeds, whose source is really and purely superstition. As to Christianity, the ethical import of life which it teaches is,

indeed, great, and belongs to it alone — that is to say, in the Occident; but it is never to be forgotten, on the other hand, that, being a monotheistic religion, it is necessarily intolerant, since a single God is, from his very nature, a jealous God, that allows life to no other. Its history, therefore, is a history of bigotry and persecution, of hypocrisy and deceit, of torture and the stake, and of crimes unmentionable, justifying, in part at least, the Spanish proverb, "Behind the cross stands the devil." As regards morality, therefore, the service of religion is largely problematical, while its disadvantages, or even the deeds of violence which have followed it, are manifest. Granted, finally, that the consolations of religion constitute, as they do, its greatest glory, what, it must be urged, can that comfort be worth over which forever hangs the Damocles-sword of disillusioning?

"Religion," says Demopheles at the end, "like Janus, or, better, like Yama, the Brahman's god of death, has two faces, and indeed, like this, one very friendly, the other very forbidding; we have each been looking at one of them." To this Philalethes assents, and the dialogue closes.

In considering this discussion, one cannot but be struck by the fact that Schopenhauer throughout appears able to apprehend religion in no other way than as folk-metaphysics, and that he judges it entirely from the standpoint of his own metaphysics, to which it is, in almost every particular, opposed. It seems to be assumed that religion is and can be only an affair of the uneducated. Much is said of the opposition between religion and philosophy, but the long line of thinkers whose philosophy has culminated in a religious philosophy are simply ignored. Emphasis is laid on the conflict between religion and science, but the many eminent men of science who, not satisfied to regard blind physical force as ultimate, have turned with reverent hearts to the personal God, are silently passed over. Science is simply set over against faith, reasoned metaphysics against folk-metaphysics, with which religion is straightway identified. The abuses which have been practiced in the name or under the cloak of religion, even those which were without or even against its sanction, these are all heaped together as a reproach upon "religion." No attempt whatever is made to grasp religion in its idea or essence; it is taken up in a purely empirical way as a complex of phenomena, chiefly sociological. The endeavor to make religion appear rational is treated by Schopenhauer in other of his writings as a piece of sophism, for which professors of philosophy receive pay from the government. *All* reli-

gion is necessarily allegorical, and therefore false. Even Demopheles in the dialogue knows of no better defense of it than as a metaphysical theory adapted to the capacities of the common people and to be respected for its practical effectiveness.

It might be objected, perhaps, at this point that religion is not adequately characterized as metaphysics at all, since the system of beliefs, which constitute what may be called the cognitive part of it, does not of itself constitute its essence. The very belief in God, we are told, need not be religious; for "God" may be simply a scientific hypothesis having no more religious value than a mathematical symbol or a formula like Taylor's theorem.¹ In order to be religious, the belief must determine the life, and a manifold of sentiments and activities must be unfolded, whose peculiar character is derived from relation to a supreme object at once of thought and of veneration.

This is true; and it is also true that religious beliefs do not exist primarily in the form in which they are taken up in the reflective consciousness. But whether in this abstract consciousness or imbedded in the medium of feeling and inwrought into the activities of will, they nevertheless do exist and involve, implicitly or otherwise, a metaphysical theory which challenges comparison with the views of philosophy obtained in other ways. In the end, therefore, nothing is gained if, as Schopenhauer claims, the ideas which determine life religiously are without foundation. If this were true, then the history of religion would be simply a history of folly. Here, then, if at all, is the point where Schopenhauer must be met. Are the ideas of religion capable of justification? Is the folk-metaphysics also good metaphysics? Or is there and can there be a good metaphysics which is also available for purposes of religion? It is noteworthy that Schopenhauer at least recognizes that religion is not to be treated merely as an artificial appendage to human life, but as having its immovable foundation in the "ineradicable metaphysical need" of our nature. This, doubtless, is not enough. The permanent foundation of religion lies not alone in this theoretical requirement, but also in the equally ineradicable feeling of individual dependence on unseen reality and in the coördinate impulse to realize personal life in union with it. But what specially concerns us here is the metaphysical element in religion, and the question whether that element is susceptible of rational development.

Viewing the matter thus, we shall have no difficulty in finding

¹ Royce, *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 2.

in these caustic criticisms of Schopenhauer much that is profitable and pertinent. I refer especially to his characterization of religious doctrines as allegorical. That they are necessarily so, as Schopenhauer maintains, is not to be conceded, but that they are largely so in the form which religion assumes as "folk-metaphysics" can hardly, I think, be questioned. For not only have the exigencies of language, built up, in the first instance, in relation to sensible phenomena, made all allusions to the super-sensible doubly symbolical, but there is here a constant tendency for symbol and idea to run together. The larger part of the metaphysical conceptions connected with the religious life of mankind has ever been and is still mythological. How difficult it is to eliminate the myth when we attempt to grasp the facts and forces of a world transcending the sense-world is illustrated by the practice of even so great a genius as Plato, who used it repeatedly as an artistic form in which to set forth doctrines too sublime, apparently, for treatment in terms of abstract thinking. Nor would it be difficult to discover a similar spirit in the professed metaphysics of later times. Small wonder, therefore, if even the more spiritual religions, especially in the popular apprehension of them, have not been able wholly to escape it. This is true, among others, of Christianity. The Bible is full of symbolical expressions and figurative descriptions, especially concerning God and the processes and results of human redemption, which, taken literally, must be judged, from the standpoint of the modern consciousness, to be pure fiction. In the Middle Ages, the dogmas of religion were apprehended in accordance with the prevalent cosmography; the divine drama was adapted to the physical theatre. The opposition of the Church to scientific speculations in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was, from its own point of view, most logical. The Copernican theory not only contradicted a literal interpretation of the Bible, it necessitated at the same time a revolution in the manner of holding the faith. The heaven above the crystalline sphere, which Aristotle had posited as the outer limit of the material world and which the schoolmen believed in, disappeared. It was no longer possible seriously to think of a throne of God above the stars whence Christ had come down to the earth to redeem it, and where He now sits in glorified body, the effulgent centre of angelic hierarchies. The earth itself, far from being the centre of a universe created especially for its benefit, was discovered to occupy only a secondary place among the planets, and transformed itself into a mere star-speck floating in the infinitude

of space. With such a conception, even the most fundamental of the Church's assumptions, the assumption, namely, that God had taken upon Himself human form and for man's salvation had suffered and died, constituting the Church a treasury of supernatural grace and investing it with a pleroma of miraculous powers, appeared highly questionable — little did the earth seem fitted for such superlative distinction. And as heaven vanished above, so hell disappeared beneath, and the doctrines of future retribution and personal immortality, in the old form of holding them, became impossible. That the old drama is not adapted to the new theatre is evident. Nevertheless, the literal materialism of mediæval conceptions still continues to leaven much of our popular theology. If, influenced by the fact of the human birth, the number of those who think of the coming of Christ to the earth in a spatial fashion is fewer than formerly, the number of those is still great who think in this manner of his ascension to heaven. From the same point of view, the great majority of Christians, apparently, still look forward to the second advent as a coming of Christ in the clouds with cohorts of angels, and verily believe that this sublime spectacle will be seen by every human eye (Rev. i. 7) — in contravention of all the laws of optics and of his own express declaration that the event predicted was to take place in the lifetime of some of his immediate followers (Mark ix. 1; cf. Mt. xxiv. 34). The same literalism prevails in popular conceptions of the resurrection, whence the horror with which cremation is regarded among the uneducated; while in respect to the final judgment, scarcely a doubt seems yet to have been stirred among orthodox believers that it will take place on a day appointed in the assembled presence of men and angels, and that each will *hear* the very *words* of Christ which will solemnly declare the world's drama to be ended and separate out for different localities the good and the bad forever. These doctrines, held in this way, simply contradict the views which necessarily connect themselves with our enlarged conceptions of the physical universe. But there are others which to a trained moral consciousness are even more abhorrent. Such, for example, is the popular misconception of the doctrine of the Atonement. As a "plan" of salvation "devised" in the council chambers of the Eternal, an "arrangement agreed upon" between Father and Son, it is an utter artificiality; as a "scheme" by which the guilty might escape through the infliction of the precise equivalent of their just penalty on the innocent, it is the worst sort of legal fiction. Matthew Arnold is undoubtedly right in

characterizing such a supposed transaction "as sheer mythology, at bottom, as Saturn's devouring his children or Pallas springing from the head of Zeus."¹ Assuredly all of these doctrines have meaning, but the form of presenting them is, as Schopenhauer says, allegorical; and every truthful man must desire to penetrate as far as possible into the meaning of the allegory, to think truly and to feel as he thinks.

We live in an age of change. No one who is sympathetic to the spiritual forces which control the intellectual movement of our times carries with him into mature life the beliefs of his childhood unaltered. The change may be a gradual transformation or an outspoken revolt. The poetry of youth may merge imperceptibly into "the light of common day," which, however "common," is at least capable of dispelling illusions; or the present may prove a rupture with the past attended with unutterable anguish and pathos. If the latter be the case, there is at any rate one consolation which earnest seekers after truth have in all ages of the world experienced, the consciousness of at least being on the right road.

"Ein guter Mensch, in seinem dunkeln Drange
Ist sich des rechten Weges wohl bewusst."

(*Faust.* Prolog im Himmel. Der Herr.)

This process, now, cannot be arrested. It is idle to attempt to permanently allay doubt with palliatives; it can only be met satisfactorily with reasons. Just as, in the age of the Sophists, when skeptical inquiry was undermining the foundations of all religion and morality derived from tradition and authority, the great and pious Socrates sought, not to deny the right of skepticism, but to so far affirm it as to make it skeptical of itself, and by a still deeper investigation to bring explicitly into consciousness the inherent rationality of the accepted order,—so the leaders of religious thought to-day must recognize every serious doubt of a dogma not seen to be rational, and every hesitancy to accept as true what does not seem to the doubter to rest upon sufficient evidence, as legitimate, in reliance on the scriptural principle, "the spirit searcheth all things, even the deep things of God," and must seek to present the essential truth of religious conceptions in a form harmonious with our growing knowledge of the world. This, happily, is what a goodly number of some of the best and wisest of our religious teachers are trying to do. They are trying

¹ See Mr. Arnold's article, "A Friend of God," in the *Nineteenth Century* for April, 1887.

to make the content of the faith, in the best sense of the word, rational; to substitute for the letter, spirit, for mechanical conceptions, vital, for artificialities, reality. This is why their appeal to the freshest minds of to-day is so powerful; they speak as having authority, and not as the scribes, for their authority is the internal one of essential reasonableness, and not the merely external one of constituted custom. Such men hold in their spirit the keys of the future. The preacher or teacher professing to declare the counsels of the Almighty with no other evidence of his claim than his bare assertion, or the assertions of those who have preceded him, may flourish for a time, possibly for a long time, but his authority is doomed as soon as it becomes recognized, as in the end it must, that every man, by the inherent rationality of his nature, is justified in rejecting it.

No one, probably, will claim, without evident self-deception, that he has succeeded in realizing in his own consciousness a system of religious beliefs which is in all respects rational, one, that is, whose inner conformity to the nature of things is in all respects manifest. The nature of things is itself altogether too vast for our comprehension; its very rationality, apart from certain broad and general principles, is a postulate, which we are bound indeed to make, if we will have any comprehension of it at all, but which is only within comparatively narrow limits verified. Much, therefore, necessarily remains matter of conjecture, hypothesis, belief. And much, doubtless, will ever remain so. We see many things only as in a mirror, darkly. The very imperfections of our knowledge suggest that there are many things in the objective order of the world, of the full bearings and relations of which we have as yet but the most inadequate insight. Nevertheless, it is a great thing to be clearly conscious of the goal; the further consciousness that the intelligence which seeks to attain it is no fixed mathematical quantum, but a developing rational life, may serve perhaps as a salutary check upon our impatience that it is not attained sooner. The next thing is to clearly apprehend the right method of approach. This, if I mistake not, must be, in the main, strictly philosophical, the attempt to realize the truth of things in its completeness. No part of experience must be treated as though it were the whole. It will not do, for example, to follow here the abstract method of the natural sciences, which, while disclosing many important things about the world as an object known, necessarily ignore the most wonderful fact of all, the knowing of this object. The subject must also come to its

rights, not only the cognitive, but the feeling and willing subject, — the subject of joys and sorrows, of needs and aspirations; the subject whose inspirations flash meteor-like upon the dark enigmas of existence, and whose ideals of science, art, conduct, and, among others, somehow to be accounted for, of religion, mark its intrinsic excellence. Nor is this all. The individual subject is, on its part, as truly an abstraction as the known object we call nature. Each individual, besides having relations through the body with the whole of external nature, stands, through the medium of language and social institutions, in relation to other individuals, in the family, in society, in the state, and is what he is, and becomes what he becomes, only in and through such relations. But they, though we commonly speak of them as our "environment," are anything but an environment in the sense in which the sea environs an island or the atmosphere the earth. They are spiritual and unique, and all merely mechanical analogies utterly fail to comprehend them. In some way, the individual life becomes a sharer in a more universal life, and is this individual only as it thus participates. There is an interpenetration of the universal in the individual, and an intussusception on the part of the individual of the universal. And not only so. Not only does each individual here and now stand in relation to other individuals here and now, but the whole life of the present is indissolubly connected with both the past and the future. It is only in the abstract science of mathematics that the world bears a purely static aspect; everywhere else it is a world of movement, of history. Particularly is this true in the affairs of men. The men and institutions of to-day are the product, in a sense, of the men and institutions of yesterday, of all past generations of men, of a long line of generations of organisms lower than man, of long ages of geological changes connected with chemical and physical processes lower still, of the primeval star-dust, and of what was before the star-dust; and not only the product, but, in some sense, the bearers, incorporating into their own life all other life; mirroring, as Leibniz, from another standpoint, figuratively expressed it, the entire universe; in one aspect most particular, in another most universal. This truth, if it be a truth, is important; for connecting man with man in society and with humanity in history, and uniting man with nature in a present which assimilates the past and gives birth to the future, it presents to us the world as an ordered system, each part of which involves the whole, and this without any loss of individuality, but rather as a necessary

condition of individuality. The world thus appears as a concrete organism, vital, and, since we can assign no limits to its content, infinite. But to conceive the world so would seem necessarily to involve the conception of Theism, since the principle of unity for such a world cannot be anything mechanical like the *partes extra partes* of figurate space, but must be ideal, like the life of the plant or the unity of consciousness; it must be Intelligence, since no lesser principle can constitute the required unity of real and ideal, nor connect into a series the succession of temporal phenomena; and it must be Power, and if Intelligence, intelligent Power, that is, Will, since the whole world-order, in its continued on-going, is the evident manifestation of energy. But however this may be, however we may be compelled to think of our Highest Principle, the point to be insisted on is this, that religion, which grew originally out of a conscious relation of the individual life to the deepest reality apprehended in the universe in the feeling of dependence, must mould its conceptions of that reality, and of all that connects itself with our relations to it in accordance with the principles which increasing intelligence finds more and more clearly revealed, not only in one department of being abstracted from the rest, but in the organic structure of the universe. Only so will it be possible to repel the bitter taunt of Schopenhauer that knowledge and faith are "like wolf and sheep caged together, and knowledge is the wolf which threatens to eat up its neighbor." (Par. ii. 419.)

Schopenhauer's views of Christianity are highly paradoxical, interesting, therefore, but not very important. The historical Christ he regarded, with Reimarus, as originally a demagogue, who, failing in the attempt to make himself king of the Jews, succeeded in getting himself transformed, after he was dead, from an earthly king into a heavenly. The details of the gospel narratives are mythical. Christian doctrine is a great allegory, which, having grown up on occasion of external and contingent circumstances, was finally put into shape by the systematizing genius of Augustine. Augustinianism, therefore, and not "primitive Christianity," is Christianity in its completeness. The doctrines themselves are derived principally from two heterogeneous sources, optimistic Judaism and pessimistic Buddhism; but their centre of gravity is decidedly in the latter. The devil is here a highly important personage. He is "the prince of this world" (John xii. 32), and a much-needed counterpoise to the all-goodness, all-wisdom, and all-power of God. So thoroughly is Schopenhauer

convinced of the Indian origin of the essential doctrines of Christianity, that he not only appeals in proof to "its thoroughly Indian ethics leading to asceticism, to its pessimism, and its avatar," but finds his theory especially confirmed by the expression "the wheel of generation" (James iii. 6), which he compares with the wheel of the transmigration of souls, frequently referred to in the writings of Buddhism. He even goes so far as to suggest that the name John may be derived from "Saniassi," — "from his Saniassi-life in the wilderness!" To account for the connection, he is inclined to attribute an element of truth to the story of the flight into Egypt, where Jesus, he thinks, might have become acquainted with Hinduism through intercourse with Egyptian priests.

These dicta are, at the best, but bold and stimulating suggestions; they certainly do not present themselves as reasoned conclusions on the broad basis of historical investigation. The point most worth considering, perhaps, is the oft-repeated assertion of the connection of Christianity and Buddhism. That the two religions present in many particulars striking similarities, cannot be questioned. So obvious, indeed, are these resemblances that missionaries have been led, at times, to look on Buddhism as a counterfeit of Christianity invented by the devil in order to obstruct the progress of the gospel. It is quite possible, of course, perhaps even probable, that each religion may have developed similarly under similar conditions in entire independence. But it is also possible that there may have been at some period a historical connection. This is a matter which can only be settled by investigations considerably more elaborate than those we find in Schopenhauer, but it is, after all, one purely historical, and any serious attempt to make out the connection will at all times meet with ready welcome among candid scholars, whatever may be their judgment as to its success.¹ But granting all this, granting even that the dependence is on the side of Christianity and that we may be obliged to recognize, in the end, along with Jewish and Hellenic also Buddhistic influences in its formation, it would still be a long way from this to the identification of the inner spirit of Christianity with that of Buddhism. Schopenhauer's procedure here is anything but judicious. Having first assumed that Christianity is

¹ Thus, for example, Professor Seydel's books, *Das Evang. von Jesu in seinen Verhältnissen zur Buddhasage und Buddhalehre*, 1882, and *Die Buddhalegende u. das Leben Jesu, etc.*, 1884, get a respectful hearing, even in circles the most unassailably orthodox.

Augustinian dogmatics, he then expounds the latter as an allegorical setting forth of the essential doctrines of Buddhism. "At bottom," he says, "and apart from mythologies on both sides, Buddha's *Sansara* and *Nirwana* are identical with the two *civitates* of Augustine, . . . the *civitas terrena* and *cœlestis*," — which is about as reasonable as if one should say that, since each narrates the story of a theft, there is no essential difference between Pope's "Rape of the Lock" and the Greek Iliad. Christianity is, in fact, no more identical with Augustinianism than it is with Pelagianism or any other -ism. Its forms are as variable as the forms of nature: one of its most eminent characteristics is that it can adapt itself to the ever-changing conditions and ever-growing capacities of humanity. Its spirit is its only really essential element — the spirit of Christ, which is the spirit of divine love in human hearts redeeming man from sin unto holiness and unto God. This spirit is world-wide different from that of Buddhism. True, Christianity has its pessimistic aspect. The world, as it conceives it, is no play-ground. There is evil enough in it — lust and avarice, pride and prejudice, hypocrisy and envy, malice and covetousness, evils of the heart more terrible far than physical sufferings. No danger of overlooking the natural corruption of human nature. And in accordance with this, a morality is demanded, the very first condition of which is self-abnegation. It is true, Christianity has for its symbol an instrument of torture and proclaims unweariedly, as the profoundest law of the moral universe, that salvation is only possible through sacrifice. But this is only one aspect of it. For if the keynote of Christian morality is the paradox, "Whoso loseth his life shall find it," the emphasis is before all else on the finding. The identification with Buddhism is thoroughly superficial. Buddhism is essentially a religion of negation; the "will-to-be," as Schopenhauer expressed it, must be denied, all desire suppressed, the flesh crucified, that at the last, after numberless transmigrations, the soul may lose itself, merged, unconscious as in a swoon, in the unruffled, changeless essence of the All. Christianity, on the contrary, is emphatically a religion of affirmation. Its negative element involves an even more characteristic positive. It not only asserts, with Buddhism, that the individual life is, as such, of evil, but it teaches that, in negating this partial, isolated, false life of self, which is alienation from God and therefore sinful, the true self is not lost but realized. If it demands, as the indispensable prerequisite to the attainment of blessedness, unqualified surrender of the self to

God, it is only that God may implete the poverty of the life apart from Him with divine fullness. If it enjoins renunciation of the world, it is in the sense of a moral attitude unconditionally necessary to a being destined for immortality, whose ends, therefore, cannot be realized in the fleeting phenomena of time. The world that is negated is the world of sense, of the things that perish with the using; and the form of negation is not absolute, for while denied as ends, the service which they render is in no way underestimated as means. The spirit of Christianity, therefore, is not the asceticism of the body, — “the Son of Man came eating and drinking,” — but the asceticism of the spirit, which turns away from the world as the unsatisfying source of delusions and misery when it is regarded as ultimate, and turns to God as the true Fountain of Happiness and the Giver of Eternal Life. Stated philosophically, both religions agree that the individual can only find the end of his being in union with the universal; but with Buddhism this union destroys individuality, while with Christianity it perfects it. Nor is the ground of this difference far to seek. It lies in the essential difference in the mode in which the universal is apprehended. With Buddhism, it is abstract; with Christianity, it is concrete. With Buddhism, the ultimate Principle is indeterminate Being; with Christianity, it is the Personal God. Buddhism, in a word, is Pantheistic; Christianity, Theistic. Hence union with the universal is in Buddhism absorption, loss of identity; in Christianity, it is full preservation of the individual life in a kingdom of free spirits, a realm of persons above whom and in whom rules forevermore the Spirit of personal, Eternal Love.

But it is precisely this theistic conception which Schopenhauer in the strongest terms repudiates as the source of all error and confusion. His account of it, however, is anything but satisfactory. He regards monotheism, for example, as the mere personification of nature, — an opinion neither historically deduced nor philosophically grounded, and false in both regards. No one, he says, has done so much harm to Theism as Copernicus (*Frauenstädt, A. S., p. 171*). Astronomy, having taken away heaven, has taken away God also, since “a personal being, as every God necessarily is, that has no place, but is everywhere and nowhere, . . . cannot be imagined, and therefore cannot be believed in.” (*Par. i. p. 55.*) He even goes so far as to say that all worship of a personal Being is idolatrous, as much so as the worship of fashioned wood, and that whether a man sacrifices his sheep, or his

inclinations, is, at bottom, not so very different. (Par. ii. p. 405.) What in all this is not pure arbitrariness rests obviously on a misunderstanding. Theism is confounded with Deism, the God who is Spirit, whom all space manifests but none contains, with the local deity who sits above the clouds on a great white throne, and finally appears upon the pictures as an old man with a beard.

We see, then, in Schopenhauer, a critic who rejects all religion as superstition; who regards Christianity, so far as it is true at all, as merely a disguised Buddhism; who looks on Theism as puerile and all worship of a personal God as idolatry; and who pronounces the conflict between Science and Faith to be a *bellum ad internecionem*. (Par. ii. p. 418.) Add to this his denial of personal immortality and his bitter repudiation of supernatural revelation as a claim made by the cunning of priests, taking advantage of the ineradicable metaphysical need of men, combined with their ignorance, to the ends of ecclesiastical and civil power (Par. ii. § 177), and we have in outline a position than which none would seem to be more radically in conflict with the current religious conceptions of our time.

As, now, the attitude towards religion generally, like that towards theories in speculation, depends no less, and in most cases rather more, on subjective disposition and contingent circumstances than on strictly objective insight, so, if we should inquire into the causes which led to this determined opposition to religion on the part of Schopenhauer, we should doubtless find them as well in the personal traits and surroundings of the philosopher as in the professedly objective considerations of his philosophy. I can here only refer to one or two salient points which appear to me not a little instructive.

And, first, while it would be odious and is far from my intention to suggest insanity, there can be no doubt, I think, that Schopenhauer inherited from both sides of his family an unbalanced nature which frequently led to an unbalanced judgment both of men and of things. His grandmother on his father's side was crazy, and after the death of her husband under legal guardianship; his uncle Andreas, her eldest son, was half-witted from his youth; her second son became so through excesses, and gave to a melancholy life, lived in separation from his family in the company of vulgar clowns, a somewhat merry ending by leaving behind to his brothers and sisters "their rightful portion," and to other persons many thousands — all on paper. The grandfather on the mother's side was, in spite of many excellent qualities, a

man of uncontrollable temper. "Just at the time when least expected," so writes his daughter, "the most trifling occasion could rouse him to a wild passion of anger, which, to be sure, was quickly over. At such times, the whole house trembled before his voice of thunder, and the entire household, even to dog and cat, ran frightened out of his way." Yes, even the philosopher's own father, whose intelligence and far-seeing industry, combined with extraordinary energy of will, marked a character of no common strength and independence, suffered at times from mental aberration, particularly towards the latter part of his life, when increasing deafness had made him moody and suspicious. It was generally supposed at the time that he committed suicide: all that is certainly known is that he fell from an opening in the warehouse into the canal and was drowned. But Schopenhauer's biographer, who narrates the circumstance, says that he knows a number of things told by the widow and son, which leave little doubt that the rumor was well founded.¹

This taint in the blood made itself painfully evident in the conduct and opinions of Schopenhauer. He was a born misanthrope. A lively imagination excited a naturally suspicious nature almost to the pitch of madness, so that the evil which he feared, he seemed at times to see bodily before him. One evening, when he was only six years old, his parents, on returning home from a walk, found him in the greatest despair, having imagined himself suddenly abandoned by them forever. A student in Berlin, he believed himself for a long time to be consumptive. At the breaking out of the war of 1813, he imagined that he had been pressed into the service. In Verona he was seized with the idea that he had taken poisoned snuff. When in 1833 he was about to leave Mannheim, he was overcome, without any external occasion whatever, with an unspeakable feeling of dread. For years he was plagued with fear of a criminal process; and if any noise arose in the night, he would jump out of bed and seize dagger and pistols, which he kept constantly loaded. His valuables were concealed in all sorts of out-of-the-way places about his rooms; some could only be found with difficulty in spite of the Latin indications of their whereabouts in his will. And as he had lived in constant dread of being cheated, so that he might not be cheated at the last he gave orders that his body should be allowed to lie longer than was customary, to make the reality of his death perfectly sure.²

¹ For the foregoing particulars, see Gwinner, *Schopenhauer's Leben*, Kap. i.

² *Ibid.* pp. 400 f., where also more of the same sort is narrated.

It was a favorite doctrine with Schopenhauer that genius is allied to madness, and he regarded himself, not wholly without reason, as a genius of the very first rank. He also considered a certain amount of misanthropy as a necessary ingredient of every more talented nature, and held with Chamfort that the beginning of wisdom is the fear of man. From the solitary heights of genius, in the proud consciousness of superiority, he looked down no less with scorn than with pity on the great herd of the uncultivated, the "pack of humanity," the "bipeds," the "Philistines," "nature's wares," as he was wont to term them, and more and more, without perhaps intending it, grew into the habit of judging all things by reference to himself. This isolation he felt very keenly when he found his philosophy, which he describes as "a superb edifice destined for the centuries,"¹ completely neglected for over thirty years. This neglect was the source of great embitterment. He could find no other way to account for it than that of a formal conspiracy on the part of the university professors to prevent him a hearing. Hence his outbursts against the paid professors, who, having to earn their living by their teaching, naturally, he thought, prefer position to truth; especially his attacks on the "three great Sophists," Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and more especially on Hegel, whom he could regard in no other light than that of a common charlatan. These invectives are marked by anything but Attic urbanity; on the contrary, they are at times right coarse and vulgar. And when he saw Hegelian philosophy trapped out with the accoutrements of religious phraseology and vaunting itself as the champion of religious orthodoxy, a man of Schopenhauer's volcanic temperament would hardly be likely to find his feelings towards the latter very strongly conciliated.

Another circumstance which contributed, I think, to Schopenhauer's alienation from religion was the absence of anything like what we should call religious training in his own family. The father's ambitions appear to have been wholly secular: Arthur was to become a merchant of position and an accomplished man of the world. True, the remark in a letter that it was quite good that Arthur should be confirmed and attend the morning lectures in Theology from a man whose favorite author was Voltaire shows a character singularly free from prejudice; but there is no evidence that he ever gave to religion any very hearty support. Naturally we might look for more positive influence from the mother;

¹ Letter to Asher, 2 July, 1858.

but between mother and son was altogether too little sympathy, and hers was a nature far too shallow. At Weimar, where after the death of her husband she held a sort of literary court, she would not have him, then a youth of twenty, live in the same house with her. An impartial critic would probably not lay all the blame to the charge of the mother. "So long as thou art what thou art," she writes him, "I would make any sacrifice rather than agree to this. I am not blind to thy good qualities, and what repels me lies not in thy disposition, thy inner being, but in thy outer, thy views, thy judgments, thy habits, — in short, as concerning the external world, I can agree with thee in nothing. Thy melancholy, too, oppresses me and puts me out of humor, without helping thee at all. See, dear Arthur, thou wert only with me a few days on a visit, and every day there were violent scenes about nothing, and again about nothing, and each time I breathed free again only after thou wert gone, because thy presence, thy complaints about unavoidable things, thy gloomy looks, thy bizarre judgments, which were spoken by thee like oracles allowing of no objection, oppressed me, and still more the everlasting struggle within with which I violently repressed everything that I might say in reply in order not to give occasion to fresh contention. I am living now very quietly; for years I have not had an unpleasant moment which I do not owe to thee."¹ Evidently Schopenhauer's was not a character finely calculated to promote peace and happiness. But here was just the trouble: Johanna Schopenhauer was ready to sacrifice everything to the maintenance of her personal even though cultivated pleasure. Her strange and gifted son she did not understand; she made no effort to understand him. On reading the title of his first work, "On the Fourfold Root of the Law of Sufficient Reason," she said to him contemptuously that that, she supposed, was a work for apothecaries! Anselm Feuerbach, who met her in the year 1815, has preserved the following notice: "Hofrätthin Schopenhauer, a rich widow. Makes a profession of learning. Authoress. Talks much and well; intelligent; without heart or soul. Self-satisfied, courting applause and constantly smiling at herself. God preserve us from women whose spirit has run to mere intellect. The seat of true womanly culture is alone in the woman's heart." This characteristic, according to Schopenhauer, who read it many years afterwards, hits the mark only too accurately.² A woman with intellect but without heart, self-complacent and delighting

¹ Gwinner, pp. 63 f.² Frauenstädt, p. 209.

in flattery, could hardly be regarded as an instrument fitted by nature for the spiritual guidance of a young pessimist. When he writes her, as a boy, from his boarding-school in England of the misery to which the compulsory inactivity of an English Sunday subjected him, she only laughs at him, recollecting the many struggles she had had to get him to do anything on Sundays and feast-days, because they were to him "days of rest," "and now thou hast of Sunday rest sufficient and enough;" while the wish, which this bitter personal experience occasioned, that "truth with its torch might burn through the Egyptian darkness in England," she only takes note of to criticise as a form of expression: "How canst thou expect truth to do any such thing? A darkness can be illumined, but burn it truly cannot. This is what in English is called *bombast*."¹

This experience in England was, without doubt, no insignificant factor in Schopenhauer's anti-religious education. He was then fifteen. He had just come from France, where the movement and freedom of a warm-blooded people had exercised all the fascination of which a nature such as his, and especially at that period of his life, would be susceptible. He now found himself in a totally different atmosphere, thrown, as never before, upon his own resources, and bound down to the rigid discipline of a clergyman's boarding-school, governed in accordance with the strictest principles of orthodoxy, theoretical as well as practical. Against all this he vigorously rebelled. Violent outbursts of indignation reach from time to time his parents, who are traveling for six months in the North, but the only response they meet with is such as that already spoken of from his mother, together with sundry exhortations, perhaps, to make himself more agreeable, and diligently to practice himself in the English language. But the stiff formality of English society never ceased to be repulsive to him, and the whole English religious life, as he saw it, wore to him no other aspect than, in the language of Carlyle, "dead, damnable, putrescent cant." To a school-friend he writes that his stay in England has made him hate the whole nation. This hatred, however, was by no means as universal as the expression might lead one to suppose. There was, in fact, no people to whom he felt himself, on the whole, so spiritually allied as the English. He prided himself on his knowledge of their language, conducted his accounts in it, read regularly the London "Times," preferred Englishmen to all others as traveling companions, and in many ways

¹ Gwinner, p. 23 f.

affected English style, even to matters of dress and the cut of his beard. But his embitterment against English bigotry and priestcraft, which dated from the experience at the Wimbledon boarding-school, remained unabated to the very last. "If you will see," he writes (Par. ii. 350 f.), "with your own eyes and near at hand what the early infection of belief can do, look at the English. See this nation, favored by nature above all others and furnished more than all others with intelligence, spirit, judgment and strength of character, see it, sunk deep beneath all others, nay, made absolutely contemptible by its stupid superstition about the Church, which, along with its other endowments, seems actually like a chronic illusion, a monomania. For this they have simply to thank the fact that education is in the hands of the clergy, who take care so to indoctrinate them in earliest youth with all the articles of faith, that there veritably results a partial atrophy of the brain, which then manifests itself all through life in that silly bigotry with which even people, in other respects highly intelligent and talented, among them degrade themselves, and leave us wholly at a loss to know what to make of them." In another passage (ii. 379) he illustrates his contention that religion tends frequently to regard supposed duties towards God as a surrogate for duties towards man by English views of the Sabbath. "Look at England," he exclaims, "where audacious priestly cunning lyingly identifies the Christian Sunday, which was established in opposition to the Jewish Sabbath, by Constantine the Great, with the latter; and it does this in order to transfer Jehovah's ordinances for the Sabbath, that is, the day when Omnipotence, wearied with six days' work, was obliged to rest — whence it is *really the last* day of the week — over to the Christian's Sunday, the *dies solis*, this first day which gloriously opens the week, this day of pious meditation and rejoicing. As a consequence of this fraud, "Sabbath-breaking," or "the desecration of the Sabbath," that is, every employment, even the slightest, that is useful or pleasant, all play, all music, all knitting, every worldly book on Sunday, is regarded in England as a grievous sin. Must not the common man there believe that, if he only keeps up "a strict observance of the holy Sabbath and a regular attendance on divine worship," as his spiritual guides tell him, if, that is, he is only inviolately and right thoroughly lazy on Sunday and does not fail to sit two hours in church to listen for the thousandth time to the "same Litany and join *a tempo* in mumbling the responses — he may well reckon elsewhere on indulgence for this or that license which he may

occasionally allow himself"? Many other passages to the like effect could be quoted, in which the judgment might appear as harsh and unsympathetic, and to pious ears, perhaps, as shocking as in those just given, but which none the less seize upon and forcibly present an aspect of truth, blindness to which would be utter folly. Enough, however, has been cited to convey the very distinct impression of the perversion to religious influences which a stupid and rigid formalism can effect when violently thrust *ab extra* upon a nature incorrigibly rebellious at the start against all control merely external. What would have been the result if, early in life, Schopenhauer had met with a presentation of religion more simple and sympathetic, we can but conjecture. Certainly, he was not wanting in those deeper mystical elements to which such a presentation is wont most strongly to appeal. As it was, he found religion everywhere, and in England more especially, identified with creed and ceremony, and went his way to wage a life-long warfare against what seemed to him, and no doubt to some extent was, superstition and bigotry, worthy only of ridicule and contempt.

I cannot bring these personal allusions to a close without referring, finally, to one other circumstance, which seems to me of no slight importance to a proper understanding of Schopenhauer's position: I mean the moral self-contradiction which he realized in his own spirit. There can be no question that Schopenhauer's is the most paradoxical philosophy of modern times; indeed, it may be doubted if in the whole history of thought there has ever appeared a system which not only ran so completely counter to natural instincts and the current views of things, but involved so many obvious internal contradictions. The inconsistencies within the system itself have been so frequently pointed out that to repeat them here, even if space allowed, would be but to slay the slain. Nor have unfriendly critics failed to call attention to the glaring inconsistency between the doctrine and the life, the self-renunciation and asceticism demanded by the former and the irascibility, self-overestimation, and very comfortable habits of Schopenhauer himself. But what has not been so often noticed is Schopenhauer's own consciousness of this contradiction, his deep sense of the inner conflict in his own spirit. Between the intellect and the will, which no one has so sharply distinguished, nor, with such fatal consequences, divided, existed in him an internecine warfare which allowed of no peace, a conflict all the more violent because of the surpassing strength of both contestants as they were

brought together on the field of consciousness of one such man of genius. By the insight of the intellect, it was declared to be necessary, in order to escape the terrible evils of existence, that the will-to-be, which is the source of existence, and, with existence, of evil, should be completely negated: it must be given its quietus, and must altogether cease; but the will-to-be was in Schopenhauer peculiarly potent: he was a man of strong passions and of a self-asserting individuality altogether remarkable. He found in himself no means of bringing this conflict to an issue. It was a burden upon his spirit, a source of fresh conflict and of a deepened sense of isolation. "Never," writes his biographer, — "never shall I forget my friend as he once saw at my house Rancé's picture of the abbot of La Trappe, and, turning away with a gesture of pain, said: That is matter of grace!"¹ And he himself tells of similar emotions experienced in the presence of the picture of St. Jerome in the Dresden Gallery. Who does not know something of what these experiences mean? Schopenhauer has but more intensely realized, because more richly endowed than most men, the universal moral struggle of humanity and the universal longing for redemption. Inevitably do his experiences suggest those of another, who centuries earlier also discovered in himself a double nature, the flesh warring against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh, and amid the desire for good evil ever present. This man too found no power in himself strong enough to decide the issue, but, looking upon it as "matter of grace," cried out in anguish of soul, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" How like the experiences, and how world-wide different the conclusions! For while Schopenhauer, seeking salvation only as a cessation of the conflict, and recognizing no redeeming efficacy but that of his own will to negate will, confessedly fails utterly in that, St. Paul, yielding himself to the inspiration of a Divine Love, finds strength made perfect in his weakness and, in "the spirit of life which is in Christ Jesus," unflinching in its joyousness, goes forth, clothed with power, as with the sun, to a life of heroic and successful service. Schopenhauer knows nothing of this heroism; life is to him either a tragedy to weep over or a comedy to laugh at. He knows nothing of the experience which produced it; had he known it, he would not have proclaimed so superficially as he did that willing existence is necessarily painful, nor have declared happiness to be merely absence of pain, and therefore capable of full realization only as a state of apathy.

¹ Gwinner, p. 396.

And his criticisms of religion, no longer wholly from without, would have gained through intimate acquaintance infinitely in justness, while losing the characteristics which they share in common with his philosophy generally of contradiction and excess.

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THE MUSLIM'S FAITH.

To most Christians Muhammadanism implies a polygamous people, a sensual Paradise and a warlike propaganda, and nothing more. And any attempt to remove, or even to modify, this impression is regarded with suspicion and distrust.

It will therefore surprise many to be told that polygamy was not *commended* by Muhammad,¹ that the sensual Paradise of the Korān occupies but a very secondary place in the Muslim's hope,² and that Islām has been no more propagated by the sword than Christianity itself. It is true that in founding the Saracen Empire in Asia the scimitar went hand in hand with the Koran, but it is equally true that in the establishment of Christianity in Europe the crosier but too often went hand in hand with the battle-axe. The very same "hammer" which smote the Saracens at Tours was successful in beating the Netherlands into Christianity. The difference must be found not in the practice, but in the principles, of the two faiths. When Wālid planted the standard of Islam on the battlements of Damascus he did it in accordance with the most solemn injunctions of his prophet; but when Bonifacius sanctioned the massacre of a hundred thousand Frisians in order to subdue the pagans of Northern Europe to the Christian faith, and when every Muhammadan inhabitant of Spain by the cruelties

¹ The injunction given in the Koran regarding polygamy is as follows: "O ye men! fear your Lord, who created you from one soul and created therefrom its mate. . . . Marry what seems good to you of women, two, three or four, but if ye fear that ye cannot be equitable, then marry only one." (See chapter iv. 1.) Herein Muhammad restricted not only the unlimited polygamy of ancient Arabia, but also that of the Jews, for in the Talmud it is said, "A man may marry many wives, for it is lawful to do so if he can provide for them. Nevertheless, the wise men have given good advice that a man should not marry more than four." (See *Arbaḥ Turim. Ev. Hazaer*, 1.)

² A sensual Paradise is seldom referred to in Muslim sermons and books, and does not form part of the Muslim creed, whilst the Day of Judgment with the reality of future punishment is a distinct article of the Muslim's creed.

of the Inquisition was compelled to embrace Christianity by force, it was done in flagrant violation of the sacred principles of the religion which the persecutors professed.¹

We are not, however, writing either a defense or an apology for Muhammadanism. We merely emphasize the fact that the inherent strength of the religious system of the Muslim must be found *not* in its future hope of sensual reward, *nor* in its power of the sword, but in those few eternal principles of God's own truth which characterized the teachings of Muhammad from the very beginning of his mission, although they have gradually become encrusted and crystallized within a vast amount of flagrant error and blind superstition.²

When we contemplate the stupendous fact that it is Islam which expelled a dark and feeble Christianity from Syria, Asia Minor, and the whole of Northern Africa, and planted itself firmly on the ruins of ancient Buddhism in India and Central Asia, we must seek the cause of this marvelous success in something more powerful and enduring in influencing the minds of men than mere brute force. "Force," said Abraham Lincoln when he was on the eve of a war, which in so far as it suppressed slavery was a *religious* war, "Force is all-conquering, but its victories are short-lived;" and we may be quite sure that Islam, as a religious system, would not have obtained the reverent submission of two hundred millions of the human race unless it had some great truths to teach.

The Muslim's creed, as all the world knows, is expressed in the simple formula, "There is no god but God, and Muhammad is his prophet." But the Muslim's faith, in its objective and subjective conditions, is expressed in a vast system of theology, of which the Christian world has been content to remain in almost total

¹ See Motley's *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, London, 1875, vol. i. p. 21; also, Circout's *Histoire des Arabes d'Espagne*, Paris, 1846, vol. ii. It does not redound to the credit of Christianity to investigate this question, for it is very evident that very many tribes and nations of Europe were converted to Christianity by force. As an able Muslim writer in a recent number of the *North American Review* tersely remarks, "Religious liberty is a modern invention unknown to the ancients." The Muslim Arabs were a tolerant race. The tyrants of Islam were the wild Turkomans of Central Asia, — tyrants alike to Muslim and Christian.

² A careful study of Islam will show that many of the popular superstitions of modern Muhammadanism were brought into the religion from its contact with idolatry. *Wahhabyism* is an effort to bring back the religion of the prophet to its primitive simplicity. See Hughes' *Dictionary of Islam* (Scribner & Welford, New York), p. 659.

ignorance.¹ For centuries the crusaders shed their best blood under the strange delusion that those chivalrous Saracens really believed that their prophet's coffin was suspended in mid-air at Medina, and the great English historian Gibbon thought he was stating an accepted truth when he wrote that Islam was a religion without a sacrifice.

Let us then honestly inquire what esoteric truths are found in the Muslim's faith which insure its vitality — what religious principles exist in this remarkable system which have secured for it so permanent a position among the three great religions of the world.

The Muslim believes in a *God*. Not the mystic essence of the idolatrous Hindu, — not the atheistic nonentity of the philosophical Buddhist, — but a real, living, personal God, the Creator, the Sustainer, and the Governor of the whole human race. The powerful language of the Koran enforces this truth, thousands and thousands of theological works which year after year emanate from the printers' presses of Stambul, Bolak, Bombay, and Lucknow present this truth to the mind in endless variety of human thought and conception, and the ninety-nine beads on the Muslim's rosary express the ninety-nine eternal attributes of the great Allah by words which are intended to convey to man's immortal soul the comprehensiveness and all-embracing character of the great Being who ordereth all things in heaven and in earth. He is *Al Adil* "the just," who weighs the balances, and *Al Muntakeem* "the avenger," who punishes the sinner; but he is also *Ar Rauf* "the kind one," and *Al Wudūd* "the loving one," who deals tenderly with the weaknesses of his people. Every chapter of the Koran, with one exception, begins with the declaration that God is both merciful and compassionate, and every time the pious Muslim prostrates himself in prayer he seeks both the forgiveness and the guidance of his God. The Muslim faith is a constant protest against atheism and an abiding assertion of the personality of the Divine Being.² When the armies of Mahmud of Ghaznee pressed down from their mountain fastnesses and declared war to the knife against the idolatry of the Buddhist [for the Buddhist as well as

¹ The theological literature consists of commentaries on the Koran, the traditions of Muhammad's sayings and doings with commentaries thereon, treatises on the exegesis of the Traditions and the Koran, works of jurisprudence, and works on scholastic theology. (See *Dictionary of Islam*, p. 634.)

² The question whether God has a special abode, and whether the terms "the sitting of God" and "the hand of God," which occur in the Koran, are to be taken literally, has given rise to a controversy in Islam as intense in its character as the eucharistic controversy between Romanists and Protestants.

the Brahmin has ever been an idolater in the sight of the Muslim], their strength lay far more in the proclamation of the existence of the great Allah than it did in any superiority of military prowess. And the mutilated hands and the broken noses of Buddhist idols, as now seen in the Buddhist Topes on the Afghan frontier of India, are pointed to by succeeding generations of Muhammadans with pride as evidences of God's abhorrence of idolatry rather than of the victory of Muslim arms. The Muhammadan raised his scimitar, it is true, in a war of conquest, but he raised it as the avenging arm of the Almighty, and it was there that his strength lay. It was the strength of religious conviction, and of his belief in a living God. But in approaching the monotheistic view of the Muslim it is not found that the Unitarian or Deist has any manifest advantage over the preacher of an orthodox faith, for the Muslim's conception both of religion and of God is very far from that of simple Deism or Unitarian belief. A very remarkable proof of this is found in the various mystic developments of belief among the Muhammadans of Persia, although it is equally evident in all parts of the Muslim world.

Rationalism finds no sympathy in Islam, and the story of the Incarnation is not some "strange thing" to the ear of one whose Koran asserts that Jesus was the "anointed one of God," the "Spirit of God," and the "Word." Nor is the Nicene symbol unintelligible to one who has become familiar with the assertion that the light of Muhammad existed before time,¹ and that the Koran is uncreated.² The Koran declaims against a Trinity³ only as Muhammad understood it, but the Muslim mind will not treat as monstrous the assertion that in the existence of the great Creator himself there is that law of multiplicity in unity analogous to that which is found in so many millions of his creatures. The rationalistic school of thought are forever reminding the Christian missionary that he would succeed better with the Muslim if he

¹ The *hakikat ul Muhammadiyah*, or the original essence of Muhammad (the *Nūr i Muhammad*, the light of Muhammad as it is expressed by the Persians), is believed to have been created before all things. There is a very curious account of this belief in Mr. Merrick's edition of the *Hiyat ul Kulub*, published in Boston, Mass., 1850.

² Abu Hanifah, the great Sunni doctor, held that the Koran was eternal in its original essence.

³ See Koran, chap. v. 77 : "The Messiah, the Son of Mary, is only a prophet, . . . his mother was a believer, they both ate food. — O Jesus, son of Mary, hast thou said unto mankind, take me and my mother as two gods besides God?"

could preach a simpler faith, but such an assertion is founded upon the most glaring ignorance of what Muhammadanism really is. Never was a religion more skillfully devised to resist the inroads of Rationalism than the faith of Islam.

The Muslim believes in a *divine revelation*. Being satisfied that there is a God, it seems to him the most reasonable thing in the world that God should reveal himself to mankind. The Muslim maintains that the Almighty has made himself known "in many portions and in divers manners." But inasmuch as the Muslim theory of inspiration is an all-comprehensive one, from the simplest intuition to the very voice of God, the title of *Nabi*, or "prophet," is applied to not fewer than 124,000 human beings who felt themselves inspired by a higher power. According to the Muslim, not merely Moses and Abraham were "prophets," but even Zoroaster, and Plato, and Alexander the Great, and he would therefore readily admit Cyrus, king of Persia, into the category of a "prophet" in virtue of his divine mission recorded in the Old Testament. But out of this galaxy of prophets there are said to be only 315 who were specially commissioned as *Rasul*, or "apostles," to certain tribes and people, and to eight of these only did the Almighty give such verbal communication as could be reduced to written "portions" and "books." Ten *Sahifahs*, or portions, were thus given to our first parent Adam, fifty to Seth, thirty to Enoch, and ten to Abraham, whilst the *Torah* was revealed to Moses, the *Zabûr*, or Psalms, to David, the *Evangel* to Jesus, and the *Koran* to Muhammad. But these portions and books were not necessarily laws, for all Muslims admit that the Psalms of David were merely devotional compilations.

But the Muslim theory of inspiration and revelation does not stop here. Had it done so there would have been no distinct assertion of the supreme and absolute authority of the Koran in matters of faith and practice. Muhammad is the "Seal of the prophets" to the abrogation of all other religious dispensations — a subtle dogma of Islam upon which all the demands of the religion are based.¹ This dogma is known among Muslim divines as "the promise and covenant" [*wadah wa misāk*] which God made with Adam immediately after the fall, as described in the Koran, chap. xxxiii. 7: "We entered into covenant with thee and with Noah, with Abraham, with Moses, and with Jesus." Taking this verse as the foundation of the dogma, the Muslim

¹ See the *Mishkat ul Masabah*, Arabic Edition. The chapter entitled *Bab ul Kadr*.

theologian asserts that from the beginning God established the covenant of promise which He sustained by six successive dispensations. It was received in Paradise by our first parent Adam, who is entitled "the chosen of God;" it was then continued to Noah, "the preacher of God;" then to Abraham, "the friend of God;" then to Moses, "the converser with God;" then to Jesus, "the Spirit of God;" and finally to Muhammad, "the apostle of God." Thus making six dispensations altogether, each abrogating the preceding one, until the covenant was sealed in Muhammad himself.¹

Upon this theory of the "eternal covenant" of God is based a vast system of theology which is expounded in thousands of volumes, and which forms one of the most attractive subjects for the contemplation of a Muslim divine. It is not our intention in our present article to enter upon the Muslim controversy, but the Christian theologian will at once perceive that it is here where the real controversy lies. Does Islam bear evidence of being a superior dispensation to that of Jesus Christ? Did not the "covenant of promise" culminate when the Saviour of mankind cried, "It is finished"?

The Muslim believes in a *future life*. Not the future life of the Buddhist, which by a prolonged process of metempsychosis gets rid of both the individual identity and of the individual responsibility of the human soul in a future existence, but in the future life of the New Testament in which all men shall give an account of the things done in the body. To the Muhammadan mind the day of judgment, and hell, and heaven are real and life-like; so real, in fact, that the ingenuity of the Muslim theologian has been much exercised to explain away their very literal character. The sensual character of the Koranic Paradise is but too well known, but inasmuch as it has been the custom of the Oriental in all ages to express the mystic love of that which is divine by the passionate love of earthly relationships, it must ever be a question as to how far the Prophet intended his description of Paradise to be taken literally. But the hell, or rather "*the fire*," as the

¹ The six founders of the six dispensations are entitled in Arabic as follows:—

Adam Saḥīyū'llah, "the chosen of God."

Nah Nabīyū'llah, "the preacher of God."

Ibrahām Khalīlū'llah, "the friend of God."

Mūsā Kalīmū'llah, "the converser with God."

'Isa Rūḥū'llah, "the Spirit of God."

Muhammad Rasūlū'llah, "the messenger of God."

Koran expresses it, is a real literal fire, through which even the unfaithful Muslim must pass ere he reaches the portals of everlasting bliss. The eschatology of Islam is, however, beset with the same difficulties as that of the Christian, for the Arabic *Khalid*, just as its Greek equivalent *αἰώνιος*, is capable of many interpretations from that of a mere cycle or age to a period of endless duration. Ibn Arābi, a Muslim theologian of the thirteenth century, as well as the great commentator Al-Baizawi, maintain that *Khalid* was nothing more than an age or era, whilst several Muslim philosophers, although asserting their belief in an endless fire, have taught that, as the body of the eternally damned must in time become assimilated with the fire itself, the condition of those eternally lost becomes one of absolute repose. But the commonly received opinion among the orthodox is, that whilst there is a purgatory of fire for sinful Muslims, there is a never-ending hell for those who cannot recite the Muslim creed when interrogated in their graves by the two angels of fearful countenance, *Munkir* and *Nakir*, and who have therefore no inheritance in the "promise and the covenant."

The Muslim believes in *salvation by faith*, — faith not in Muhammad, but in Islam,¹ — a faith which is defined by theologians as "the confession of the lips, and the confidence of the heart." It is divided into *Imām Mujmal*, "simple faith," and *Imām Mufassal*, "comprehensive faith." The first being a simple expression of belief in Islam, the second a formal declaration of assent to the six articles of the Muslim creed.² Those who express their belief in God and the Prophet are considered to be in a state of grace, no matter what their actions may be; but in the future life the sins even of sincere Muslims must be purged away in the fires of purgatory ere they pass into the Paradise of God. According to the traditional sayings of Muhammad it is very evident that he endeavored to keep his followers up to a fair standard of morality by proclaiming a very literal "fire" in hell as the punishment for sin, and by enunciating an elaborate system of rewards

¹ There has been endless discussion regarding justification by faith among Muslims just as among Christians. For example, the sect known as *Amiliyah* say faith is simply good works; the *Tariktyah* say nothing but faith is necessary for salvation; while the *Shakhtyah* say it is impossible to define what faith is, and in this way there are at least some eight or ten sects on the question of justification by faith. (See *Dictionary of Islam*, p. 569.)

² Six articles of faith: (1) God; (2) the angels of God; (3) the books of God; (4) the Prophets of God; (5) the day of judgment; (6) the predestination of good and evil.

for good deeds.¹ For example, he says: "When a man embraces Islam and obeys its precepts, God will cover his former sins and give him ten rewards for every good deed up to seven hundred, and even more than that. Whereas the punishment for his misdeeds is only as one to one unless God in his mercy pass them by altogether." And there are hundreds, if not thousands, of such sayings of the Prophet thus recorded, which prove that it was his constant effort to stimulate the hearts of men to good deeds by distinct promises of present and future reward. Some of these sayings are very beautiful. As, for example, in his explanation of what almsgiving is: "If you smile kindly on the face of a brother, it is almsgiving; if you exhort men to good actions, it is almsgiving; if you restrain men from sin, it is almsgiving; if you show a man a road when he has lost it, it is almsgiving; if you assist a blind man on his way, it is almsgiving; if you remove a thorn out of a brother's finger, it is almsgiving; if you assist a brother in drawing water from a well, it is almsgiving." Muslim theology is replete with such quotations from the sayings of Muhammad, and the traveler in Oriental lands is often reminded of the kindly influence of such simple ethical teachings on the minds of uncivilized races. Islam, with all its shortcomings, has a very strict moral code,² and if it has failed in raising the hearts of men to the high level of a spiritual Christianity, it must be because it does not possess in the character of Muhammad what Christianity possesses in the character of the Divine Jesus — a living example of purity and truth.

The Muslim believes in a *sacrifice*. So far from Islam being, as the historian Gibbon says, "a religion without a sacrifice," the great central feast of Islam is a day of sacrifice strictly observed throughout the length and breadth of the Muhammadan world. The *Id ul Azha*, which is known in Turkey and Egypt as the *Bairām*, not only forms part of the ceremonies of the Meccan pilgrimage, but is observed by every faithful Muslim on the tenth day of the twelfth month of every year. And it is a notable fact that whilst Muhammad professed to abrogate the Jewish ritual

¹ Practical religion in Islam has been formulated into five articles: (1) The recital of the creed, There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His messenger; (2) the five stated periods of prayer; (3) the thirty days' fast in the month of Ramazan; (4) the payment of the legal alms; (5) the performance of a pilgrimage to Mecca once in a lifetime.

² The *Shari'ah*, or moral code of Islam, is divided into five sections: Belief, moralities, devotions, transactions, and punishments, and its enactments are very strict and exacting. (See *Dictionary of Islam*, p. 285.)

and ignored the doctrine of the Atonement as taught in the New Testament, denying even the very fact of our Saviour's crucifixion,¹ he made this "day of sacrifice" the great central festival of his religion; thus unconsciously bearing witness to the doctrine of revealed truth that "without shedding of blood there is no remission." The annual sacrifice for every family or household must be either a goat, a sheep, a cow, or a camel of full age and without spot or blemish. In Muslim theology there are six words used for sacrifice,² but the most common one is the Hebrew *kurbān*, expressing that which "approaches near," whilst the Hebrew *zabḥ* or *zebach* is the ordinary word for slaying animals for food, thus perpetuating the sacrificial idea in the daily life of the Muslim even as it did in the daily life of the Jew. The crucifixion of Christ is the missing link in the Muslim's creed, and it is here that the Christian missionary will find a wide field for a literature suited to the spiritual yearnings of the Muslim mind.

"The sacrifice" as it now stands in the Muslim's faith is an anomaly, and it is Christianity alone which can supply the key of interpretation to that which at present is an unmeaning ordinance in the religion of the prophet of Arabia. The Muhammadans of to-day "ignorantly" bear witness to the crucified Christ in the bloody sacrifice on the plains of Mina even as the Athenians of old "ignorantly" worshiped the true God at a heathen altar in the court of the Areopagites, and it is for the Christian Church, possessing as she does the divine oracles, to point out where the Arabian prophet departed from the path of God when he instituted a sacrifice, without any expiatory significance in its teachings, and made it a great central ordinance in his vast religious system.

The Muslim believes *in prayer*. Five times a day³ does he prostrate himself in humble adoration to his God, and seek both for-

¹ The crucifixion of Christ is thus referred to in the Koran: "The Jews plotted, but God plotted. Remember when God said, O Jesus! verily I will cause thee to die, and I will take the cup to myself, and deliver thee from those who believe not." (Chap. iii. 47.) "Yet they slew him not, and they crucified him not, but only his likeness." (Chap. iv. 155.)

² *Zabḥ*, to slay by piercing; *kurbān*, approaching near; *nahr*, to slay by stabbing; *uzhiyah*, morning sacrifice; *hady*, that which is presented; *mansak*, a rite.

There is also the sacrifice of a goat at the birth of every child, which is called the sacrifice of *Akeekah*. The idea of sacrifice is therefore one very common to Islam.

³ The five periods of prayer are not enjoined in the Koran, but in the Traditions. They are before sunrise, at midday, in the afternoon, after sunset, and at night. (For the Muslim Liturgy, see *Dictionary of Islam*, p. 464.)

givenness and guidance. Much has been written to show that the prayer of the Muslim is a mere form, but surely not more so than that of millions of those who call themselves Christians. It is undoubtedly an unfortunate circumstance that the Muslim liturgy is recited in Arabic, a language but imperfectly understood by the people. But Arabic is still a living language, and it must be borne in mind that all the theological terms in the system are expressed in that language and remain untranslated in every spoken tongue, so that the Arabic liturgy of the Muslim is not as meaningless to many as the Latin liturgy of the Roman Church. In a religious system propagated as Islam is propagated, a liturgical form of worship becomes absolutely necessary, and it must be admitted that there is scarcely a sentence in the whole liturgy which a Christian man could not utter. At the close of each service the worshiper raises his heart in silent and extempore supplication, which, according to the sayings of Muhammad, is "the very marrow of prayer." The Muhammadan prayers are not as mechanical as the praying wheel of the Buddhist, nor, in fact, as much so as the saint worship of a very large proportion of the Christian world; and in days when men of science scoff at prayer and question its practical utility, we cannot but be thankful that Islam is still teaching so many of the millions of uncivilized humanity to believe in its reality and power. In fact, very much that has been said regarding the mechanical nature of Muslim worship has been said by those whose habits of thought and mental training have not fitted them to appreciate true "devotional life" of men who have a firm and ever-abiding belief in the existence of a supreme being. To the Occidental, God is an occasional thought, a Sunday meditation; to the Oriental He is all and in all. It was the Oriental that gave to the world its highest conception of God, and it is a subject of devout thankfulness that the prophet of Arabia retained so many high conceptions of the Divine Being in the religious system of Islam. At the same time it must be admitted that the constant round of devotional forms, which in so many cases are but the service of the lips to a very great extent, accounts for the fact that among the majority of Muhammadans religion and true piety stand very far apart. It is in this respect that Muhammadanism contrasts unfavorably with Christianity, but how far the better condition of things among Christian nations can be accounted for by the depth of religious feeling on the one hand and by the surrounding restraints of civilized society on the other we will not attempt to determine. To the cosmopolitan observer it seems difficult to cast a stone.

The Muslim believes in the *absolute predestination* of good and evil. No theological dogma has been more warmly discussed in Islam than this, and the various schools of thought have expounded the doctrine with great liberality of view from fatalism to free will. But the teaching of the Koran, and consequently the teaching of Muhammad, seems clear and definite — "All things have been created with a fixed decree," — "God misleadeth whom He will and whom He will He guideth." In fact, it is the very basis of the religion itself, for "Islam," the word generally used by Muslims to express their religion, implies "resignation" to the divine will — the fixed decrees of the Almighty. It was this doctrine, combined with a belief in the existence of an all-powerful God, which nerved the early Muslim conquerors to action. They were but instruments in a MIGHTY HAND. Did the unbelievers reject the prophet's mission — "Their eyes were veiled from any warning and they had no power to hear." Did the enemies of Islam fall beneath the Muslim sword — "God slew them, and those shafts were God's not thine." Did the zealous warrior give his life's blood as the road of God — "No one dieth without God's permission." So saith the great oracle. But the traditional sayings of the prophet are even more explicit. "From the beginning God created one family for Paradise and another for hell." The moral or rather immoral effect of this awful doctrine is but too evident in the every-day lives of Muslims. For whilst on the one hand *Islam*, as expressing a true spirit of resignation to God's will, is a beautiful religious conception, Islam as implying a belief in the fixed decrees of God is nothing but a fatalism which enervates and demoralizes the social and national life of all Muslim people. It is this which has rendered the elaborate, and in some respects strict, moral code of Islam completely powerless in restraining the violent passions of man.

The Muslim believes in the *second coming of Christ*. The Koran has no definite teaching on the subject, but the Traditions have many references to our Lord's second advent, whilst a vacant spot in the "chamber" at Medina next to the grave of Omer is reserved for the final burial-place of Jesus after his second appearance upon the earth. The Scriptural view of the gospel predictions of Christ's second coming is strangely perverted, but every true Muslim is taught to look forward to the second coming of "the Christ."

The Muslim believes in the *need of divine grace*. His Koran begins with the prayer, which he recites some forty times a day,

"Guide thou us in the straight path, the path of those to whom thou art gracious." And the whole system of the Sufi Muslim is founded upon a belief in what the Puritans called "preventive grace." The Arabic word generally used to express it in Christian books is *fazl*, a term which in its literal sense implies that which is "redundant," but it is more correctly expressed by the Arabic *sayz*. Every religious Muslim believes that it is impossible to perform good works without this *preventive grace*, and the Sufistic treatises of the Muhammadans are full of the most spiritual teachings on the subject, clouded of course with the necessary mists of error belonging to a false system of belief. For example, a well-known Muhammadan writes, taking the thirtieth verse of the fifteenth chapter of the Koran, "I have breathed into it my spirit," and remarks, "we do not interpret this of *life*, but of the *spirit*. Now before a man can receive this spirit he must have a capacity, and this capacity can only be acquired by purging oneself of sin and all sinful dispositions, and by adorning oneself with the precious jewels of a holy life." This pursuit of a holy life is called *At Tareekah*, "the path." It is common to Buddhism and to Islam. But the Atheistic system of Gautama has nullified its influence on the life by making it a purely pantheistic conception, whilst the God-believing system of Muhammad has brought it nearer to the Christian belief. It is, however, difficult sometimes to distinguish between the pantheism of the Buddhist and that of the Sufi mystic. But an impartial critic must candidly admit that there are no evidences of pantheism in the theology of the Koran.

Such is but a very brief outline of those salient points in Islam which seem to touch most closely upon revealed truth. A full consideration of them within the limits of a single article is impossible. But these are suggestive. There is enough to show that in dealing with the Muhammadan religion the Christian controversialist will find many esoteric truths whereon to raise a superstructure of a higher faith. In ordinary Christian polemics it has been usual to take the Koran piecemeal with the avowed intention of exposing its inconsistencies, and to attack (often most unjustly) the character of Muhammad in order to prove that so "earthen a vessel" could not possibly have been the means of conveying any form of truth to mankind. Such methods are of course most offensive to Muhammadans, and it is not difficult to see that they must but too often defeat their own ends. In the first place, very many arguments urged against the inspiration of the Koran must of

necessity be common arguments against any written revelation, and in the second place it is difficult to see how the character of Muhammad can affect the authority of his message any more than the character of David, Balaam, or Solomon can affect the truths they uttered. Besides this, it but too often repels a spirit of inquiry among more reverent Muhammadans. Nay, more, it is a method totally at variance with that of the great apostle to the Gentiles, who when he stood on the very spot at Athens which had been made memorable by a long series of the most awful crimes, and was still debased by the most abject idolatry, could address a heathen audience, in the very presence of their idol temples, as "too carefully religious," and remind them that even there they ignorantly worshiped the only true God. The world is not convinced by argument but by assertion, — the assertion, as well as the reiteration, of strong and earnest convictions, — and this was most certainly the method employed by the early missionaries of the Christian faith. The Christian when he is brought face to face with a religious Muslim teacher is not dealing with an Ingersoll or a Bradlaugh, but with a reverent and an honest believer in a God and a revealed religion.

The Muslim moral code is founded on the Mosaic law. It is in fact a reproduction of it. And any modification of it effected by the Arabian legislator was honestly intended to be an improvement in the direction of mercy and goodness. The Mosaic law whilst it did not encourage polygamy never limited it, but the Muslim law did.¹ The Jewish law of divorce, "suffered" as our Lord tells us by Moses on account of the hardness of the Jewish heart, was, according to the interpretation of Hillel² and other learned doctors, a far more unmerciful institution than the divorce of Islam. And the slavery of Muhammadan law is a more merciful and just institution than that of the Jew,³ not to speak of that which had the sanction of American Puritanism with its Protestant faith and an "open Bible."

¹ Among the Arabs previous to the establishment of Islam there was the most open license regarding marriage and divorce.

² For the Muslim law of Divorce see *Dictionary of Islam*, p. 86.

³ In Muslim law, if a slave can redeem himself (or herself) it is the duty of the master to grant the emancipation. When a slave-girl has a child by her master, both she and the child are *ipso facto* free. The kindness of Muslims to their slaves has never been questioned. Slavery, however, is in complete harmony with the spirit of Islam, while it is abhorrent to the spirit of Christianity. And yet the most unjust and cruel slavery the civilized world has ever known was Christian slavery, and not the slavery of either the Jew or the Muslim.

But the Word of God never presents the Mosaic law as a perfect institution — it made nothing perfect, but it brought in a better hope, and the imperfect first covenant was taken away when the perfect second covenant was established.

It is said that Muhammadanism fails to regenerate mankind. But so did Judaism. It would be as impossible to civilize and regenerate the world on the strict unbending lines of Moses as it is with the hard and fast legislation of Muhammad. If Islam fails in its mission to mankind, it fails simply because it is not Christianity. Islam has done its work far better than Buddhism, or Hinduism, or Sikhism, or Confucianism, or Touism, but inasmuch as it is anti-Christian, — “denying the Father and the Son,” — it cannot possibly give a “light” to the world which it does not itself possess. The ideal life of the Christian is the highest type of manhood — a redeemed soul sanctified. The ideal life of the Muslim is, taken at its best, a compromise — a religious devotee with his face Mecca-wards, yearning for a closer union with God as he prostrates in the direction of a black stone in a heathen temple and cries, *Allaho Akbar* — “God is great.”

Thomas Patrick Hughes.

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HAVE WE DATA FOR DETERMINING THE DURATION OF HUMAN EXISTENCE?

It would appear that the first step of obedience to the dictum “Know thyself” should be the discovery of the duration of human existence. All other knowledge seems ill-proportioned and useless until we have learned the great laws of the perspective of time. Life itself may be a farce, a melodrama, or a tragedy, according to the different views held by the actor regarding life’s persistence. There is no question which more needs the help of modern science than the question, “Is the soul immortal?” The new psychology promised to give aid in the solution of the problem. But so far it has not kept its word. Neither the microscope nor the careful observation of consciousness seems to have gone far in determining the great question of life and of death. It is literally true that most of what has been said in the last 2500 years on Immortality is contained, and in its clearest and finest form, in the *Phaedo* of Plato, and in a few short, scattered passages in the New

Testament. But these are practically elaborations of the argument from desire (we long for continued existence; therefore we shall continue to exist), or statements in simple form that belief in Jesus Christ constitutes a claim upon Immortality. It is fair to say that to-day neither argument satisfies the mind. Perhaps neither has ever done so. But the restlessness of the race under the uncertainty which envelops the logical outcome of life, as well as what we call its actual outcome, was never so evident as now. Both in the church and out of it this uneasiness is growing. The theological differences of opinion which mark this age all have their root here, though no theologian acknowledges as much. The practical psychologists are the class of experts to whom the world naturally looks for satisfaction. They alone seem to ignore the world's passionate search after data on which to base a calculation as to the future of human life. In default of an authoritative word from a trained specialist like Spencer or Darwin or Huxley or Wallace, the object of this essay is simply to attempt the use of the scientific method upon such large data as are ready for the mind not specially trained to such research. In such an attempt by an amateur in the science of mind some loose use of terms and much bungling illustration must be pardoned. If by this effort to combine the scientific method with plain common sense some hint is given of the direction in which better qualified minds may work, the writer's ambition will be satisfied.

It seems that some hypothesis of the future should lie waiting for the discoverer's hand which shall be as satisfactory and as self-justifying as the hypothesis of the past which we call the Theory of Evolution. The Persistence of Force is now a generally acknowledged law. This fact has a vast significance in psychology. What we call mind certainly represents force. It is a simple absurdity to believe every energy of the universe conserved except that most potent energy which works in the human intellect. It is of prime importance, however, that we infer neither too much nor too little from the persistence of force. It is folly to argue that because force persists it will necessarily keep a certain specified form. To use for a moment the dialect of the theologian, there is a wide difference between Immortality and what is known as Personal Immortality. The great law of persistence will not go one inch towards proving the continuance of individual consciousness, and the psychologist who tries to utilize the argument for that purpose commits logical suicide.

But we return to our statement that mind is bound to persist,

and we assert this to be a fact of equal importance whether we hold the theory of the Christian philosopher that soul is a divine gift, or whether we hold the materialist's theory that mind is the most complicated manifestation of that mode of matter which we call motion. That motion cannot perish is a truth so vast that men but slowly grasp it in all its bearings. But in a decade we shall come not only to assent to it, but to realize it. It must be accepted, as we accept the law of gravitation, — practically. Men must square their course by the fact which they realize. The persistence of all force must be relied upon as the mariner relies upon his compass. The compass may look like a miracle to the tyro; but to the pilot it is as natural as sea or earth or sky.

But the end of the labyrinth is not yet reached. Suppose we grant that all the force which goes to-day in our race to the making of states of consciousness, to the investigation of profound natural truths, to the establishment of governments, to the enjoyments of social and domestic life, must go on in its resistless and undying current forever, we are still fronted by the staggering question, "Yet what is the significance of human life?" Man fights, builds, trades, loves, hates, struggles, fails, succeeds, aspires, and, most inexplicable of all, he is conscious that he does all these, and the acts seem to him important, often vitally necessary. Modern science leads us to expect a consistency in the adjustments of the universe. One by one laws reveal themselves which show how coherent is the nature of things. Evolution makes all history intelligible. But can there be a complex and measureless diffusion of force for no reason except that it may be again gathered and concentrated? Is the logic of the world no more serious than that of the idle child who scatters a basket of chips that he may pick them up again? If human life has no more significance than the life of the flies buzzing about the tempting, fatal cup of treacle, here is the most frightful mal-adjustment of effort to result. Let us repeat that every achievement of science in the past half-century prepares us to doubt that we have reached the correct explanation of the meaning of conscious human life when we say that its differentiation has gone on only to prepare for a most complete disintegration. Economy, not wild waste, seems to be the law of the universe. But if there is no outcome as a result of the enormous sum of human effort, we have a single instance of a waste which sets at naught all previous economies.

What hypothesis, then, may we use to solve the riddle? What is the meaning of this struggling human life? What profits it?

Toward what sea run the countless streams of individual effort? If they rise only to be lost again in a tangled marsh, they are the solitary instance in nature. We must not expect to solve the problem at a glance. But we may hit upon "a working hypothesis." It will be remembered that but a few years ago Evolution was so called, and justly. We must look for a supposition which will explain the greatest number of facts.

In observing species closely related we see that the highest or rarest characteristic of the lower species gives the hint of the change to be made in the next species. The higher grows upon the higher. The appearance of a nervous system in one creature denotes a more complete nervous organization in the species just above in the scale. The hint always fulfills itself. It becomes the habit of the naturalist to observe this set of functions most closely. Now let us ask what is the most lofty, most characteristic and so most significant function of man, in distinction from the race just below him. It appears at once in the highest power of the human mind, — intelligent and intelligible *choice*. The world presents unique opportunity for the exercise of that function. From the instant when the baby prefers its mother's arms to those of a stranger, the human creature finds his real life in the exercise of choice. He is largely distinguished from the lower animals by the fact that his choices are governed by complex motives, theirs by simple ones. In other words, it is tolerably easy to tell what even the most intelligent dog will do under given circumstances. His action is along a straight line. But it is very hard to tell what our nearest friend will do under given circumstances. His action is along a curve whose equation we do not know. But in spite of fate, as we say, the man does in the long run what he chooses to do. The moment the attention is called to the huge proportion of life which is made up of choices, we can but feel that there must be some vital if subtle connection between the logical outcome of life and the choosing power. Mr. Arnold reiterated for years that conduct is three fourths of life. Choice is all conduct and more, for much choice never gets out into action. Does it not then appear possible that choice may be the pivot upon which force turns? This life is a test. The duration of it is truly brief, but *it determines the direction of the persisting force*. If this is true, we see at once that this world instead of presenting a small field for human powers offers a vast arena. The most trivial decision becomes important. In order that choice should be something more than a mere child's make-believe, a

stake of enormous magnitude has been set upon the play. A man may use his best powers and have none too much certainty of winning. Indeed, so essential was it to the universal economy that men should feel the seriousness of earthly, human choice, that the so-called religious instinct was overweighted in man, and he has been a fanatic far more often than he has been an indifferentist.¹ Up to the nineteenth century more men have overestimated the seriousness of life than have remained cold to its stimulus.

Two points of vantage have now been gained in our argument. Force persists. Mind is a form of force. It may at least be asserted as a working hypothesis that choice in this world determines the future direction in which this force is to persist. But, so far, nothing has been said to prove the continuance of individual consciousness. Still another step may be taken in the line of modern science. There is yet another regard in which man differs widely from the lower animals in his history. In all alike, the supreme achievement of the centuries is the perfection of the individual. But, with man, advance is marked not only by a constantly increasing complexity of function, but also by a larger and larger differentiation among the individuals of the species. The most careful cultivation of the lower animals produces a Type. In human history the strength of the centuries is concentrated upon the development of a Person.

Here, at last, even the rashest writer must pause for a definition. What is a Person, — in distinction, perhaps, from a Type? Again, it is both easy and natural to point out that for purposes of this argument the definitions of two widely differing schools of philosophy might be used. The theologian will define a Person as a single, divinely created soul. A materialist may define a Person as the most highly developed, the most complex, the most nearly unique manifestation of that mode of matter which we call motion. Now whether we speak the language of the church, and declare that men have more *soul* now than they had in the ninth century, or whether we speak the language of science and say that men have differentiated rapidly in the last ten centuries, our meaning is the same. The individual man is getting more and more complex and so more important. We have nearly overlooked one significant fact in natural science. It is a fact all the same. There is infinitely more difference between man and man than between dog and dog, or between monkey and monkey. The

¹ Other examples of over-provision for a great purpose are not wanting. To some of these Emerson has called attention.

environment of the brute is constantly making for uniformity in the species. The circumstances of man's life steadily contrive to render the individual unique. A dog accordingly finds his keenest pleasure in doing what he is most accustomed to do, — whether it is to carry his master's dinner-pail, to retrieve a partridge, or to rescue a snow-bound traveler. Man, on the other hand, in his most cultured form, seeks invariably the novel. He finds delight in the possible new combinations of a pack of fifty-two cards. He travels, he explores, he experiences, with rapture. Indeed, a recent "highly evolved" author boldly says that a cultured man is one who has no habits. Exactly the opposite would be true, it is evident, of a "cultured" horse or dog.

A hundred facts of modern civilization show the new importance attaching to the individual. The hold upon educators which has been gained by the Elective System is one of the most significant. Each man must now be treated like a fresh and unique problem. Individual preference must be conserved and utilized as a motive power. The recoil of the cultivated mind against socialism is another evidence of the suspicion which follows any plan for the suppression of individual enterprise. The method of the popular novelist is another witness to the claim of the single soul upon our interest. He fairly plucks out the heart of the mystery of his hero or heroine. More practical psychology is put into one modern novel than would have been required for the making of all Scott's works. To-day we demand the most careful study of character, — that is, of the unit of mind.

All these and a hundred other phenomena lead us to the suggestion of another inference. All the forces at work upon human life on this planet seem to bend themselves to developing a most complex, unique, and effective creature. We call it the Individual Man. It is unlike in its highest qualities anything else in the universe. Two drops of water mingle inseparably; two gases combine; two blades of grass are indistinguishable from each other; two chickens or two kittens are often nearly so. Even among men individuals of the lower classes strongly resemble each other. We say that they all look alike. But no stretch of the imagination can conceive another manifestation of force like that found in the mind of a Darwin or a George Eliot. There is an uncombining, insoluble, unvarying quality about these lofty individual minds. One knows that the woman who could write, "O may I join the choir invisible," would be a conscious and recognizable voice in the music of that choir in spite of her belief to the contrary.

To return to the most prosaic statement of this gigantic, if familiar fact, it is either the unobserving or the unscientific who can believe that all the force which has been going for centuries to the development of the Individual is waste force. Not only has the single human mind become a power, it has become a recognized power. To-day the most distinguishing facts of history and civilization stand pointing to the complex product, the single human mind, and indicating that as it has traveled long and far from unthinking homogeneousness toward conscious complexity, so it will continue its journey onward, not backward. Force lasts: mind lasts: earth's life may determine simply in what form this inevitable, unending existence begins its next phase; and, finally, by all the analogies of science we may infer that the preservation of the Individual is the end toward which all the wondrous development of the Individual tends. The stream of human life does not flow onward like a great river, only to lose itself in the sea — even in the sea of Love. No figure which attempts to describe the destiny of man by recourse to physical analogy is worth much. For the very deepest fact of the relation of man's life to the material life by which he is surrounded is the fact that all material life is at work making him unlike itself.

The fullness of time has come when men most skeptical of so-called religious truth may at least believe that their own conscious existence will go on through endless æons of constantly developing life. The day has gone by when the most hopeful word about the future from the lips of a thinker and scholar shall be, "I half suspect some of us pessimists are in for the greatest surprise of our lives when we die;" or, "Yet I *do* kind of believe in immortality after all!" The hour is at hand when the dim longing of the agnostic and the glowing hope of the Christian shall give way to the conscious, steady, working conviction of each thoughtful soul that the extinction of its individuality is as impossible under the laws of the universe as the annihilation of an atom. With this conviction men will gain immeasurably in calmness, in persistence, in seriousness, in content. If to these acquisitions is added in the minds of many a deepened gratitude that the gift of eternal life is made evident through the Christ, as well as through Science, will it be strange?

Heloise Edwina Hersey.

STOCK COMPANIES AS DISTRIBUTERS OF WEALTH.

IN what proportion shall the product of industry be distributed among the classes taking part in production? What part of the value created is due to labor expended? What part to the tools and material used? What further part to the skill of the manager?

Evidently the man making baskets in his own cabin does not need to ask these questions. The value of his baskets is doubtless owing to his labor, his skill, and the materials he has collected from some swamp. He takes the whole product, and no one asks for a distribution. This was the primitive condition of industry, the blissful golden age to which Rousseau and Ruskin would have us return.

From this the landlord early emerges: the basket-maker pays rent to the owner of his shop, or of the marsh where the willows grow. Something of the value of the baskets goes to another as his right and first claim. How much shall it be? Certainly just as much as the landlord can exact; society has entered upon a state of economic war. We cannot call it by any softer name with the history of Ireland before us.

A third stage is reached when our basket-maker persuades another man to help him make baskets in return for a certain portion of the product. Here again the question arises, "How large shall this portion be?" that is, what wages shall be paid.

There are now three parties to the distribution of the product, landlord, laborer, and capitalist-manager. Until quite recent times this was the prevailing method of conducting business. From an economic point of view this union of capitalist and manager in the same person is open to the very serious objection that the possession of capital does not guarantee the possession of brains to manage it, that is, a capitalist is not *ipso facto* a manager. Capital is therefore mismanaged to a frightful extent. Probably ninety per cent. of the men who engage in business ventures are unsuccessful.

A natural solution of the difficulty was for men who had capital to hand it to men who had brains to manage for them. This fourth stage gives us the orthodox list of parties to the distribution of the product of industry, as given, for example, by Walker:—

- "1. The landlord, receiving rent.
- "2. The capitalist, receiving interest.
- "3. The employer, receiving profits.
- "4. The employed laborer, receiving wages."

Are there no economic objections to such a method of distribution? Grave ones suggest themselves.

As regards capital: —

A. It is evident that it will be largely a matter of chance, local acquaintance, etc., whether capital will find the man with brains. The capital will therefore remain unused, to the lessening of the wealth of the community. Or the man found to employ the capital may be unsatisfactory; he is only the best of a limited number. Hence the capital is inadequately employed or wasted.

B. Inasmuch as modern inventions compel business to be done upon a large scale, the small capital of the humbler man will remain unused, — in the aggregate a vast sum of idle wealth, and unexerted power. One hundred or five hundred dollars will be put in the strong-box, while ten thousand dollars will be profitably invested, that is, will create wealth.

As regards the employer or manager: —

C. He cannot always find capital in desired amount at the time when he needs to use it.

D. He does not belong to any specialized class in the community, and appears more or less of an adventurer; scarcely more secure than one in our civil service.

As regards the laborer: —

E. The non-use or bad use of capital lessens the potential competition for his services, that is, lowers wages.

F. He is unable to use his small savings as a source of profit, that is, he cannot become a capitalist — though to become a capitalist is to ennoble him.

G. His relation to his employer is a purely personal one, and subject to bitter, dangerous personalities.

H. His employer is one who receives the profits, that is, gets all out of him he can for his own advantage. Political economists may tell the laborer that his share of the product is vastly greater than his employer's,¹ which is true; and no doubt it is capable of

¹ According to the first Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor, 1886, — the per cent. of total product going to labor as compared with that going to capital, — in coal mining, province of Hainault, Belgium, during twenty-three years has varied as follows: Labor, 100 — 62.71 per cent.; capital, 37.29 — 0 per cent. While in the United States, in the

proof that profits tend constantly downward toward the current rate of interest as their limit; and this competition of employees for profits is also a competition for labor, so that the surplus, after paying rent, interest, etc., *does* go to the laboring class in the long run.¹ (Cf. Walker.)

But while this is true of a long period of time and of labor as a class, the working of the law in any individual case is imperceptible. The laborer knows that he is paid a fixed sum, and that an enhanced value in the product, due to more faithful and intelligent labor, to a better market, etc., is appropriated by the employer.

The economist replies that next year's wages are adjusted to this year's production, so that increased wages claim the profit shown on this year's books.

This ideal result is, however, prevented by the very number of the laborers; the supply is greater than the places to be filled; the employer pays only what he must pay; and if the old body of laborers will not work at the old wages, a new body will be glad to do so. Or if not, last year's account is closed and the profits pocketed, and using them to employ labor the coming year does not make them thereby the property of the laborer; they are simply invested as an addition to capital. Indeed, the pressure of labor will never reduce profits until Malthus's law becomes a part of the laborer's creed. It is a truism that the competition of laborers increases profits by lowering wages, while the competition of managers reduces profits by raising wages or employing more laborers.

To meet such objections as the above to the distribution of the product of industry into four parts, the ready wit of man invented the stock company, — an institution whose revolutionary influence upon our entire civilization has not received half the attention it deserves.

Economically, stock companies enable capital

1. To get into use readily even in small sums.
2. To find competent management by the establishment of a class of managers.

Woolen industry, labor and materials take from 74.09 to 100 per cent.

Silk	"	"	"	"	85.84 to 100	"
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Metal	"	"	"	"	64.38 to 100	"
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Cotton	"	"	"	"	78.88 to 100	"
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the rest going to taxes, insurance, profits, etc., the latter item not taking over ten per cent. of the total, while labor gets from fifteen to seventy per cent.

¹ It would be interesting to show how our tariff and patent laws, by interfering with competition, have withheld the surplus or profits from labor.

Managers are enabled

3. To get capital readily in support of their enterprise, that is, find exercise and support for their talents.

4. To move easily from one position to another as members of a well-defined industrial class.

The laborer is enabled

5. By the more general use of capital to get higher wages.

6. To become capitalist and profit sharer by the investment of his savings.

7. To substitute for his personal relation to his employer a relationship to an institution whose prosperity he and many of his class directly share.

8. To become a manager, since the manager is simply a large wage-earner, one of his own class.

The joint-stock company has effected a mighty change in the distribution of wealth.

1st. Socially, between individuals.

2d. Territorially, between localities and nations.

Let us first consider the stock company as a distributor of wealth socially.

The joint-stock company has effected an entire change in the distribution of profits in productive industry. As we have seen, under the old system, the profits went to the manager after paying interest, rent, and wages. Under the joint-stock system the profits go to the stockholders, who are capitalists, while the manager is simply a wage-earner. To illustrate: According to a writer in the "Boston Post," for the past fifteen years the stock dividends of the Amoskeag Manufacturing Company have averaged 10.87 per cent.; the Pepperell Manufacturing Company have averaged 14.67 per cent. From these figures we must subtract perhaps seven per cent. as interest upon the stock as capital invested, leaving 3.87 per cent. and 7.67 per cent. respectively as profit to the stockholders. The profits from these great enterprises are thus divided among many stockholders, when formerly they went to a single owner, or two or three partners. The manager is paid a salary, that is, wages, and unless he is also a stockholder gets none of the so-called profits. Nor is this to deprive the manager of sufficient incentive. He has exchanged the uncertainties of independent ventures for a great fixed salary and an established position as a member of a highly specialized class. The late Mr. Potter, vice-president and manager of the Union Pacific Railway Company, was a splendid example of these royal wage-earners;

trained men who pass from one end of the country to the other at the call of industry, creating profits for stockholders.

I have said that stock companies have effected an entire change in the distribution of profits — distributing among many what formerly was absorbed by one. Under the joint-stock system a vast number of people with small capital get not merely interest upon their capital, but profits as well. This certainly tends to equalize wealth in a community. As illustrating this investment of small savings, where they draw interest and profits, some rather rough figuring gives the following results:—

In the case of the Boston and Albany Railroad 29.5 per cent. of the total number of stockholders hold five (\$100) shares or less. In the case of the Old Colony Railroad this is true of 47 per cent., while the transfer agent of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé Railroad Co. thinks that 7,000 of the 14,000 stockholders hold from one to ten shares. In the case of the Boston and Maine Railroad in 1887 —

607	persons held one share,
341	" " two shares,
245	" " three shares,
180	" " four shares,
322	" " five shares,

or 43 per cent. of the stockholders held five shares or under.

In the case of the Union Pacific Railway Company, same year —

206	persons held one share,
254	" " two shares,
191	" " three shares,
136	" " four shares,
541	" " five shares,

or 22.8 per cent. of the stockholders held five shares or under.¹

Turning now to manufacturing companies, —

In 1887, 25 per cent. of the shareholders in the Merchants Co. of Fall River and the Wamsutta Co. of New Bedford held five (\$100) shares or under.

Of two companies where the shares are \$1,000, in the Pacific of Lawrence 73.5 per cent. of the shareholders hold five shares or under, and in the Merrimac of Lowell 83 per cent. While in each company the number of persons holding one share is very large.

It must be remembered too that this does not by any means indicate the interest of small capitalists in stock companies. The

¹ Report of the Directors, 1887, page 100.

above is only the direct investment, but there is an enormous indirect investment through the investments of savings-banks in such companies. In 1885, 3,071,495 persons had deposited in savings-banks in the United States \$1,095,172,147, an average of \$356.56.¹ A large part of this doubtless found investment in stock companies in which these small depositors were therefore indirectly interested, as they received all the bank profits.

Of course the percentages above given do not indicate that anything like such a proportion of the total capital stock is held by small investors, but simply show that many people of small means become stockholders. Brokers say that the number of such people is larger than we are aware of and continually increasing. Indeed, it is generally conceded that there is a growing tendency for good stocks to find their way into the hands of small investors.² The fact which I wish to emphasize is, that the profits of stock companies go to the stockholders rather than to a single employer, and these stockholders may be and often are persons of small means — even employees in those very companies. Profits in the form of dividend checks are distributed by mail to every nook and corner of the land. Formerly these profits were all appropriated by the employers. In so far stock companies tend to more equal distribution of wealth. This tendency is partially offset by two considerations.

1st. Stocks afford a new and inviting field for speculation, so that by simple manipulation they accumulate in the hands of the few, thus increasing the disproportion in wealth.

2d. While small capital gets a percentage of profits, the large capital gets the same relative and vastly greater absolute portion of profits. This is, however, better than for small capital to get none as under the old system.

The moral effect of this new method of distribution of profits upon the laborer must necessarily be immense.

¹ First Annual Report of Commissioner of Labor.

² That, conversely, small investors drop a stock as soon as it becomes bad, *i. e.* non-dividend paying and speculative, is strongly stated by President C. F. Adams of the Union Pacific Company, in his statement before the Committee of Congress in February last.

"Prior to 1884, the Union Pacific had for a number of years paid dividends regularly to the holders of its stock. Since April, 1884, it has not paid a dividend. On December 31, 1884, there were 7,550 stockholders of record on the company's books, each stockholder holding an average of 80 shares. The total number had, on December 31, 1887, been reduced to 5,800, holding an average of 105 shares, — a reduction of 23 per cent. in three years." At the same time there was a reduction of 25 per cent. in the number of small stockholders.

1st. It is possible for him as never before to turn his savings into capital. Instead of hiding his savings he becomes, by investing them, a partner in some great enterprise. He passes at one step onto a higher plain. He cannot but be on the side of law and order as soon as he has something to lose by disorder and bad government.

If Social reformers, both clerical and lay, would expend their energies in persuading the laborer to save and showing him how to invest savings, they would do more for the so-called "Labor Question" than in any other way. In a word, the difficulty is in human nature, which is not revolutionized by votes of a convention or legislature.

2d. A further advantage evidently accrues when the laborer owns even one share in the company which employs him. His interests and those of the employing company are then evidently directly identical. This accomplishes the same result as the industrial copartnership or profit-sharing system, and is further relieved of any suspicion of charity or caprice. In this way, too, it tends to become a great coöperative institution in which the most intelligent classes have such a predominating financial interest as to induce them to supply the guidance which purely coöperative concerns often lack. It would doubtless make it easier for skilled and thrifty laborers to become stockholders in the employing companies if the par value of the shares were made smaller — say \$50 or \$10. Perhaps the time will come when far-sighted companies will set apart a certain portion of their capital stock to be sold to their employees. Of course such a plan has its dangers and should have its safeguards. The savings-banks at present take the thrifty laborer's savings after he has bought his home, but this indirect investment in stock companies has not quite the moral effect that a direct investment has, even though it is safer.

3d. The employees in a stock company know that the manager is only a wage-earner like themselves and the profits go not to him, but to the hundreds or thousands who make industry possible by contributing their savings to be used as capital. This very knowledge cannot but make easier and pleasanter their relations to the employing power, whether they themselves are stockholders in this company, or some other, or none at all.

4th. Finally, the stock company by specializing the class of managers and making them wage-earners has put them into organic connection with the entire class of laborers. Not the child of birth or fortune or favor, but the man of experience, skill, and

energy is the manager in every department of modern industry, and he is the man who fights his way up from below. Modern industry is thus a living organism and not an image with a golden head and iron body.

The territorial distribution of wealth by stock companies is no less interesting than the social distribution, but we can only refer to it.

From this point of view a stock company may be described as a device by which capital is collected from many savings, transferred to any desired point, and there set to work. It entices hoarded wealth from its hiding-places, and makes it productive, thus giving people of narrow lives not only a little profit, but also a great interest in distant enterprises and peoples. Stock companies are invisible threads binding in one huge mesh all the peoples of the civilized world. German savings helped build the Northern Pacific and many another railroad on the plains. French savings are building the Panama Canal as they built the one at Suez. Neither oceans, national, race, or social divisions can oppose barriers to this collection and use of savings by this busy bee of industry — the stock company.

The additions thereby to the volume of the world's business have been enormous.

Industries have been established on a scale hitherto impossible, and in places hitherto inaccessible. Simply as an engine of civilization the stock company deserves the most respectful consideration.

Unfortunately stock companies constitute a field largely unexplored by statisticians.

Tables showing the proportion of stock companies to private firms, and in these companies the proportion of small holdings to large, would be of immense value to the sociologist.

It is a matter of common observation and remark that the number of stock companies is increasing much faster than the number of private firms. As long ago as 1870 the late Professor Levi wrote:¹ "The business of the country is gradually passing from the hands of private firms to those of joint stock companies." Only last year the sensation in financial circles of London was the floating of the stock of the Guinness Company, and a recent paper gives an account of the transfer of the business of the Messrs. Walker, brewers of Liverpool, into a stock company with a capital of \$3,000,000. Certainly all new enterprises of any magnitude take this form.

¹ *Journal of Statistical Society*, vol. 33.

Such facts as the following merely hint at the enormous extent of the stock-company system in our time. A recent writer estimates the farm mortgages in ten Western States at \$1,200,000,000 — quite a portion of which was certainly placed by Mortgage Companies.

In Fall River alone thirty-two manufacturing companies have a total stock capital of \$17,108,000, on which, according to the "Boston Post," they paid an average dividend of $4\frac{3}{8}$ per cent. for the first four months of 1888. In 1884, 1,541 joint-stock companies in the United Kingdom had a nominal share capital of \$664,758,854.40.¹

According to Bradstreets, May 5, 1888, the total active shares — mostly railroad — listed on the New York Stock Exchange foots up a par value of \$2,660,974,086. This does not include bonds, and is by no means the total of railroad shares in the United States.

\$5,000,000,000 would probably not be an overestimate of the par value of the capital stock of companies in the United States alone, and this vast sum serves to distribute profits, as it is itself distributed and applied capital.

D. Collin Wells.

ANDOVER.

THE TERRITORIAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES.

To hold any part of our country as a Territory, is a violation of the fundamental principles of our growth, is contrary to our history, and is dangerous to our national life.

Local self-government is the characteristic of our national life. It is the one feature that distinguishes us from other nations. The vigorous and logical prevalence of this principle is the one thing that foreigners refuse, or are unable, to comprehend. That local bodies do so much, while the general government does so little, is to them conclusive proof that in due time the government will go to pieces and be succeeded by wild anarchy, forgetting that anarchists are imported, and that the life of the central government is assured because the local unit is complete in itself, and gives of its life to the larger body. The local unit may be a great State like Texas, or a small township like Hull, but, great or

¹ First Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor, p. 33.

small, it is complete in itself. It is sovereignty embodied. It needs no higher reason for existence than itself. It tolerates no external interference. Voluntarily it surrenders certain of its powers that it may gain the advantage of union with other units, but it never recognizes the right of the aggregated mass to control, even in the least, the independence of the smallest unit. The smaller the unit, both in area and in numbers, the more satisfactory the results. This is seen in the smaller States, where politics are purer, and expenses of government less per capita than in larger States. Where the authority of the ultimate unit, the family, is held most sacred, there the general welfare is most secure, and the authority of law most firmly established. It is both cause and effect, that the maximum of local efficiency is found where there is the minimum of governmental interference. Both in theory and in practice, the individual is best cared for who must be least cared for, and his best development is secured when he has the least help, provided he be not hindered in working out his own enlargement.

But when a body of our people take up their abode in a part of our land beyond the limits of any State, though these people are the same in origin and character and education as dwellers in the States, though not changed in purpose by migration, though just as capable of self-government as ever, they are, from the first, treated, not simply as aliens, but almost as enemies. They are not allowed to make their own Constitution, but Congress provides an Organic Act, which may or may not be always suited to local needs. They are not regarded as a part of the common country, but as a dependency, a province. They may not choose any State officers, nor elect their own judiciary. These are sent to them by the general government. They may elect legislators, but they may not say how many, nor how often they shall meet, nor how long they may remain in session. Nor can they be assured that the laws enacted will be allowed to remain upon the statute book, for Congress reserves the right to annul any or all of them at any time. When laws are enacted affecting great commercial interests, that there may be an approach to permanency, Congress must be petitioned to enact the same law, or to ratify it, that the peril of instability may be lessened. Of course Congress rarely exercises its right to veto, but that it may do so has not the effect to give a high character to the body of territorial law, as was, no doubt, the original intention, but casts a shadow of uncertainty over the whole, giving to territorial statutes generally an unsavory reputation.

To complete the ungracious treatment of those who are willing to enlarge the boundaries of the nation by developing barren lands into fruitful fields, under the disadvantages necessarily belonging to work in new lands, the inhabitants of Territories are forbidden to take part in national elections. They have as intelligent an interest in all questions affecting revenue, labor, reforms of all kinds, as any in the States; they are taxed to maintain the general government, — a Territory sometimes paying more net revenue than any one of several States, but not a citizen of a Territory can vote in a national election. They are allowed to send a delegate to Congress who may sit on committees, and may speak to any question before the House, but he cannot vote, — though he may have a constituency as intelligent as any in the nation, and nine times as numerous as that which sends some of the voting members.

Such treatment of any body of citizens is entirely contrary to the principles so strenuously observed in the founding of our nation. Though the original charters gave ample title to the land, there was no attempt to retain powers of government. These belonged to the colonists. When King Charles in 1628 gave another charter to Richard Saltonstall, John Winthrop, and others, they were empowered to elect their own officers annually, and to make such laws as were suitable and necessary to the plantation, saving that no laws should be repugnant to the laws of the kingdom. As this charter did not specify whether the seat of government should be in England or in the colony, the corporation receiving the charter, after careful deliberation, voted that the seat of government should be in the colony. Even if this was entirely an afterthought of the corporators, it is plain that they were fully convinced that such a nation as they would build could be governed only by the actual settlers who were to make the nation. It must be remembered also that this action was taken while a large part of the corporators were still living in England; and yet they gave up their power to those of their number who were to live in the colony. Later, when the Established Church of England, which was still "Our dear Mother" to many of them, was evidently planning to bring the colonies under the jurisdiction of the Bishop of London, the leaders deliberately set aside the entire Anglican system, substituting the Congregational order. To make this effective, and to prevent the revolutionizing of the colony by the importation of a few shiploads of colonists from England, suffrage was restricted to the members of the

church. In no other way could they retain in their own hands the liberties which had cost them so dear. This was not a theological, but a political movement. It was a necessary and a legitimate step, growing logically out of the act whereby they, while yet in England, transferred the seat of government to the colony in New England. Had the colony which went to Virginia fourteen years earlier been granted similar powers of self-government, the sad disasters that waken pity when told to-day might have been averted, and Virginia have been far more than the Mother of Presidents for this nation. The noble labors of William Penn, on both sides of the sea, went far to confirm the "right of the free Saxon people to be governed by laws of which they themselves were makers." There is no reason to rehearse the many incidents occurring in all the colonies during the long period in which they gained confidence for the final struggle with the Mother Country, resulting in forever establishing for this nation the principle of local self-government. It is upon this principle that we have grown. Our entire development has been along this line. There was never less reason to deviate from it than at this time when the nation is enlarging by the development of Western territory faster than it ever did by conquest in earlier days.

It is not to be supposed that any set of men, or any particular section of the country, is determined to carry out the territorial system. Both great political parties, and all parts of the country, are alike responsible. It is a conflict between the centralizing tendencies of our government, — of all government, it might be said, — and the opposite principle of local self-government. The former never needs to be strengthened. It will gain quite fast enough unaided in every government that has vitality enough to exist. But the latter must always be protected, both against the aggressions of the general government, and its own readiness to yield all that is demanded.

Hence we see that the territorial system is a dangerous part of our national life, because it is a constant menace to the fundamental principle of our life, and at the same time is building into dangerous proportions the centralizing tendency that is already too strong. Specifically it is dangerous, because it takes away from large bodies of citizens the privilege and the duty of self-government. Often these groups of citizens are more numerous than those that have a State government. Always they are equal in virtue and intelligence. They may in some cases excel in

enterprise and sturdy vigor. They are loyal to the nation, obeying all her laws. In times of peril they quickly respond to her call for help. They have borne the first shock of savage uprisings: they have patiently endured the ills that are inseparable from the developing of new lands. No part of our people excel them in loving reverence for the Fathers of the Republic. None are more loyal to the fundamental principles of our national life than those who are shut out from a full share in our common inheritance until—until when? There is the bitterness! There are well-defined principles which should govern the general government in admitting new States. These principles have been reinforced by usage, by the authority of courts, by the opinions of eminent jurists and statesmen of all political preferences, and still they are arbitrarily and persistently ignored.

That the central government, that is, the party in power for the time, should dare to set aside all law, and defy all precedent, and refuse to admit into the Union new States that have more than complied with the requisites for admission, shows that the tendencies of our government to centralization have reached the danger-point. To make the case both more aggravating and more dangerous, the party in power acknowledges the claim of the States to admission, and yet deliberately refuses to admit them, because to act now would endanger the continuance of party supremacy. This is not a charge that the present dominant party is less patriotic, and less amenable to the demand for justice than the other party. It would not be right to make this assertion, even though this same party sinned grievously in the same way thirty-two years ago, in denying to Kansas the right of local self-government. The people took the matter in hand then, as they will again, when they take the pains to understand the situation, and for twenty-four years put another party in charge of the government. It is not the Democratic party, nor the Republican party, but the party in power, whichever name it may bear, that sins. The Republican party, during the last part of its governmental existence, committed no overt act of violence against this vital principle of our life so gross as that of the other party in the case of Kansas, because there came no occasion for it. But it cultivated the territorial system assiduously, using it as a means of rewarding partisan workers by appointing them to places of emolument in the Territories. And it is an open secret that leaders in both parties, in years past, have been slow to create new Territories from the outlying communities on the border, lest they

should in time come to have importance enough to demand statehood, and so divide the honors and the powers of the nation with the older States already existing.

If we seek the reason for this distrust of the newer portions of our country by the older and stronger, we shall find that it comes in part from the well-known principle in human nature which makes the strong and prosperous domineer over the struggling and the weak. Besides this, there is a fear, more or less intelligent, of the doctrine vaguely described under the name "States Rights." Because some States have insisted on an excessive exercise of their sovereignty, using to the full powers that have once been formally abdicated in favor of the general government, is no just cause for refusing to other States rights that are fundamental, that are essential to their very existence; rights that must have entire freedom of action in every State, whether it be in the Union or out of it, without a shade of restriction from the central government. Let this absolute freedom be denied to the State, and the Union is ultimately destroyed, for the State does not in the least get its authority and power of life from the Union. It is the Union that exists by consent of the States. Let no one get excited by this statement, thinking it smacks of nullification, secession, or even of treason. Neither doctrine, supremacy of the Union or States Rights, can prevail to the exclusion of the other. Both exist together, making by their joint life our nation. But the nation could never have come into life, had not each State been possessed of perfect powers of self-government, — powers inherent and undervived. These powers can never be denied, or even tampered with, by the Union without peril to both parties.

That this is the abiding conviction of our people was most happily shown at the close of the rebellion. The Union was victorious: the seceding States were thoroughly beaten, ready to accept any terms that the Unionists might lay upon them. The proposal was made in Congress, and discussed at length throughout the country, to abolish the governments of all the States that had left the Union, and treat them as Territories, governing them by Congress for an indefinite period. Had this plan been carried out, then the Union had surely fallen to pieces. The conquered States would have been justified then in resisting tyranny. They would have been stronger than their oppressors, and would have prevailed by the thrice-armed justice of their cause.

Since it is the profound conviction of our people that the full privilege and power of self-government belongs to them, the

people; since that principle has been established in spite of the bitter attacks made upon it by ignorance and selfishness; since the people ultimately rebuke with an unmistakable emphasis every violation of this principle, though the violation may flourish apparently unchecked for years, and though it may take a generation or more for the strong sense of justice in the heart of the people to assert itself, so as to make it very plain that they are the rulers, — why should not they now speak again, with a voice as clear and resistless as when they reinforced it by bullets and bayonets. Let the edict go forth from the people, No more Territories. Not only let no new Territories be organized, but let all Territories now in existence be proclaimed as States. They need not be admitted to the Union at once, nor any the sooner for being declared States. Let them have the same power that States within the Union now have to elect all their own officers, and make and execute their own laws. Congress should, as now, see to it that each one has a form of government that is truly republican, and in entire harmony with the spirit that created the present Union. Public lands and United States courts would be under the control of the general government as they are now. Briefly, let no discrimination be made against these States because they are not yet within the Union. Let them not be restricted to one delegate in Congress as now, but let them have as many delegates as their population calls for, — the delegates being as now without a vote, but entitled to speak, and to sit on committees of the House. The only change from the present custom would be in giving to the communities described the privilege of electing all their own officers, and making all the laws under which they live; but this is a change involving the very fundamental principle of our existence as a nation. To grant it is to build our nation firmly. To deny it is to put our nation in a greater peril than threatens it from any other cause. To do this, so far from weakening the general government, would be a source of strength. The stigma put upon citizens in a Territory would be removed. The inducements to develop new States would be multiplied, and the productive area and capacity of the nation would be rapidly augmented. Yet better, the nation would be unified. The possibilities of sectional jealousies would be diminished. The cause of pure government would be immensely advanced, for there is no need to dwell upon the fact that our general government is not only burdened but defiled by having so large a list of offices to fill. Any scheme to diminish this list would be a welcome relief to all right-minded men. And

beyond these great advantages to the nation that would follow from this logically consistent attitude of the general government toward the newer parts of the land, another very important end would be gained. The great number of our young men that are growing to be citizens, and the mass of foreigners that help to make our frontier population, would be saved from the demoralizing influence of Federal patronage. It is not because large numbers of officers are appointed that the tone of political life in a Territory is utterly bad. But the local government is so utterly dependent on the wish or the whim of the Administration, and the pressure that comes from Washington is so strong and so inevitable, that no man can stand against it. In addition to all the local reasons that tend to make a politician a mere time-server, there is the same cringing toadying to the Administration in the Territories that appeared in any remote Roman province in the bad days of the Empire. This absolutely prohibits a decent man from entering political life. As a result, the evil elements that are local to any community are almost without exception strengthened by the whole force of Federal patronage. There are hundreds of men who will vote this year for the first time, whose only idea of our government is, that it is a dispenser of patronage, strong enough to decide the complexion of politics in the community where they live. Now let this unwarranted governmental interference be removed, and there will be hope for pure politics all along the frontier. It will not be so hopeless a task to mould an American people out of the conglomerate that is poured into our borders every year.

But it is not only the Territories that, as political organizations, are interested in limiting this growing usurpation of government by Congress. The present States are in peril from this increasing assumption of authority by the central government. More and more the States are looking to Congressional action, and submitting to its dictation in both political and commercial life. The idea is rapidly gaining, that the general government not only can, but must legislate for local needs. The Blair Educational Bill is a notable example. But by so much as any State allows Congress to do that which it is able to do for itself, by so much does it lose self-respect, and the power to maintain separate existence.

This assertion of the right of self-government by all local bodies is a part of the contest which must always be carried on by the individual against the mass. This contest is not always wisely managed, but costly mistakes do not stop it. Slowly the

single unit gains an acknowledged position ; each movement has a little less un wisdom, and the rate of progress gradually quickens. It is not fitting for our government to forget the principle that gave it birth, and wantonly oppress the members of its own body. Strictly speaking, there is no central government. The President and Congress, with all the departments of administration and of justice, either separately or unitedly, have no original authority. They have nothing that they can give. They can confer no life, no right to be, on any State, or part of a State, on any Territory, or part of a Territory. President, Congress, departments, courts, these are only agencies created by the States to transact the business of the United States. The further fact that this Union is to be perpetual, and that in making the Union the States permanently gave to the Union certain of their powers, does not give one atom of original creative power to the business agents of the United States. They have no more authority over the States than if the Union was by first intention to cease at the end of ten years, and the granted powers to revert to the States at that time. Nor does this power enlarge by lapse of years. It has now, one hundred and twelve years after being created by the States, only the extent voluntarily given by the States in the beginning. And this range can be narrowed at any time. Indeed, the granted powers can be entirely recalled, and other powers be given by the States, should they at any time see fit to change their present method of doing their business as a Union, — for it is the Union only that is perpetual, and not the business methods of the Union.

The “well-established principles,” previously alluded to, as governing the action of Congress in admitting new States, are these :

The ordinance of Congress “for the government of the territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio,” adopted July 13, 1787, and commonly called “The Ordinance of 1787,” has in Article V. this provision : “And whenever any of the said States (meaning the new States to be formed out of territory northwest of the Ohio) shall have 60,000 free inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever, and shall be at liberty to form a permanent Constitution and State government.” This provision was reaffirmed in the treaty by which France ceded Louisiana to the United States, April 30, 1803, making it if possible even more obligatory on Congress to act, by declaring that “the inhabitants of the ceded

territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyments of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States."

As showing how the courts construe the Ordinance of 1787, the case of Michigan is in point.

While the territorial government was in complete exercise of all its powers, extending its authority over all that is now known as Michigan, and also Wisconsin and a part of Minnesota, the people held a Constitutional Convention for that part of the Territory known as the Peninsula, and now as the State of Michigan. That Convention framed a State Constitution and submitted it to the people, who adopted it, and elected a complete State government and a State legislature without an enabling act from Congress. The State presented itself for admission, by a memorial from the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Michigan, in December, 1835. President Jackson presented the claim of the State to Congress, and based the claim of the State to admission upon the Compact in the Ordinance of 1787. Owing to a difficulty in adjusting the boundaries, the State was not formally admitted by Congress until January 26, 1837. Yet the State had exercised all the functions of a State from the time that the people had adopted the Constitution of their State. One act of its legislature was to incorporate a society in Detroit, which society finally acquired title to real estate. The legal existence of this society was denied, and its right to hold property contested in the courts, because the State government which created this society had not at that time been recognized by Congress; and also because there was at that time a regular territorial government, having full authority from Congress, in active existence. But the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the society was a valid corporation, and "that the State of Michigan was fully and completely and lawfully formed when the people adopted the State Constitution," October 5, 1835; that the Territory and the territorial government then and there ceased to exist; that the State legislature was a lawful and competent State legislature, whose laws must be respected and obeyed. In pronouncing upon this case, "*Scott vs. The Detroit Young Men's Society, lessee*," the court thus interpreted the Ordinance of 1787:—

"The Confederation, in that act, in effect said to those who should emigrate to either division of the Northwest Territory: 'If you will buy, reclaim, and settle our waste lands, and thus

replenish our empty treasury, and at the same time protect our widely extended northwestern frontier from the incursion of the Indians, we will provide for your government until your number shall reach 60,000, and then you shall be at liberty to form a State government for yourselves, and shall be admitted into our Union of States on an equal footing with ourselves.' "

But the same question has been passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the famous "Dred Scott" case. In this, Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the court, pronounces as follows: "There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal government, to establish and maintain colonies bordering on the United States, or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure; nor to enlarge its territorial limits in any way, except by the admission of new States. . . . But no power is given to acquire a Territory, to be acquired and held permanently in that character." . . . "It is acquired to become a State, and not to be held as a colony and governed by Congress with absolute authority." . . . "The citizens of the United States who migrate to a Territory belonging to the people of the United States, cannot be ruled as mere colonists, dependent upon the will of the general government, and to be governed by any laws it may think proper to impose. The principle upon which our governments rest, and upon which alone they continue to exist, is the Union of the States, sovereign and independent within their own limits in their internal and domestic concerns, and bound together as one people by a general government, possessing certain enumerated and restricted powers, delegated to it by the people of the several States." . . . "A power therefore in the general government to obtain and hold colonies and dependent territories, over which they might legislate without restriction, would be inconsistent with its own existence in its present form."

Thus at every period of our history this principle of the absolute independence of the local unit has been plainly asserted and insisted upon. The first charters were built upon it. While the Confederation was coming into shape, Vermont, then a part of New York, took the necessary step to make herself a separate State. In 1785 Tennessee, then a part of North Carolina, did the same. At later dates the same steps were taken by Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Wisconsin, California, Kansas, Oregon, Nevada, and Michigan, as already given at length. In each case the State took the initiative, not waiting for Congress to pass an enabling act. This right has been sustained by the highest courts.

It has the solemn endorsement of leading statesmen of all parties, — Stephen A. Douglas, for one, making this declaration: "If there is any one principle, dearer and more sacred than all others in a free government, it is that which asserts the exclusive right of a free people to form and adopt their own fundamental law, and to regulate and manage their own internal affairs and domestic institutions. I deny the right of Congress to force a good thing upon a people who are unwilling to receive it."

It now only remains for the people of every local unit to know their rights, and to maintain them, not in the least in a spirit of selfish bravado, but for the sake of the common weal even more than for their own local advantage.

Joseph Ward.

YANKTON, DA.

CURRENT PHASES OF AMERICAN JUDAISM.

THE Jew has suffered a peculiar martyrdom at the hands of historian or critic. He has either been described as considerably lower than the angels or elevated to a pedestal above humanity. In either case there has been a curious lack of blood and flesh treatment, and the representation has been as lifeless as the figures in relief on an Attic frieze. If one goes to the novel, there is the same want of sanity in the Jew's portraiture: the two poles seem to be Fagin and Daniel Deronda. And in how many pulpits is the same unreal picture presented of a Jew that never was on sea or land — a mere shadow of a text and tradition as vague as the legend of the Wandering Jew. The mistake arises from ignorance of history. It is commonly held by otherwise well-informed writers that the Jewish nation died when Jerusalem became a Roman city. The fact is, Judaism was only born at that epoch, and the dispersion begun centuries before was the means whereby the Jew was to be transformed from a Palestinian and an Oriental into a citizen of the world. His history was henceforth to be studied, not from the flora and fauna of Palestine, as if he himself were but an antique or a fossil, but in the history of mankind. It is because the critic refuses to recognize the common humanity in the Jew, but regards him as something separate and distinct, that the antediluvian impression of him prevails even to-day in some cultured American circles.

The Jew is not a Jebusite, a Perizzite, or a Canaanite. He has

long since emerged from their surroundings. However firmly he may hold to hereditary religious customs, he is none the less a citizen of the country of his adoption, that is, if he be admitted to civil and religious liberty. He feels his age and its tendencies. He is generally what his neighbors are. He is not a figure-head or a mummy, but can be liberal, conservative, reactionary, according to the trend of the time. The history of Jewish thought since the dispersion presents striking analogies to the history of Christian thought. Let one who is unfamiliar with Rabbinical literature read Farrar's recent work on the history of Old Testament exegesis, and he will be startled at the points of contact and agreement. What was true in mediæval ages, under the Cross or Crescent, is no less true in our century. The Jew is no passive spectator of events, but an active participator. He is influenced by his environment, and is alive to present needs and problems. And just as in olden Alexandria Philo strove to reconcile Plato and Moses, and in the twelfth century Maimonides sought to reconcile Aristotle and Moses, so Jewish thinkers have striven in turn to harmonize Kant, Hegel, German idealists and English evolutionists, with the laws and doctrines of Judaism. In their interpretation Jews naturally differ, like good churchmen. The unity in Judaism is organic, not mechanical. The Talmud itself is but a digest of conflicting opinions.

It is necessary to bear in mind, then, that Jewish thought is plastic, not stationary, in constant ebb and flow like human thought in general, before one can gain a just impression of current phases of American Judaism. It would seem that in their settlement on American soil Providence has not only given the Jews a material development — in numbers, wealth, and influence — that is likely to surpass their brilliant record in Alexandria and their golden era in Spain, but in the play of opposing opinions (the conflict of course purely intellectual, and confined to pulpit, press, and platform) has allowed full scope for high spiritual development. And this conflict is not a solitary process. All American sects seem to run in parallel lines, and meet the sweep of the same currents. There is life, action, movement everywhere.

The Jews in America, who number probably about 500,000, — in 1845 the Jewish population in our country reached 50,000, — have come from all climes, and bring with them the characteristics of each. Here, again, the Jew is no exception to the general American rule. America has been aptly termed the scrap-bag of the nations. English conservative, German rationalist, Russian and

Polish strict conformist, have now to be considered. It is no more the Pharisee, the Sadducee, and the Essene, although present Jewish tendencies suggest to a certain degree those historic schools of opinion. The lines shift, it must be confessed, and it is difficult to give a precise definition of what is currently called orthodox and reform — terms obviously un-Jewish and esoteric. The gamut of controversy is covered by other words as well — conservative, progressive, radical, ethical culture. The classes may thus be briefly and soberly characterized.

The strictly conservative are composed chiefly of emigrants from European lands where the Jew is exposed to severe exactions. They bring with them to America the Ghetto atmosphere, and do not change appreciably their hereditary local usages. Their children, however, are quickly Americanized, and attend almost without exception the public schools. This class is marked by positive traits in striking contrast to the poor emigrant of other nationalities. He is pious, charitable, economical, usually learned in Talmud and Hebrew, however lowly his occupation. For all practical purposes he and his class form a body by themselves. They have their own press in a special dialect, and their preachers generally do *not* employ the language of Shakespeare or Lessing. Upon the great body of American Jews they exert no influence.

The conservative, embracing what may technically be termed the enlightened orthodox and the moderate reformed, include the great majority of American Jews, and are ranged on the same social and intellectual plane. They favor — with but rare exceptions — departures from European conservatism in synagogue and home usages, but hold firmly to the essentials of Jewish doctrine and ceremony. Their rabbis are scholarly men, who preach both in German and English. Their temples and synagogues vie in proportions with the costliest shrines of other creeds. They have rapidly Americanized themselves, and are indistinguishable from the general body of American citizens, so far as occupation and profession are concerned.

The radicals, one is tempted to say, are the strict conservatives of the third generation. But that description would be more pointed than fair. They embrace a large and increasing class who wish to abolish distinctive Jewish rites but retain the Unitarian idea. They form a right and left wing: the one conservative of the Jewish race idea and opposed to intermarriage with non-Israelites; the other, practically ethical culturist or agnostic, if its views be closely examined, although it still claims to be Judaism. The

ethical culturists represent the latest phase of German-American Jewish thought ; it is the logical outcome of private judgment and individualism in Judaism. It is only of about a decade's growth ; its leader, active and resolute in educational and philanthropic movements, has shown himself uncompromising in his attitude towards all historic religious beliefs. He and his followers have tacitly left the synagogue, although the synagogue has issued no anathema.

The conflict of opinions is singularly favored by the fact that each synagogue is a law to itself, and each rabbi is amenable to no one for his views except his own congregation. There is no ecclesiastical authority, no discipline, no church organization, no synod, no check or balance wheel of any kind. The Union of American Hebrew Congregations, of about fifteen years' growth, supports the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, which has graduated thirteen young rabbis, with forty in its classes in the academical year of 1888. But the Union is restricted to educational interests and cannot legislate for religious purposes proper. A movement was begun last year in New York and Philadelphia to establish a seminary on a more conservative basis, and its introductory classes have been started in New York.

The point at issue among the leaders of Jewish thought is the authority of Bible and Talmud. The conservatives adhere to ceremonial Judaism more or less ; the radicals have practically cut loose from traditional rites and forms. An unprejudiced critic might say that the conservative is no less a radical, but he reforms more slowly. But while it is difficult to define the conservative platform, certain essentials are insisted upon, for instance, belief in Revelation, the authority of the Sabbath, observance of the dietary laws, the festivals, and circumcision. If a goodly number of conservatives no longer keep the dietary laws and the Sabbath, they do not justify their neglect, but ascribe it to circumstances. The radical, on the other hand, and especially the advanced radical, holds no more to the authority of the Bible and to Revelation, as commonly understood. He claims to be above the letter of Scripture, and regards its spirit only as binding. The individual is the sole authority. The majority vote is to decide. Sunday lectures and services have now been adopted in half a dozen large congregations — no service at all being held on Saturday in one instance. It is said that the universal character of Judaism can be best indicated by the observance of Sunday which has become the world-Sabbath, and that Judaism as a religion of humanity is

likely to make more headway if a transfer of its Sabbath be made. The radicals have reached this point to-day, so far as one can judge from the utterances of radical rabbis.

It would be wrong to call the conservatives reactionary; they wish to progress, but in an orderly and constitutional way. They suffer from a want of precision and energy, and a failure, perhaps, to recognize the gravity of the situation. Some are alarmed, too, at the advanced strides of the radicals and the spread of agnosticism among them, and hence make haste too slowly for their public. It is as unjust to term the radical leaders indiscriminately atheists and infidels. Some apparently have no moorings, and vacillate painfully in the expression of their opinions; but others are inspired by a genuine and honest love of religion, and wish to raise the Jew to a higher spiritual level. Their weakness lies in their placing no limit to "reforms" in Judaism. And in some cases they advocate a nerveless ethical sentimentalism, utterly removed from the practical righteousness enforced by the Law and the Prophets, based on belief in a Personal, Intelligent God.

From the religious standpoint, American Judaism doubtless suffers from the hazy and indefinite views that prevail. But there is some excuse for its shortcomings. It is a new land in more senses than one, and an era of transition. The great majority of the people have been transferred from the Ghetto environment to American freedom. Hence they insist on their rights, but fail at times to realize their duties. A better temper will be taught them, and they will learn to reconcile past and present, without violence to either. With tact and statesmanship, the future would seem to lie with the moderate school, conservative, yet alive to the necessity of progress in the right direction. The two extremes of German radicalism and Russian-Polish orthodoxy are not likely to survive upon American soil. The latter becomes Americanized in a decade or two; the former, in its advanced phase, will probably either join the advanced Unitarians or form a separate sect, unless it concludes to ally itself with ethical culture. It is difficult to predict its future habitation and name: it may return to the fold like the Prodigal Son, and great will be the rejoicings!

One feature of American Judaism cannot too strongly be emphasized: the spirit of coöperation and brotherhood that prevails among all for charitable purposes. The practical translation into life of the Jewish idea is a happy augury, and proves that the differences, doctrinal and ritual, are only on the surface. There has been an advance in this respect since the Pharisees and Sad-

ducees of old were secret or open enemies to the death, and wasted in fratricidal struggle the strength that should have been conserved for the nation's resurrection. A radical rabbi of Chicago was the most zealous to aid in the education of the children of poor Russian emigrants. A New York radical leader has more than once addressed in their synagogue his strictly conservative brethren. All are interested in the maintenance of Jewish charitable institutions, and the training, industrial and religious, of the children of the poor. Standing thus shoulder to shoulder for humanity's sake, many of us are asking ourselves, — in particular those born on American soil and sharing American culture and aspirations, — why should not a more intense religious unity join us soul to soul? Why should petty differences as to custom and ceremony weaken our growth and influence? Jewish common sense, which has accomplished something in the sphere of American trade, will achieve as much in the sphere of American religion, and the great body of American Israelites will develop in time into a well-defined and symmetrical organization, working in parallel lines with the best and most cultured of its sister creeds to spread the Fatherhood of God and the unity of mankind.

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THE HUMAN LIMITATIONS OF THE CHRIST, AS DESCRIBED OR SUGGESTED IN THE GOSPELS.

THE purpose of this article is to view the Christ from the standpoint of his humanity and therefore to collate all historical facts and hints bearing directly upon the problem of his limitations. It is hoped that some light, thereby, may fall upon the question of the ultimate value of his incidental allusions to Jewish tradition, his seeming endorsement of the pathology of the age, and what in general we may call the local coloring of his utterances.

It is of supreme importance to us, as believers in his full divinity, to know, whether He — without acceptance — accommodated himself to current ideas in Biblical criticism, pathology, and the physical sciences; or whether, supposing his thinking in real harmony with tradition and popular belief, the local coloring may be allowed for as human limitation; or finally, whether even each faintest trace of prevailing thought in his discourses must be accepted as infallible and unquestionable fact and therefore as criterion in physical or Biblical research.

It seems proper to begin our discussion of the acknowledged limitations of the Christ with the phenomenon of *development*. The Gospels assure us, that a natural process of unfolding preceded the miraculous awakening of divine consciousness in Jesus of Nazareth. He entered the world not as a manifest theophany but as a human babe, and there followed a growth of mind as of body, of character as of mind. "He increased," Luke declares, "in wisdom and stature and in favor with God and man."¹ He was "subject" to his parents.² In the Temple, a lad among the rabbis, He made no claims, did not prophesy, did not even teach: knowing that He was about "his Father's business," He listened to the doctors and asked questions.³ While exciting astonishment as a boy of rare spirituality and understanding, He did not awaken extravagant expectations on the part of his relatives and neighbors. There is absolutely no scriptural warrant for the conclusion, that his precocity encouraged any one, at that time or indeed prior to his baptism, to expect from Him redemption for Israel. Even his cousin John, though recognizing unusual personal worth, failed to build great expectations upon his future. "I knew him not," protested John, "but He that sent me to baptize with water, the same said unto me, 'Upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining on him, the same is he which baptizeth with the Holy Ghost.'"⁴

This natural development of a singularly pure and wise childhood and youth, according to all the Gospels, ended in a sudden miraculous awakening of the divine consciousness; and Jesus Ben Joseph became the Christ, the Saviour of the world. But still — and always thereafter — under human limitations of utmost significance. This appeared immediately.

The Baptism of Jesus was seemingly the full dawning of self-knowledge, the critical point when thought escaped the chrysalis form of observation, meditation, expectancy, and aspiration. Or, looking at the life of Christ dramatically, it was the first scene of the first act in the sublime tragedy, — all before having been but proem or prelude. Necessarily it proved a period of intense mental excitement and spiritual elevation. Here "two seas met," the Deep of Humanity and the awful Ocean of the Infinite! Hence there followed a long seclusion. Jesus fled from men into absolute solitude and perpetual soliloquy.

Now notice that this period of temptation was marked by precisely that class of allurements which would assail one, however

¹ Luke ii. 52.² Luke ii. 51.³ Luke ii. 46.⁴ John i. 33.

pure, who had become suddenly conscious of a great mission and of unusual powers. The first suggestion of the tempter appealed to that elation which naturally accompanies sense of new and unexpected ability and opportunity, and was fitted to work a godless self-confidence. He was perishing of hunger: 'why not — relying on mighty self rather than on a so forgetful Providence — use this wonderful gift of miracles (of possessing which in limitless degree He was now first aware) to satisfy personal cravings?' This assault failing, the other side of the citadel was attacked. If faith were so desirable, one surely could not have too much of it. 'Go, O mighty prophet, go straight to the Holy City and leap from the very pinnacle of the Temple into the wondering multitudes of Jerusalem. Trust God's angels and thus successfully at once assert and prove thy messianic claims!' This, however, would have been a mere display of fanaticism or overfaith, the antipode of self-confidence, or rather the second focus in the same ellipse of human folly. The third temptation, the most trenchant and terrible of all, was the whispering of carnal ambition. 'Use your sublime powers for personal aggrandizement, subdue all kingdoms of earth and enjoy universal dominion!'

The three sins repelled in the Wilderness, then, were: self-confidence, which is the disease of elation; fanaticism, which is faith heightened to folly; and ambition, which is the peril of greatness, — precisely the temptations of all sudden consciousness of power. Every man of genius become aware of lofty mission, and indeed every child of fortune, though the sudden gift be but riches, has reflected this experience of Jesus in the Wilderness, in its allurements if not in its triumphs. Self-confidence or overfaith and carnal ambition struggling for the favored soul, the drama — not seldom as a tragedy — repeats itself on every page of history. In all that long and fateful soliloquy the Christ was tempted in all points like as we; and the conflict in the desert became one of the sublimest of his parables. And it was doubtless on this very account that Jesus adopted the pictorial method in describing to his disciples afterward the crucial testing of his worth.

We have now to deal with the triumphant Christ, the Son of God and Saviour of men; and we still find Him under human limitations. These may best be described in a fourfold division.

First, his *body* was still human in its needs and capabilities. He continued to hunger,¹ to thirst,² even after his resurrection.³ He walked, He grew weary,⁴ He sat down, He reclined, He slept,

¹ Matt. xxi. 18. ² John iv. 7, xix. 28. ³ John xxi. 13. ⁴ John iv. 6.

He bled,¹ He died. Nay, we seem justified to infer from the transference of the cross to the shoulders of a peasant, on the way to Golgotha, and from the speedy death in crucifixion, that his physique was not of unusual robustness.

In the second place, his *soul* — like his body — must needs conform to the mental and emotional habitudes of his kind, race, and class.

He used the vernacular with its characteristic idioms and ambiguities. Thus the meaning of John iii. 8, "The wind (πνεῦμα) bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the spirit" (still πνεῦμα), depends upon the Jewish use of (רוּחַ) "ruah," the Hebraistic equivalent of πνεῦμα. "Ruah" meant, successively, breath, wind, spirit, Divine Spirit; and the saying was one of those wholly earnest plays upon words in which the older Hebrew prophets delighted. Christ taught by fiction,² by enigma,³ by irony,⁴ by sarcasm,⁵ by hyperbole,⁶ and by denunciation,⁷ all figures and forms of speech suggesting the limitations of human intelligence. Mark goes so far as to say, that "without a parable spake he not unto them,"⁸ — the word parable probably covering all forms of indirect utterance.

He perceived with attention and mused upon what He saw. (θεωρεῖ, Mark xii. 41.)

He seems not to have frowned upon the little transparent and well-meant artifices of social courtesy: thus we are told in Luke xxiv. 28, "He made as though he would have gone further."

He acted *reluctantly*, and many think that He spoke with sense of annoyance at Cana, when his mother suggested that He should work a miracle in the interest of the general merriment.

By three evangelists He is described as "marveling" (θαυμάζω), though on but two occasions, — in the one instance over unusual faith, in the other over unusual unbelief.⁹

Once¹⁰ anger — ὀργή — is imputed to Him; but the circumstances indicate righteous indignation.

Jesus indulged in personal preferences, as in the cases of Lazarus, John, Mary and Martha. He was even capable of loving at sight, and though the object of his sudden liking was one who,

¹ John xix. 34.

² Luke xv. 11-32.

³ Luke xx. 41-44.

⁴ Matt. xv. 21-28, especially vs. 23, 24, 26; Matt. xxvi. 45; Mark ii. 17.

⁵ Luke xi. 48.

⁶ Mark x. 25.

⁷ Matt. xxiii. 13-39.

⁸ Mark iv. 34.

⁹ Matt. viii. 10; Mark vi. 6; Luke vii. 9.

¹⁰ Mark iii. 5.

so far from being in full sympathy with his life and aims, "had great possessions," and "went away grieved."¹

He sighed — στενάω:² — He sighed deeply — ἀναστενάω:³ — twice it is said that He groaned — ἐμβριμάσθαι:⁴ — He cried out in agony:⁵ He wept at the tomb of Lazarus⁶ and over Jerusalem.⁷ In Gethsemane He declared himself "exceeding sorrowful even unto death;"⁸ and the intensity of the agony showed itself in sweat-drops of blood. During the bodily pain and weakness of crucifixion, for a moment He fell victim to despair in his cry, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me!" almost immediately recovering himself in the last words of faith, "It is finished! Father, into thy hands I commend my Spirit!"

Turning now, in the third place, from mental and emotional habitudes to a study of unusual psychological phenomena, we are led to observe, that, while the Christ was discerning of the minds and characters of men to a very remarkable degree and intensely prophetic in aim, vision, and utterance, He was not omniscient.

1. He was discerning of the minds and characters of men. John the apostle says of Him: "He knew all men and needed not that any should testify of man; for He knew what was in man."⁹ This insight was no ordinary discernment. He saw Nathanael afar under the fig-tree, and read the absent stranger's character and history.¹⁰ He not only searched the heart of the Samaritan woman, at the well of Jacob, her present social status and past history were an open book to his all-seeing eye.¹¹ During a dark night, after the feeding of the five thousand, He "saw" the disciples "toiling in rowing" on the Sea of Galilee, though himself ashore.¹² The character and mood of Zaccheus were revealed to an upward glance as the Master passed under the sycamore tree at Jericho.¹³ At a great distance He knew that Lazarus was dead.¹⁴ The treachery of Judas was in vain concealed from Him.¹⁵ Simon Peter¹⁶ and all his disciples were the objects of a scrutiny which would have been uncanny in its marvelous penetration but for its spirit of love and purpose of benevolence. Easily He penetrated the motives of his opponents, as the evangelists frequently assure us.¹⁷

¹ Mark x. 21, 22.⁴ John xi. 33, 38.⁷ Luke xix. 41.¹⁰ John i. 49-51.¹³ Luke xix. 5.¹⁶ Luke xxiii. 31.² Mark vii. 34.⁵ Matt. xxvii. 50.⁸ Matt. xxvi. 38.¹¹ John iv. 17, 18.¹⁴ John xi. 14.¹⁷ Matt. xii. 25; Mark ii. 8, xii. 15; Luke vi. 8.³ Mark viii. 12.⁶ John xi. 35.⁹ John ii. 25.¹² Mark vi. 48.¹⁵ Matt. xxvi. 25.

2. The prophetic afflatus of the Christ was lofty and intense, beyond all human experience of inspiration.

He predicted future events, Peter's downfall,¹ his own death and resurrection,² the persecution of the disciples,³ the fate of individual followers,⁴ the destruction of the Temple⁵ — of Jerusalem⁶ — of the world,⁷ the coming of the Comforter,⁸ the election of the Gentiles,⁹ the completion of his work in his Coming,¹⁰ and the Judgment.¹¹

Moreover, "He spake as never man spake" — his enemies being the judges — in exposition and application of moral and religious truth, adding vastly to the sum total of human knowledge on divine things, never delivering himself after the servile method of the Scribes, and rather "as one having authority." As Messenger of the Covenant, Son of Man, and Son of God, He brought "the Message," at once angel and evangel.

3. *But*, though thus gifted with insight, and thus prophetic, the Christ was not omniscient.

As He himself assured the disciples, "As I hear, I judge."¹² "For I have not spoken of myself."¹³ "But of that day and of that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, *neither the Son, but the Father.*"¹⁴

His oft-repeated prayer in Gethsemane, "O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me," suggests that, up to the very last, and notwithstanding his vision of the dark future, it seemed to Him — perhaps only at times — that his fate might be averted.

His quotations of Old Testament scriptures form an interesting study, in point. They were from memory, and He seems to have exerted no supernatural control over the processes of recollection, and much less lent himself to any miraculous restoration of original readings. Compare Matthew xii. 18 with Isaiah xlii. 1-4. One very remarkable quotation (Luke xi. 49) cannot even be identified in any Old Testament writing, and was, apparently, a fair summing up of the substance of many prophetic utterances of a certain class.

No slightest hint in the Gospels leads us to conclude that He

¹ Matt. xxvi. 34.

² John xvi. 2.

³ Matt. xxiv. 2.

⁴ Matt. xxiv. —.

⁵ Luke xxi. 27, 28.

⁶ John xii. 49.

⁷ Matt. xvi. 21; xx. 17-19.

⁸ Matt. xvi. 28; xxvi. 31.

⁹ Luke xvii. 20-37; xxi. 24.

¹⁰ John xvi. 7.

¹¹ Matt. xxiv. 14.

¹² Matt. xxv. 31-46.

¹³ John v. 30.

¹⁴ Mark xiii. 32.

possessed unusual technical, artistic, or scientific information ; nor that He anticipated future discoveries in mechanics, physics, medicine, political economy, or even Biblical science.

There are none but speculative reasons for asserting that He questioned the current demonology as explanatory of hysteria, epilepsy, idiocy, and mania. He addressed demons as though personal beings,¹ conversed with them,² and cast them out. He spake without interrogation of the Devil,³ and of "his angels,"⁴ of Satan,⁵ and of "the Prince of this World."⁶ Of a woman, "who had been long bowed together and could in no wise lift herself," He queried, "Ought not this woman, . . . whom Satan hath bound, lo, these eighteen years . . . ?"⁷

Moreover, no Scriptural ground whatever can be discovered for supposing that Jesus rejected or modified the biblical criticism of the times. Severely as He reflected upon the follies of Rabbinical tradition, the popular veneration for *τα ἱερὰ γράμματα*, and as well the subservient literalism of learned exegetes, remained unchallenged. He evinced no modifying knowledge of geology or astronomy. Of the prehistoric man, of elementary documents in the Pentateuch, of chronological errors, scholastic interpolations, discrepancies, or text variations, there is left us no hint. He alluded to Scripture quite in the method of Peter and James, Sham-mai and Hillel; and his references were without qualification to Adam, to Abel, to Job, to Moses, and to Jonah.

Finally, the Christ, though gifted with extraordinary power, was not omnipotent.

He could convey himself through multitudes, as at Nazareth and Jerusalem.⁸ He turned water into wine, multiplied loaves, and calmed the storm. He healed the sick, even at a distance,⁹ and often by a mere touch;¹⁰ and He raised the dead. Himself arose from the dead, and after the resurrection He appeared and disappeared at will, mysteriously.

But He made no claim to omnipotence. Indeed, He plainly declared of himself: "I can of mine own self do nothing."¹¹ "The Son can do nothing of himself but what he seeth the Father do."¹² "I must work the works of Him that sent me; while it is day."¹³ "The works that I do in my Father's name they bear

¹ Matt. xvii. 18.² Luke viii. 30.³ Matt. xiii. 39; John viii. 44.⁴ Matt. xxv. 41.⁵ Matt. xii. 26; Luke x. 18.⁶ John xii. 31.⁷ Luke xiii. 16.⁸ John viii. 59.⁹ John iv. 53.¹⁰ Mark vi. 56.¹¹ John v. 30.¹² John v. 19.¹³ John ix. 4.

witness of me."¹ Very effective is the striking confession made to the Apostles on that last night in which He was betrayed. "The words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself, but the Father that dwelleth in me, He doeth the works."²

We are not surprised, therefore, when we read,³ that ere healing the deaf and dumb man, "He looked unto heaven," or that at the grave of Lazarus He prayed and gave thanks, in these words: "Father, I thank thee that thou hast heard me!"⁴ He bade the exorcised Gadarene tell his friends how great things "the Lord hath done for thee," clearly referring to Jehovah.⁵ And on one occasion,⁶ indignantly denying the charge of his defamers that He wrought miracles by necromancy, He only claimed for himself that He cast out devils by the Spirit of God. "But if I with the finger of God cast out devils, etc."⁷ And He distinguished between himself and the Divine Spirit by adding that while a sin against the Son of Man could be forgiven, blasphemy against the Holy Spirit "hath never forgiveness."

It was quite in keeping, then, with the modesty of his own claim when Luke declared,⁸ that, on a certain day when multitudes pressed Him, "the power of the Lord was present to heal them." Nor was there any incongruity in his own rebuke to Peter, when at the crisis of his life in Gethsemane He assured the doughty apostle, "Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and He shall presently *give me* more than twelve legions of angels?"⁹

Mark¹⁰ even went so far as to limit his miracle-working power, with conditions of success external entirely to himself, in the declaration that at Nazareth He "could do no mighty work" (*οὐκ ἔδύνατο*); Matthew, in the parallel passage, explaining that this was owing to unbelief.¹¹

And John the Baptist occupied precisely this standpoint of the contemporaneous disciples, in his assurance, "For God giveth not the Spirit by measure unto him."¹²

Undoubtedly Luke at once stated the theology of the apostolic group, and revealed the very secret of Christ's marvelous power, when he explained, "And Jesus returned *in the power of the Spirit* into Galilee."¹³

It need scarcely be added that a quite similar impression as to the sources of his power was made upon the wondering multitudes.

¹ John x. 25.

² John xiv. 10.

³ Mark vii. 34.

⁴ John xi. 41.

⁵ Mark v. 19.

⁶ Matt. xii. 28.

⁷ Luke xi. 20.

⁸ Luke v. 17.

⁹ Matt. xxvi. 53.

¹⁰ Mark vi. 5.

¹¹ Matt. xiii. 58.

¹² John iii. 34.

¹³ Luke iv. 14.

Thus, when our Lord healed the demoniac, whom his disciples in his absence had utterly failed to restore, "they were all amazed at the mighty power of God."¹

So far from claiming for his miracles an exercise of might, wholly superior in kind and intensity to the occasional triumphs of faith, Christ felt himself in this regard as but one of a noble army of heroes and martyrs who even as miracle-workers were his worthy predecessors, and He anticipated many followers of like gift.²

We learn then from the facts, that Jesus, having "increased" in stature and wisdom until suddenly filled of the Divine Spirit, uttered the "Word of God" — in speech, person, and life the Christ, the Son of God, and the Saviour of men. As the Christ, though wonderfully discerning, and though exalted to the topmost pinnacle of prophetic vision, He was not omniscient, and, though a worker of many wonderful miracles, not omnipotent. Which is precisely the standpoint of the apostle Paul in his Epistles, as is plainly stated (Phil. ii. 6, 7): "Who being in the form of God thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but made himself of no reputation — *εἰπὼν ἐκένωσεν* — (*emptied himself*), and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men."

These undeniable facts would seem to compel an honest thinker to acceptance of the following propositions, defining the dogmatic significance of the human limitations of the Christ.

1. The Christ of the Gospels was a tangible Redeemer, no shadowy theophany, no spectral personality, but a near, tender, human, and humane Saviour, — never merely human, never wholly divine. The deity in the God-man was self-limited to the necessary conditions of bodily incarnation, personal growth, and historical existence, — "emptied for the time" of absolute attributes. The Jesus of history may be compared with our incandescent electric lamps, a soul of light in a body of glass: the light in essence was the very glory of God, lessened in intensity to the capacity and need of whoso should behold.

2. Hence, the silences of Christ were not all necessarily significant. Often, they showed only unwillingness to illuminate dark problems not yet in current discussion, or to anticipate standpoints of thought and social, ecclesiastical, or theological conditions of the remote future. His divine consciousness was wisely focused upon present issues, and his preaching the practical appli-

¹ Luke ix. 43.

² John xiv. 12; Mark xvi. 18.

cation of eternal principles of morality and divine grace to common every-day situations.

To show that Jesus did not specifically describe and enjoin coming reforms furnishes no valid argument against such movements, provided they evolve themselves out of Christian principles.

3. It follows, also, that we are compelled to allow for *local coloring* in his utterances, precisely as we allow for idiom and provincialism and trope in his use of the vernacular.

We are to interpret Him as a being who breathed an atmosphere and formed part of a landscape. To accept his parables as though all spoken in the categorical imperative by a Voice of God thundering from the skies to all lands and ages, is a procedure out of harmony alike with historical sense and with spiritual discernment.

Though occupying the theological standpoint of the Nicene Creed, we are yet to account for the necessary limitations of our Lord's humanity and the rich suggestiveness on this subject of the four Gospels.

It is perfectly legitimate to aver, that the incidental allusions of our Saviour to Adam, Abel, Job, Moses, and Jonah form no bar to warranted scientific conclusions in geology, anthropology, chronology, and Biblical criticism. Boldly we may protest our loyalty to the Divine Christ and from the standpoint of the Nicene Creed; albeit we insist that the questions of the composition of the Pentateuch, of the historical verity of Jonah's deliverance, of the prehistoric man, and like enigmas, are all open to discussion, discovery, and unprejudiced conclusion.

And even touching his attitude toward demonology, a similar reasonableness of interpretation is allowable. His conversation with demons and his attributing the crippled woman's infirmity to Satan's device indicate only that his mission was of religious and not of scientific revelation, and do not necessarily furnish any pathological explanation of idiocy, lunacy, mania, hysteria, and epilepsy. Whether we attribute his seeming acceptance of the current and ancient hypotheses of "possession" and "selenism" to accommodation or to the involuntary focusing of his divine consciousness upon the popular and practical aspect of facts, we are at least permitted to allow for it as local coloring, consistent with the honesty of his purpose and the peculiarities of his mission. And without any thought of depreciation or feeling of irreverence, we may refuse to believe that lunatics are moonstruck, or that

maniacs are possessed. Nor will such conclusion involve any valid charge against Jesus of credulity or of superstition. A theory of disease which had been universally accepted by the sages of Egypt, Babylonia, and Greece, which was at the beginning of our era unquestioned by any authority, and which having survived the Middle Age is advocated to-day by not a few men of scholastic learning, cannot be viewed as either credulous or superstitious for a Jew of the first century. At most, it was a shadow on the landscape or an unnoticeable taint in the atmosphere.

We are surely not obliged to stake the validity of Christ's work upon the correctness of an exploded pathology, nor upon a system of Biblical exegesis, which, if not exploded, is suffering disastrous defeat all along the line; and the statements and suggestions of the Gospels render such over-zeal quite *de trop*.

4. Finally, we learn the essential unity of the divine and the human. Deity is humane, humanity may become divine. God is our Father, we are his children. The doctrine of the God-man is not only a statement of the Incarnation, but as well a parable of the Moral Union of the Finite and the Infinite.

C. Van Norden.

SUFFIELD, CONN.

EDITORIAL.

THE ORDINATION OF MR. TORREY.

THE ordination to the Christian Ministry of Mr. Daniel Temple Torrey has attracted much attention and comment. It is important that the proceedings in this case be generally and correctly understood, and to promote this end we put on record the main documents and facts.

The ordaining council was convened by the following Letter Missive : —

DORCHESTER, MASS., May 28.

The Harvard Congregational Church in Dorchester sendeth greeting to the — — —

DEAR BRETHREN : — Mr. Daniel Temple Torrey, a member of this Church, has had charge, since its organization, of its pulpit and pastoral work. We do not know how long this relation of service may continue, as it has been from the first Mr. Torrey's hope and intention to enter upon the Foreign Missionary Work. But we desire that he may be able, so long as he may continue to serve us, to discharge all the functions of the Ministry. We therefore ask your attendance by Pastor and Delegate, at an Ecclesiastical Council, to be held in our House of Worship at Dorchester, on Monday, June 4, at 3 o'clock P. M., to examine Mr. Torrey, with a view to his Ordination to the Christian Ministry, as an Evangelist, and, if he is approved, to assist in the service of ordination, on the evening of the same day at 7 o'clock.

Yours in the Fellowship of the Gospel,

THOMAS W. BICKNELL,

HENRY N. MARR,

FRANK L. MILLER,

Committee of Church.

CHURCHES INVITED.

Dedham, First Church ; Norwood Congregational Church ; Boston, Dorchester, Second Church ; Boston Union ; Boston, South, Phillips ; Boston, Dorchester, Village Church ; Boston Highlands, Eliot ; Boston, West Roxbury, South Evangelical ; Boston, Jamaica Plain ; Boston Highlands, Immanuel ; Boston, Neponset, Trinitarian ; Hyde Park, First ; Boston, Dorchester, Pilgrim ; Boston Highlands, Highland ; Boston Highlands, Walnut Avenue ; Boston, Olivet ; Quincy, Wollaston ; Boston, Boylston, Jamaica Plain ; Hyde Park, Clarendon ; Islington ; East Walpole ; Atlantic, Memorial ; Dorchester, Bethany Church.

The above churches constitute the Suffolk South Conference, of which the Harvard Congregational Church of Dorchester is a member.

Also, the following churches : —

The Old South Church, Boston ; the Park Street Church, Boston ; the Mt. Vernon Church, Boston ; the Berkeley Street Church, Boston ; the Central Church, Boston ; the Shawmut Church, Boston ; the Harvard Cong'l Church, Harvard ; the Chapel Cong'l Church, Andover ; the South Cong'l Church, Andover ; the Topsfield Cong'l Church, Topsfield.

Also the following persons : —

Rev. J. H. Means, D. D., Dorchester ; M. H. Buckham, D. D., LL. D., Burlington, Vermont ; Rev. L. O. Brastow, D. D., New Haven, Conn. ; Rev.

William J. Tucker, D. D., Andover ; Rev. William E. Merriman, D. D., Boston.

Rev. Dr. Davis and Rev. Mr. Hamilton having each declined to be nominated for Moderator, Professor Tucker was nominated and unanimously chosen. Rev. C. C. Kellogg was appointed Scribe. When the Council was ready for business, one of the pastors present offered this resolution : —

"Resolved, that this Council considers it not in accordance with due Congregational order, to ordain candidates to the ministry who are not under call to some definite work, and expecting to engage in it, either as pastor or evangelist, home missionary or foreign missionary; and believing that such action lessens the proper safeguards to the ministry, and is liable to be used to promote unworthy or questionable ends, it declines to proceed in the matter laid before it."

The point of order was raised, that the churches represented in the Council having consented to advise the Harvard Church under the Letter Missive, the Council could not consider such a resolution at that stage in the proceedings. The chair sustained the objection and on appeal was sustained by the Council, 19 to 13. Several members of the Council had not arrived when this vote was taken. The Council then listened to statements of the action of the church and parish in calling Mr. Torrey, to his reply to the same, and to an account by him of his reasons for desiring ordination as proposed in the call of the Council. It appeared that he had been invited to serve as acting pastor, and had accepted the invitation ; also that he had long cherished the desire to engage in foreign missionary work, particularly in Japan, and still hoped to do so, and for this reason did not wish to be installed as Pastor of the Harvard Church. He gave a sketch of the rise and growth of this consecration of himself to foreign service, and a full summary of his religious beliefs. The case being thus fully presented, the Council considered, without objection from any member, the resolution introduced at the opening. After an interesting discussion it was rejected, 27 nays, 16 yeas. We have reason to suspect that one vote was counted with the minority through a misunderstanding of the form of the question on the part of the voter. The resolution was then a third time presented, assuming the form of a protest. It received fifteen signatures.

The following preamble and resolution were then introduced : —

"Inasmuch as it is an obvious inference from the Letter Missive, which inference has been confirmed by statements made by the candidate, that the proposed ordination is but a preliminary toward entering the foreign missionary work, the candidate having not only had no call to such work, but his application for it having been twice considered and failed of acceptance, we deem it especially undesirable that this church, so recently received into our fellowship, be made an instrument in reopening in our churches a former controversy and the renewing of an unprofitable agitation we hoped had passed ; and we are also unwilling to put ourselves and the churches we represent in

opposition to brethren who have already considered the question. Therefore, *Resolved*, that we, as a Council, decline to proceed in the matter submitted to us."

This document was laid on the table after discussion. A motion was then made and seconded to adopt the following resolution:—

"*Resolved*, that this Council proceed to ordain Mr. D. T. Torrey to the Christian Ministry as acting pastor in this church according to their request, without reference to his personal qualifications for the foreign missionary work."

Upon a motion so to amend, the Council struck out the last clause, viz., "without reference to his personal qualifications for the foreign missionary work." The resolution was then changed so as to read:—

"*Resolved*, that this Council proceed to examine Mr. D. T. Torrey with a view to ordination to the Christian Ministry, as acting pastor in this church, according to their request."

In this form the resolution was adopted, and the roll was called for questions. Very few were asked. We note those to which importance has been attached, with the answers of the candidate.

The following report appeared in a letter published in the "Congregationalist," June 14:—

Qu. "Do you hold to your views on future probation as they have already appeared in print?—and the paragraph was indicated.

Ans. "I do, provided my use of the word 'hypothesis' be understood.

Qu. "What do you mean by the word 'hypothesis'?"

Ans. "A supposition which cannot be proved.

Qu. "Do you mean to say, then, that you do not know that there is a probation hereafter for those who have not heard of Christ in this world?"

Ans. "I do, but I must say I hope there is; and that is all I have ever said.

Qu. "You are, then, an agnostic so far as a future probation is concerned?"

Ans. "Yes."

A fuller and more exact report appeared in the "Boston Evening Traveller," June 5. It reads:—

Qu. "Does the candidate desire to withdraw the statements he made regarding future probation in the letters addressed to the American Board, including the words, 'I hold the hypothesis of future probation'? Is your language the same, and do you accept that statement of your views to-day?"

Ans. "I will answer the question simply by saying that, with a proper understanding of the word 'hypothesis,' I do not wish to withdraw the statement.

Qu. "Will you be good enough to explain your use of the word 'hypothesis'?"

Ans. "Yes, sir. I understand by the use of that term, or, rather, I mean by the use of it, a supposition which is not without ground, but which we are not able to prove.

Qu. "You would not affirm that there is an opportunity for those in the

other world who have never heard of Christ to hear the gospel? You simply say, 'It may be so.' That is, you do not know.

Ans. "No, sir; I do not know. I know nothing about the future in one sense of the word.

Qu. "You don't know whether there is a gospel offered hereafter to those who have not received it in this world?

Ans. "No, sir; but I must be permitted to say that I do not mean the same to indicate that I have no hope, or that I have no ground.

Qu. "Then you hope that there may be such a thing, but you do not know.

Ans. "That is the position I have always held. [Loud applause.]

Qu. "What is the nature of the ground of that position? Is it Scriptural in character or on the ground of reason?

Ans. "I may reply to that question by reaffirming the latter clause of my statement—that the position I take is grounded in Scripture and in our knowledge of God as revealed.

Qu. "How largely do you trust the gospel in its results? Are you looking for the speedy coming of Christ, as you term it, or do you think the gospel will be preached largely, at any rate, in all parts of the earth?

Ans. "I do not measure my hope by time, but by the grace and love of God.

Qu. "I understand that the candidate does not retract or withdraw his views about future probation?

Ans. "That is so."

No one desiring to ask any further questions, the Council voted to be by itself. When it reappeared it was announced that the Council had passed this resolution by a vote of 38 to 2:—

"*Resolved*, that the Council proceed to ordain Mr. Torrey to the Christian ministry as acting pastor of this church, in accordance with their request, without reference to his personal qualifications for foreign missionary work, either for or against."

It also became known that eleven names originally attached to the protest had been withdrawn, leaving only four, and one of these that of a pastor who had left before the action was taken which led so many of his associates to cancel their subscriptions; also that the resolution which had been tabled was taken up and withdrawn by request of the mover. It was also understood to have been agreed that Mr. Torrey was left entirely free to go abroad whenever he chose, the Council confining its attention to the question whether it would ordain him as acting pastor according to the request of the church.

These are the main facts, in bare outline. Mr. Torrey desired to remain free to go abroad as a missionary, and the church desired that while he remained with them he should be able to discharge all the functions of the Christian ministry. Both desires were gratified.

It would be entirely unfair to construe the strong vote for Mr. Torrey's ordination as designed to express disapproval of his rejection by the Prudential Committee. The Council said emphatically that in character and abilities he is a fit man to be a Christian minister. It did not consider his

fitness to work under the Board, any more than it considered the Board's fitness, under its present management, to employ young men of his type of personality. Either question was *ultra vires*.

There is nothing unusual in the practical unanimity with which a man holding Mr. Torrey's opinions, and actuated by his spirit, received ministerial fellowship. Probably, with an equally intelligent apprehension of the facts in the case, the same result would have been reached by any Congregational Council in any section of the country. Mr. Torrey's statements have been somewhat more pronounced than those of many others in substantial agreement with him who have received ordination in recent years in different parts of the land, but the difference is unimportant, and men of his way of thinking, otherwise qualified, need have no concern as to whether or not there is room for them in the Congregational ministry.

Though the Council had nothing to do with the action of the Prudential Committee, — it would indeed be a strange anomaly, after the votes at Springfield spurning any use of councils, if councils were obliged to regard the Board or its management, — we are not surprised that the secular press comments freely upon the contrasts between Council and Committee. The latter, though not unanimously, rejected Mr. Torrey; the former accepted him, the only recorded dissentients being a member of the Prudential Committee and a delegate from the church of which he is pastor. The ground of rejection by the Committee was solely doctrinal. On the same statement of his faith the Council approved him. The Committee consists of ten gentlemen, residing in Boston and vicinity. The Council was composed of four times as many gentlemen, appointed to represent the churches of the same locality. The Committee is a secret tribunal; Mr. Torrey was never seen by its members. The Council was a public deliberative body before which Mr. Torrey appeared in person. His public answers to questions removed prejudices, and relieved difficulties, and men who had been distrustful of his doctrinal position were disabused of their fears.

The secular press has drawn an inference which is likely to become general. Whatever may be said as to the differences between home and foreign service, they do not lie in the grounds of divergence between the action of the Council and the Committee. Unless common sense has abandoned the "majority" at Springfield, the doors of the Board cannot remain closed to men like Mr. Torrey.

Some communications that have been addressed to the public since the Council dissolved may make the impression that Mr. Torrey, before the Council, not only explained but modified previous statements. Such an impression would be incorrect. On the special question thrust upon him by the Home Secretary of the American Board, his statement to the Council was identical with his statement to the Secretary. The "Traveller" reports correctly his declaration: "That is the position I have always held." It also gives his identical words (as we know by a note taken by us at the moment) in answer to the inquiry respecting his use of the word

'hypothesis' in the sentence so unjustly harped upon by the Home Secretary. The account we have quoted from a letter to the "Congregationalist" omits an essential part of this reply. Mr. Torrey's answer was: "A supposition *which is not without ground*, but which we are not able to prove." The words we have italicised are noticeably absent from the report given by the letter-writer. In answer to a further question Mr. Torrey indicated the grounds of his hope precisely as in his published correspondence. Such explanation, moreover, as he gave the Council was available for the Prudential Committee before its first action in his case. It was also given to the public in a letter from Mr. Torrey which appeared in the "Congregationalist" of August 20, 1887, in which he said:—

"In a word, then, I do not hold future probation as a *belief*. I am sorry that I did not succeed in making it impossible for any one to think that I do. I hold future probation as an *hypothesis*, a *hope*, resting for whatever support it may have upon God's revelation of Himself in Christ and in the Bible." "By an hypothesis I mean a supposition, not impossible and not unreasonable, although not recognized as an established doctrine. I do not find sufficient warrant in Scripture for a 'belief' in future probation. It is not a part of my creed."

In view of such explicit statements there is not the slightest reason for the suggestion that Mr. Torrey's statement to the Council differed from those before the Board, or which ought to have been laid before it. The simple fact is: All explanations were thrown away upon the Committee; they were not thrown away upon the Council. The difference was not in the statements, but in the men who received them, and in the circumstances in which they were received. If the Council at Harvard shall prove to have helped to greater care and intelligence in apprehending one another's opinions, it will have done its best work in such a result.

We notice that a sensational religious journal, besides starting the absurd representation that the Council was "picked"—a Council which embraced every church of a Conference, and came to its result by a vote of 38 to 2!—sounds the alarm of a new impending agitation against the American Board. It trembles lest Mr. Torrey should make a new application to the Board! We should think it more likely that the Board will be glad to apply to him.

ARE INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC CONTESTS PERNICIOUS?

RECENT action of the Harvard Board of Overseers has presented to friends of the higher education the question whether intercollegiate ball-matches and races ought to form a feature of college life. The Committee whom the Board asked to report upon the influence of these contests on the university presented a paper which characterized them as, on the whole, harmful. It was alleged that physical exercise among the body of students is not promoted by them; and that they are attended with serious evils: withdrawal of students from lectures and recitations;

growth of hostile feeling between members of the various institutions represented, betting, etc. The Board of Overseers did not adopt the stringent measures of repression recommended, but did follow the presentation of the report with the recommendation that the number of contests be diminished, and thus seemed to assent to the strictures of its Committee. Unless we misinterpret its action, it virtually declared that the contests have not by their results fully vindicated their right to exist; that the propriety of permitting them to form a permanent feature of college life is at least an open question. This affirmation, from the eminence of its source, and from the moral courage it exhibits, deserves, and will no doubt receive, careful consideration.¹ Indeed, the report of the Committee was so carefully drawn, and presented such an array of considerations, as to ensure its making a considerable impression upon the public mind. A thorough discussion of the contests by those most competent justly to estimate the benefits and the evils they bring is likely to follow. This will be of important service, even if its result is only a firmer conviction that the contests cannot wisely be abolished. For the view of them expressed in the Committee's report has many adherents among friends of the higher education, and makes an important subtraction from the influence of the colleges.

The decisive fact to be brought out by the discussion is, we think, the relation which the contests sustain to the physical activity of the great body of students. If, as the Harvard Committee think, the contests represent only the trained skill of a few picked men, then they should be given up—for the reason that they are shams. No one would contend that the students of two universities might properly institute annual races between crews of professional oarsmen hired by each and decked with the respective university colors. Races between student crews, who alone of the undergraduates of the institutions represented habitually rowed, would have little more right to exist. The university race must be a sham, and so an evil, unless there be a body of skilled oarsmen in each university.

The intercollegiate contests are known to have such a representative character. The contestants are put forward as the best exponents of the skill of their respective colleges in several manly exercises, and broadly represent the aspiration of the mass of undergraduates for strength and skill of body. Such representative contests can present as their right to exist, besides their intrinsic interest, an important service rendered to undergraduate life. They are a most effective stimulus to physical exercise. The hope of a place on the university crew makes many more oarsmen than the chosen eight. The possibility of belonging to the college nine makes many ball-players who do not reach the coveted

¹ Since the above was written, a committee chosen by the Harvard Faculty from their own number at the request of the Board of Overseers, to inquire into and report upon the effects of the athletic contests, have presented a report embodying substantially the opinions of this article.

honor. And the skill vividly embodied in the contestants stimulates many who do not hope to reach a foremost place. The description of the Oxford races in "Tom Brown at Oxford" illustrates the effect of a system of races in promoting athletic exercise. The college crews would not faithfully row but for the hope of victory. The greater prize of the University race nerves the best oarsmen of the college crews.

With regard to this decisive fact, the relation of the contests to the physical activity of the body of students, we believe that the opinion of the Harvard Committee cannot be accepted, at any rate as regards college life in general. Certainly the Yale "teams" and "crew" stand for much exercise besides their own. About forty men play baseball regularly; many more occasionally. About sixty play football. The number of men training in the gymnasium in the winter is about one hundred. These, to be sure, are but a fraction of the whole number of students. But their example and the interest the contests excite presumably stimulate a large number to exercise. Evidence that this is the case is shown by the introduction into college life of new games — tennis, cricket, lacrosse. If what is true of Yale is true of other institutions, if the contests have living roots in collegiate life, and foster love of exercise in a considerable part of the undergraduates, they have, it may be fairly presumed, a right to exist.

No one will deny that athletic play is beneficial to the undergraduates, that it not only supplies bodily exercise, but a healthful and needed diversion. No one acquainted with American college life will deny that the majority of students are disposed to neglect physical exercise. Not only opportunity for active play, but stimulus to taking it, is one of the needs of student life. An attractive system of exercise is, therefore, recognized as a part of the equipment of a college. Gymnastics are presented by some as most economically supplying the want. But the facts underlying the present discussion show that they do not meet it. They give the opportunity for play, but only for a small minority do they have the zest which belongs to the most desirable physical recreation. The German university student delights in them, but the American, like the English youth, requires a stronger motive to overcome inertia than their formal routine presents. This is afforded by a competitive game, in which strength and skill are called out to secure victory. The emulation involved in such a game does not, of course, present a moral objection to it. The contest is not for an actual, but a fictitious, victory, and is included in the play. The desire to beat is not ignoble, as a secondary motive. A person too good to enjoy a victory in tennis, or in chess, is too good for this world.

If the athletic contests shall be found, upon full inquiry, to have living roots, and to foster a love of physical vigor, the evils attending them must be, indeed, grievous and incurable, to be a sufficient reason for abolishing them.

As to this, those in management of the colleges must decide; but it

is not presumptuous for outsiders to point out that in making their decision they will remember that the question is not what is ideally best, but what is best, considering the preference and character of the mass of young men. Taking this into the account, we may forecast their estimate of some of the considerations urged by the Harvard Committee. One of these is the intellectual loss suffered by the participants in the athletic contests. We admit the loss. The members of the competing "crews" and "nines" give, on the whole, more time and strength to training than is desirable. Few men are so made as to be able to do their studies full justice while striving for the greatest possible physical skill and endurance. Too much of the capital of vital force is given to bodily toil. Yet the comparatively short time given to the severest training, and the fact that men of high scholarship are often found in winning "teams," must be considered. It must be remembered, too, that there are important gains. The powerful men who contend for their colleges gain from vigorous exercise and the discipline of training much relief from physical temptation. Absolute disuse of spirituous liquor and tobacco is required of both ball-players and oarsmen. And the self-control required in rowing a race or playing on a ball-ground before thousands of shouting spectators is a possession of no mean value. Granting that the gain probably does not usually compensate for the loss, it may be claimed that the difference is not so great that the choice can be forbidden. If the members of the contesting "crews" and "nines" maintain the required average at recitations and examinations, the contests ought not to be prohibited on the ground of their interference with study.

The excitement which the contests occasion is sometimes urged against them, but, in our judgment, without reason. Men who lead sedentary lives are benefited by occasional excitement, provided it be not vicious. Young men shut up to a life of study are less likely to commit physical excesses if occasionally roused to demonstrative enthusiasm. The acknowledged diminution of rowdyism in American colleges in the last twenty years is believed to be in large measure attributable to the athletic contests.

Some of the evils charged upon the contests by the Committee are not necessarily involved in them. They foster, it is said, the practice of betting. But those who stake money on their college crew have no principle against the wager, and in this instance are chiefly actuated by a pecuniary motive. Loyalty to one's college is not held to require betting upon its athletic champions. To fight this vice, therefore, by removing an intrinsically harmless occasion of it would be irrational. If students are to be kept from betting they must be made to see the immorality of the wager. It is to be feared that the excitement of the contests causes much profanity. Is this an important reason for abolishing them?

The contests, it is said, impose a heavy tax upon the students. A large sum of money must be raised for them every year, and many

students are tempted to subscribe a larger sum than they can give without wronging themselves or their friends. But more money may have been expended than was needed. Young men are apt to spend lavishly upon that which they greatly care for. It seems unlikely that a system of athletic contests necessarily requires more money than the body of students can honestly give. If so, how can so much be spared for betting as we are told is wagered upon the boat-race? There are many whose ability to contribute is large, and those who can give but little suffer no real hardship in giving according to their ability. The college authorities will probably see no greater reason for interference here than other voluntary expenditures, such as for societies, or "spreads." They will say that if their students desire to spend five thousand dollars for an annual boat race, it is to be presumed that they have the sum to expend, and that their giving it to this or any other not immoral purpose is not a matter which calls for the attention of a college government. It is urged that feeling is engendered by the contests, which lives after graduation. This is indeed a serious aspersion upon American manhood, — the charge that the alumni of one great institution dislike those of another because of the athletic rivalry of student days. We cannot accept it unless fuller testimony be presented than has yet been given. That the feeling of rivalry between undergraduates, and especially between members of competing "teams," tends to degenerate into bitter partisanship is true. The temptation is incident to all competitive effort, and is not a sufficient reason for refraining from a beneficent competition. Rather than abolish intercollegiate contests because they involve it, the college faculties will bid their students face it, and gain by overcoming it a stronger manhood.

COMMENT ON CURRENT DISCUSSION.

JUSTICE AND MERCY.

In the June number of the "New Englander" Professor George B. Stevens of the Yale Divinity School offers a searching criticism of the positions taken by Rev. Dr. A. H. Strong in a discourse concerning the Holiness of God, which appears in his recent volume entitled "Philosophy and Religion." Exception is taken by Professor Stevens to the distinction made between God's holiness or justice which is exercised necessarily, and his love or mercy which is exercised optionally. Dr. Strong says that justice must be exercised, but that benevolence or love may be exercised or not; that as we may be kind but must be righteous, so God, in whose image we are made, may be merciful, but must be holy; that mercy is optional with Him.

Objection is made by Professor Stevens on several grounds. He argues that since love, by Dr. Strong's own statement, is an essential attribute, it cannot remain passive or quiescent, but that it must be eternally operative as truly as justice must be; and so God would not be God if He did not love the created spirits that have never sinned. He

argues that love should not be compared with omnipotence, which may or may not be exercised, since power is the exercise of will and depends on will, but love is a moral concept which concerns personal relations. He argues that even with regard to sinners love cannot be subordinate to justice, for as matter of fact, love, the weaker attribute, has triumphed. And if it is said that justice does have its way in the penal inflictions which were visited upon the God-man, it must be remembered that Christ, who bore those penalties, is divine, and that love led Him to suffer, and therefore love is really supreme and triumphant. "If love is a subordinate attribute in God, we affirm that it is logically inconceivable that a plan of grace for sinners should ever arise." "If love is not, at least, coördinate with justice in the divine nature, no logical ground can be found in the divine Being for the work of redemption. We believe that the perfection and glory of the divine Being consist in the eternally perfect harmony in unity of all the qualities of his life. To us this stratification of attributes is unsatisfactory in itself and doubly so in the results to which it leads. . . . We regard it as fatal to Dr. Strong's analysis that it gives no logical ground in the being of God for the work of atoning love, imperils the divine essence in a war with itself, and gives no better reason why the feebler principle prevails over the stronger than that God, within the realm of his own being, expends his wrath upon Himself, a proceeding to which, if it were not inherently absurd, He could have been animated only by *love*." Professor Stevens challenges the illustration from man's moral nature to the effect that he *may* be kind, but *must* be righteous, asking if men are not under moral obligation to be kind, and if the moral obligation to be righteous is higher (than) or different from the obligation to be kind. It is shown that Dr. Strong has confounded two widely different conceptions: the conception of God's obligations to *sinners* as such, and the conception of his obligations to himself as the perfect Being. The sinner, considered as a sinner, can make no claim upon God's mercy, but this does not reduce God's love to a precarious and subordinate place. "Dr. Strong has been so anxious to deny the former ground of obligation, that he has actually denied *any* and *all* obligation on the part of God to exercise an obvious moral attribute."

A fine point is made upon Dr. Strong's assumption that we do not *thank* God for his justice, for He *must* be just, but do thank Him for his love since that is optional. It is shown that "we do praise and adore him for his justice as part of his moral excellence, precisely as we praise and adore him for his love. If we do not *thank* Him for his justice, and do thank Him for his love, it is simply because love is the giving side of his being—that side of his nature which is related to us as blame-worthy and undeserving, and not because the one is necessary and the other optional. We thank God, of course, for what we do *not* deserve; we cannot thank Him for what we *do* deserve; but the difference is not grounded upon the necessary character of the latter and the optional

character of the former, but upon the *relation* which we sustain to him, in the one case as *undeserving* and in the other as *deserving*."

We have indicated some of these points of Professor Stevens's criticism, both because his treatment of the subject is convincing and discriminating, and because the misapprehension he so successfully removes is quite common in popular thought. The conception of the justice in relation to the grace of God in Christ is of the greatest importance for a correct understanding of the gospel, and we welcome this contribution to the discussion of the subject. Dr. Strong seems to have gone farther than Dr. Shedd went in his sermon, entitled "The Exercise of Mercy Optional with God," for the latter dwells almost exclusively on the ill desert of sinners and the necessities of penalty which rest heavy upon them, so that they have no claim on the mercy of God.

A suggestive paragraph appeared some time ago in the London "Spectator," which presents an admirable discrimination on this subject, and which runs as follows:—

"When you come to examine the matter you find that what Scripture deals with is the love of God for man, and the hatred of God for sin, and that while sometimes the one teaching predominates, and sometimes the other, there is no intention at all of defining exactly for how much the one principle will or will not count, if it should ever have to be weighed absolutely against the other. The revelation never makes the attempt to measure the one against the other. It holds out the most indefinite, or rather infinite, hopes, based upon the love of God for man. It holds out the most indefinite, or rather infinite, fears, based upon the hatred of God for sin. And sometimes the two different streams of teaching seem to be in conflict with each other, like a flood with a devouring flame. Clearly, however, it was not intended that man should try to gauge the relative force of each. We were intended to hope everything from God's love, if we could learn to lean upon that love, to care to welcome it. We were intended to fear everything from his righteousness, if we could feel no joy in that righteousness, nothing but terror of it. But the great revelations thus made to the spiritual affections of man were not intended to be intellectual revelations to his reason of the relative weight of these two diverse principles. We were created to weigh the sun against the planets,—nay, it may be, to weigh the sun against the fixed stars,—but not to weigh one infinite attribute of God's against another equally infinite attribute of his. The Christian revelation was the grafting of a new life in our hearts, not the imparting of a new calculus of the infinite to our minds. So far as it has been treated in the former light it has regenerated our spirits; so far as it has been tortured into the latter capacity, it has turned us into either bigots or doctrinaire optimists. Where divine justice begins and divine mercy ends, is not a question on which finite minds can speculate with any good result. All we were intended to know on this head is, that the divine love we crave we may have without stint,—that the divine purity we dread, we shall not escape from, either in this life or the next."

THE INAUGURATION OF PROFESSOR RYDER.

HON. CHARLES THEODORE RUSSELL, a former Visitor of Andover Theological Seminary, who retired from service on account of his having

reached the constitutional limit of age, presented to the Board, on the trial of the accused Professors, a carefully prepared and impressive sketch of the way in which from the founding of the Seminary its Creed had been construed. "For eighty years," he remarked, "these Statutes and Creed have, without deviation, been construed in the manner I have stated: — strictly and firmly, in every necessity to security; broadly, tolerantly, and liberally, in every essential to that intellectual and spiritual freedom and progress without whose conserving influences creeds fall from living organisms to fossils."

The recent inauguration of Professor Ryder at Andover added another interesting precedent to those which Mr. Russell adduced. Before subscribing the Creed Professor Ryder read a paper which had been submitted by him to the Visitors who confirmed him, — President Seelye, Rev. Dr. Eustis, Hon. Joshua N. Marshall, — and which had met with their approval.

Professor Ryder's statement is also of interest at this time as showing how a mature Christian pastor and scholar approaches such a Creed, and what principles of construction and interpretation, apart from existing controversies and unaffected by them, he naturally and conscientiously adopts. We give his statement in full.

"While confessing to a preference for expressing my own convictions in my own language, were that permissible upon this occasion, I can say with all sincerity that the creed to which I am now to give assent approves itself to me by its orthodox soundness and its broad catholicity. As I interpret it there is not a fundamental religious doctrine expressed in it to which I cannot fully subscribe. Nor do I feel that such subscription will fetter me in my search for truth or embarrass me in my efforts to 'open and explain the Scriptures to my pupils with integrity and faithfulness.'

"Under ordinary circumstances I might be willing to give assent to it with the simple statement that I accept it 'for substance of doctrine.' But desiring to avoid all possible ambiguity and all occasion for misapprehension, I choose to preface my subscription with the remarks which follow: —

"I. I express my acceptance of the creed as I understand its framers intended it should be accepted — as the statement of 'the fundamental and distinguishing doctrines of the gospel.' I am not to be understood as assenting to all the doctrinal views which some or all of the framers may have held and taught, but only to those which they included in their creed. I do not subscribe to their psychology or metaphysics, or to all their interpretations of Scripture, but simply to the 'doctrines of the gospel as expressed in the creed.'

"II. I accept the creed as a whole, with the limitations and interpretations which certain parts of it put upon other parts. I should shrink from saying that I believe that 'every man' is 'morally incapable of recovering the image of his creator, which was lost in Adam,' and is therefore 'justly exposed to eternal damnation;' and that 'by nature every man is personally depraved,' were I not permitted to say also that I believe 'that man has understanding and corporeal strength to do all that God requires of him; so that nothing but the sinner's aversion to holiness prevents his salvation.' The men who constructed this creed had the later confession in view when they expressed the earlier. So have I, as I subscribe to it.

"III. I accept different parts of the creed with different degrees of confidence. The doctrine 'that there is one and but one living and true God,' I hold with a settled confidence and a degree of clearness of apprehension which I cannot give to the statement which describes the experiences of redeemed souls in the intermediate state. I assent to the latter doctrine as I understand it, but I am not so sure that I apprehend the thought of the framers, or that their own thoughts were perfectly clear upon this subject, as I am concerning their statement upon the former doctrine.

"IV. As requiring more specific interpretation, I note the following points :—

"1. When I affirm my belief that 'the Word of God contained in the Scriptures is . . . the only perfect rule of faith and practice,' I do not affirm that I believe that all souls that leave the world without a knowledge of the Scriptures — and therefore have lived and died without acquaintance with the only perfect rule of faith and practice — are hopelessly lost ; but simply, as the framers of the creed intended, that, as opposed to ecclesiastical tradition and authority, and to the unaided human reason, the Scriptures alone teach the pure truth of God and the way of holiness.

"2. When I speak of the Son as one person in the Godhead and adopt the phrase 'The eternal Son of God,' I do not affirm that the term Son of God, as used in the Scriptures, describes the Logos as He was before the incarnation, but only that I believe that the Word which became flesh and dwelt among us was in the beginning with God and was God.

"3. When I affirm my belief 'that God created man after his own image in knowledge, righteousness and holiness,' I do not express the belief that human knowledge and moral character are the immediate result of a creative act, but simply that man was made with a capacity for, and a call to, such attainments.

"4. I interpret the expression which refers to Adam as 'the federal head and representative of the human race' as intended primarily to qualify, if not to deny, the statement of the catechism 'that all mankind . . . sinned in him (Adam) and fell with him in his first transgression.' The phrase, as I understand and use it, and as I believe the framers of the creed intended it should be used, asserts the representative character of the first man, 'in consequence of (whose) his disobedience all his descendants were constituted sinners,' and at the same time teaches that the sin charged to every man is not an inherited and involuntary state.

"5. The expression 'faith is the gift of God,' states what I hold to be true, if rightly understood ; but it is my opinion that the phrase is suggested by a mistaken exegesis of a sentence in the Epistle to the Ephesians.

"6. When I solemnly promise 'that I will maintain and inculcate the Christian faith' 'in opposition' to various errorists, I do not pledge myself to seek polemical conflict or to oppose truth which a Pelagian, an Arminian, or a Sabellian may hold, but simply to expose to my pupils the errors of these systems, so far 'as may appertain to my office,' and to inculcate the opposite truth."

BIBLICAL AND HISTORICAL CRITICISM.

THE VIEWS OF THE BABYLONIANS CONCERNING LIFE AFTER DEATH.

AMONG the vast series of facts which the excavation and the decipherment of the cuneiform monuments brought to light, none have proved more fruitful from the point of view of culture history, and comparative mythology, than the information we have been enabled to glean concerning the religion of ancient Babylonia. Studies in religious history are always made with difficulty. The dogmatical statements of a church, the theoretical expoundings of the schools, and the form which these two assume under the influence of popular belief and popular superstition, must all be taken into account. Nor is the problem by any means simplified when we have, as in Babylonia, two distinct systems, of two distinct races, contending for mastery, or at all events but inharmoniously blended. As is well known, the entire religion of the ancient Egyptians has been unfolded by a careful study of their funeral rites and mortuary remains. And it is indeed a canon of anthropology (enlarged upon in the official reports of the Bureau of Ethnology) that investigators should pay especial attention, in studying the culture history of any newly discovered people, to their funeral rites and their views of life after death, since no people, however degraded, have ever been discovered, anywhere, who have not indulged in some speculation upon this subject. Almost as soon as the foundation of the decipherment of the Semitic cuneiform inscriptions was firmly laid, students commenced to search for the religious statements which they must needs reveal. As early as 1854, the celebrated Irish scholar Dr. Edward Hincks read before the Royal Irish Academy a paper on Assyrian Mythology. And it was in the same year that Mr. Hormuzd Rassam discovered the so-called Library of Asurbanipal (Sardanapalus 668-626 B. C.), containing a large number of distinctively religious texts.

The first expression of opinion on the Babylonian view of a hereafter was that of Mr. H. Fox Talbot, in November, 1871, in a paper entitled, "Notes on the Religious Belief of the Assyrians," published in the *Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology*. He remarked there: "It is a question which I believe has hitherto not received any satisfactory answer, whether or not the Assyrians believed in the immortality of the soul and a future state of happiness. There is nothing, as far as I am aware, in the historical inscriptions which throws any light upon this subject, but on the clay tablets of the British Museum I have found two passages which I think indicate their belief with sufficient certainty. They are both prayers for the happiness of the king, first upon earth and afterwards in a future life." And later on in the same series (vol. ii., pp. 29 and 436) Mr. Talbot thought that he had deduced the notion of the future punishment of the wicked. Both Mr. Talbot's assertion concerning the historical annals and his deductions from the liturgical texts were unfounded, yet it is worth while to cite his statements as the first expression of opinion on the subject. To these opinions Mr. W. St. Chad Boscawen lent considerable support by a discussion (*Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology*, iv. 267) of the twelfth tablet of the Nimrod-Epic, and of the Descent of Istar to Hades. Dr. Alfred Jere-

mias, a pupil of Professor Friedrich Delitzsch, the celebrated Leipzig Assyriologist, has recently, however, placed this whole matter on a sounder basis, though he has by no means exhausted the subject.¹

As was already recognized by Boscawen, the first great source for our knowledge of the Babylonian Hades is furnished by the text of the so-called Descent of Istar. The connection in which this story is related is as follows: A man was in distress at the death of his sister. He accordingly betook himself to a magician to learn by what means he would be enabled to release her from Hades. The magician told him the story of the Descent, to show the petitioner that the gates of Hades were not impassable, and advised him to bring offerings to Istar and Tammuz, in the hope that they would aid him in his quest. The poem is at once so instructive for the subject in hand, and so interesting as a specimen of Babylonian literature, that it is worth while to cite as complete a translation as the text permits of at present:—

"To the land whence none return, the region of [darkness],
Istar, the daughter of Sin, inclined her [ear];
The moon-god's daughter inclined her ear
To the house of darkness, the seat of the god Irkalla,
To the house from whose entrance there is no exit,
To the road whose course never leads back,
To the house whose inmate is shut off from light,
Where dust is their sustenance, clay their food.
The light they behold not, in darkness they dwell;
They are clad like a bird with a garment of feathers;
Over the door and bolt is scattered the dust.
Istar, on arriving at the gate of Hades,
To the keeper of the gate addresses a word:
'Keeper of the waters, open thy gate,
Open thy gate that I may enter;
If thou openest not thy gate so that I cannot enter,
I will smash the door, the bolt I will shatter,
I will smash the door posts, I will pull out the doors,
I will bring up the dead, eating, living,'²
The dead will outnumber the living.'
The keeper opened his mouth and speaks,
He says to the princess Istar:
'Stay, my lady, shake it not,
Let me go and report thy name to the queen Allat.'
The keeper entered; he says to the queen Allat,
'These waters thy sister Istar [has crossed].'

When the goddess Allat [heard] these words,
Like a mown herb she sank down,
Like a cut-off *Kuninu* reed she fell to the ground.
'What brought her to me?
These waters I will not share with her;
I should rather eat them like bread and drink them like wine;
I will weep for men who have left their wives,

¹ *Die Babylonisch-Assyrischen Vorstellungen vom Leben nach dem Tode*, nach den Quellen mit Berücksichtigung der alttestamentlichen Parallelen dargestellt von Dr. Alfred Jeremias. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1887.

² Prof. Sayce, in the Hibbert Lectures, p. 146, says: "In the legend of the Descent of Istar in Hades, the goddess is made to threaten that unless she is admitted to the realm of the dead she will let them out in the form of vampires." This is based on *akile baltuti*, which he translates 'eating the living,' but it seems to me that the translation and deduction are both incorrect.

I will weep for handmaids taken from the bosom of their husbands,
For the little child let me weep, who before its time [is wafted hither].

Go, keeper, open for her thy gate,
Strip her according to the ancient rules.'

The keeper went, he opened to her his gate,
Saying, 'Enter, my lady, *Kútu* (the underworld) may rejoice,
The palace of the land whence none return may be glad at thy presence.'
The first gate he made her enter, he began to unclothe her, hurling the grand
diadem from her head.

'Why, O keeper, dost thou take the grand diadem of my head?'

'Enter, my lady, for such are the commands of the goddess of Hades.'

The second gate he made her enter, and went on to unclothe her, throwing
away the jewels of her ears.

'Wherefore, O keeper, hast thou thrown away the jewels of my ears?'

'Enter, my lady, for thus are the commands of the goddess of Hades.'

The third gate he made her enter, he continued to unclothe her, taking the
necklace from her neck.

'Why, O keeper, hast thou taken the necklace from my neck?'

'Enter, my lady, for thus are the commands of the goddess of Hades.'

The fourth gate he made her enter, he continued to unclothe her, taking the
ornaments of her breast.

'Why, O keeper, dost thou take the ornaments of my breast?'

'Enter, my lady, for thus are the commands of the goddess of Hades.'

The fifth gate he made her enter; he continued to unclothe her, taking the
gemmed girdle from her waist.

'Why, O keeper, dost thou take the gemmed girdle of my waist?'

'Enter, my lady, for thus are the commands of the goddess of Hades.'

The sixth gate he made her enter, he divested her, taking the bracelets of her
hands and feet.

'Why, O keeper, dost thou take the bracelets of my hand and feet?'

'Enter, my lady, for thus are the commands of the goddess of Hades.'

The seventh gate he made her enter, he stripped her, taking the cincture of
her body.

'Why, O keeper, dost thou take the cincture of my body?'

'Enter, my lady, for thus are the commands of the goddess of Hades.'

When finally Istar had descended to the land whence none return,

Allat beheld her and waxed wroth.

Istar did not heed counsel, she spat upon her.

Allat opened her mouth and spoke.

To Namtar, her messenger, she addressed a word:

'Go, Namtar . . .

And lead out . . . the goddess Istar;

With disease of the eyes smite her,

With disease of the hips smite her,

With disease of the feet smite her,

With disease of the heart smite her,

With disease of the head smite her,

In her whole body put disease.'

After the lady Istar had descended into Hades,

The cow and bull would not unite, the ass would not approach the female,

The handmaid on the street did not approach the gentleman.

The freeman ceased to give his order,

The girl at his side slept instead of responding to it.

Then Pap-sukal, the messenger of the great gods, bowed his face before the
sun-god Samas:

'Everything is upset below, for all things are full of destruction.'

The sun-god went, he wept before Sin, his father,

In the presence of Ea the king, his tears flowed.

'Istar into the earth descended and has not reascended,

A long time ago Istar descended to the land whence none return;

The cow and the bull will not unite, the he-ass will not go to the female,
 The handmaid does not approach the freeman in the street,
 The freeman has ceased to give his order,
 The handmaid falls asleep instead of responding.
 Ea in the wisdom of his heart formed a man,
 He created Uddusu-namir, the servant of the gods.
 'Go, Uddusu-namir; to the land whence none return direct thy face,
 Let the seven gates of the land whence none return be opened before thy face.
 Let Allat see thee, let her rejoice at thy presence,
 When her heart is at rest and her liver appeased,
 Conjure her also by the name of the great gods,
 Lift up thy head; to the spring of waters lead her,
 The waters in its midst let her drink.'
 When Allat heard this she smote her thigh, she bit her thumb.
 'Thou hast asked of me a request none should request.
 Away, Uddusu-namir! I will shut thee up in the great prison.
 Let the mire of the city be thy food,
 Let the gutters of the city be thy drink,
 Let the darkness of the dungeon be thy habitation,
 Let the threshold be thy seat,
 May imprisonment and confinement be thy strength;'
 Allat opened her mouth and speaks,
 To Namtar, her messenger, a word she addresses:
 'Go, Namtar, strike open the palace so firmly built,
 Shatter the posts so that the thresholds tremble,
 Bid the subterraneous spirits (Annunaki) come forth, and seat them on a golden throne,
 Over Istar sprinkle the waters of life and bring her before me.'
 Namtar went; he struck open the palace,
 He shattered the posts, the thresholds trembled,
 He brought forth the subterraneous spirits (Annunaki) and seated them on a golden throne,
 He sprinkled Istar with the water of life and brought her along.
 The first gate he made her pass, he restored to her the covering of her nakedness.
 The second gate he made her pass, he restored to her the bracelets of her hands and feet.
 The third gate he made her pass, and restored to her the gemmed girdle of her waist.
 The fourth gate he made her pass, and restored the ornaments of her breast.
 The fifth gate he made her pass, and restored to her the necklace of her neck.
 The sixth gate he made her pass, and restored to her the earrings of her ears.
 The seventh gate he made her pass, and restored to her the grand diadem of her head."

This ends the legend. Now the priest begins:—

"If she accords not to thee her release, turn to her again.
 For Tammuz, the bridegroom of her youth,
 Pour out pure water, precious oils;
 Clothe him with a sacrificial robe, a crystal flute may he play.
 May the Uhats sigh with heavy sighing,
 The goddess Belili may break the costly draperies.
 The sacrificial dishes shall be filled with gifts.
 She heard the complaint of her brother (Tammuz), the goddess Belili smashed the draperies,
 The sacrificial dishes were filled.
 O my only brother, let me not be destroyed;
 On the day of Tammuz play for me the crystal flute, play the . . . instrument of joy.

At that time play for me, let the wailing men and the wailing women
Play for me on instruments . . . let them breathe incense."

A similar purpose furnishes the occasion for the most interesting tablet of the Nimrod¹-Epic, the eleventh tablet, containing the Babylonian account of the Deluge. In the fifth and sixth tablets we learn how Nimrod freed Erech and ascended the throne; how Istar was inflamed with love for the hero, and how she, when rejected, applied to her father Anu to avenge her disgrace; how Nimrod was cursed by Istar, and how his friend Ea-bani, who cast further indignity upon the goddess, was, at the request of the enraged Istar, smitten with a fatal disease. The ninth tablet opens with the lament of Nimrod over Ea-bani, and his resolve to seek out his ancestor, Samas-napistim,² to obtain the resurrection of his friend and immortality for himself: —

"Nimrod over Ea-bani his friend bitterly wept, and lay down on the ground.
I do not wish to die like Ea-bani.
Lamentation has entered my bowels.
I have become afraid of death and lie down on the ground.
For the strength of Samas-napistim, the son of Ubartutu (*Oriaptes*)
I will take the road and quickly go."

But he has an arduous task before him: —

"To the mountains of Mâs,
The exit of whose gate is guarded by day,
Whose summit reaches to the lattices of heaven,
Whose breast reaches to Hades below.
Scorpion-men guard its gate,
Their sight is terror, their glance is death.
Terrible is their dread, destroying mountains.
At the rising of the sun, and the setting of the sun, they guard the sun.
Nimrod looked at them in fear,
And terror darkened his countenance.
It took away his breath.
The scorpion-man spake to his wife:
'He who comes here — his body is a mark of the gods.'"

Finally the mountain of Mâs is reached. There is a gate leading to it, guarded, however, by a scorpion-man. When Nimrod tells him his desire to visit his ancestor, the gate-keeper warns him of the dangers of the way. Twelve miles he must travel on a waste and sultry road enveloped in continuous darkness. But Nimrod is not to be deterred, and he finally gains entrance to the gate. In the historical inscriptions Mâs appears as the designation of the Syro-Arabian desert, but in the ancient period of which the poem treats it seems still to have been a *terra incognita*.

Next the adventures of the road are set forth, though unfortunately this portion is very much mutilated. In the last lines of col. v. Nimrod

¹ Izdubar is the provisional reading of the name of the hero. Most Assyriologists have followed George Smith in identifying him with Nimrod. There is no cuneiform evidence, however, for the reading Namrûdu. Comp. PA OS. May, 1881, p. 12, Halévy ii. Z A 397.

² Dr. Jeremias always reads this name Pir-napistim, following Delitzsch and Zimmermann (cf. the latter's *Babylonische Busspsalmen*, p. 26, 1). To show the possibility of the reading Samas-napistim it will suffice to refer to ii. R. 44, 5a, where the character *ut* without the determinative of divine names occurs as the equivalent of the Sun followed by the ideogram of the air-god Rimmon. Cf. Strassmaier, No. 7895.

finds himself in a land of magnificent trees, whose fruits are precious stones, and at the end of the sixth column he has arrived at the sea, where a new obstacle presents itself. And the obstacle at first seems insurmountable, for Nimrod says :

"If it be possible, I will cross the sea ; and if it be not possible, I will stretch myself on the ground (in despair)."

Sabit, the keeper of the waters, answered this appeal as follows :

"Nimrod, there never has been a passage, and no one has ever been permitted to cross the sea.

Samas the hero has crossed the sea, but beside Samas who can cross it ?

Hard is the passage, most difficult its course,

And closed are the waters of the dead which are placed around (like a moat).

Why, O Nimrod, wouldst thou cross the sea ?

When thou approachest the waters of the dead, what wilt thou do then ?

Nimrod, there is Arad-Ea, the ferryman of Samas-napistim.

If possible, cross with him ; if not, after him."

After a long passage over the river, they come to the ocean, where is Arad-Ea's stopping place. Nimrod relates to Arad-Ea his woes, and begs the ferryman to take him across. Arad-Ea then gives Nimrod directions for the journey, and the preparations being made, they start. For more than a month they cruise about in the waters of the dead. Then the real danger begins. Finally they approach the shores of the regions of the blessed. Samas-napistim gazes at them in astonishment as they near his abode. Nimrod again relates his woes, tells of the countries, mountains, and seas he has traversed, and questions him, how it happened that he obtained immortality, and access to the regions of the blessed. Then Samas-napistim tells the "hidden story" of the great flood, how he alone was saved in universal destruction. After the close of the story of the deluge, Samas-napistim begins the cure of Nimrod, who was smitten with ulcers at the request of Istar ; and the hero recovers his strength through a magical food and a magical sleep. Samas-napistim commands his servant Arad-Ea :

"The man whom thou hast brought, has his body covered with ulcers ; Leprosy has destroyed the beauty of his flesh.

Lead him, Arad-Ea, take him to the place of purification.

Let him cleanse his ulcers in the water ;

Let him cast off his skin, so that the sea may carry it away and his body appear well."

This is next related as having taken place. After Nimrod is purified, the wife of Samas-napistim inquires :

"What wilt thou give that he may return to his land ?"

Thereupon, Samas-napistim reveals "the secret and command of the gods," and shows the hero a plant which appears on the high trees and cliffs of the island. The name of this plant, *sibu issahir amelu*, "which restores to a man already old his youth," the fountain of youth in other words, indicates its magical power. With this Nimrod could regain his former strength. But this boon was too precious for mortal man, and on the return a lion-like demon snatched the plant out of his hand, and carried it off to the sea.

So much for the legendary and possibly early views. In the prayers, on the other hand, scattered through the royal inscriptions, we find no in-

dications of any longing after immortality. The Babylonian gods deal exclusively with the living. They reward the good in this life, and punish in the flesh the evil deeds of the sinner. From the prayers preserved we learn the rewards of righteousness to be earthly prosperity, long life, and undying progeny. Away back in the earliest period of Babylonian history, 4000 B. C., we find kings erecting temples "for the preservation" or "prolongation of their life." The early Chaldean king Gudea, of whom so many remains were discovered by M. E. de Sarzec at Tel-loh, makes this request,¹ a prayer which Dungi, king of Ur (about 3000 B. C.), echoed on a beautiful seal cylinder. Kudur-Mabuk and Eriaku (Biblical Arioch), his son, king of Larsa, (Ellasar, Gen. xiv. 1) about 2100 B. C., who seem to have been co-regents, always erect temples for the preservation of their own and each other's lives.² For Agu-kak-rime (c. 1600 B. C.) it is asked that his years may be extended and his reign abound in blessings; that his throne may be firm and his mind be endowed with wisdom. (V. R. 33, Smith Disc. 230, 231.) Tiglath-pileser I. (c. 1120-1100 B. C.) says of his grandfather Asur-dân: "The work of his hands and the offering of his sacrifices pleased the gods, so that he arrived at the highest old age." Sargon II. (722-705 B. C.) prays for length of days and stability of his throne. Nebuchadnezzar II. (604-561 B. C.) for "length of days and victories." (Borsippa Inscription, I. R. 51, Col. II., l. 25.) Nabonidus, the last king of Babylon, prays to the moon-god: "Me, Nabonidus, king of Babylon, preserve from sin against thy great divinity; a life of distant days award me;" and for Belshazzar his first-born son he petitions, "The fear of thy great divinity establish in his heart, that he may not consent to sin; fullness of life may he enjoy."

The punishments for evil-doers, too, are always earthly — sickness, disease, the rooting out of one's progeny, or sudden death. In an incantation we read: "Whoso fears not his god, like a reed shall be cut off." Of any one who would destroy a royal inscription it was said, "The god Rimmon commanded that he should not live a single day; his name and seed were destroyed in the land." Another curse closes with the words, "May his name be blotted out and his seed be destroyed." "In distress and famine may they end their lives." So that from these and many similar expressions we are led to the inference that both reward and punishment are of this life. But death levels all; it even tears the pious from communion with his god, hence the great horror entertained for it. Of the suddenness of death the Babylonians had several proverbs. "He who is alive at even, is dead the next day." "No one knows the day of his death." The corpse was called *salamtu*, "that which has come to an end." The dead are said "to go on the road on which people come to an end;" or "the road which leads mankind to rest;" or "to a distant land which cannot be seen;" "to the wail of the dead." The location of the land of the dead, however, was definitely in the earth. In the twelfth tablet of the Nimrod Epic we read:

"The woe of the earth carried him off.

The plague did not carry him off, consumption did not carry him off, the earth carried him off.

The relentless demon Nergal did not carry him off, the earth carried him off; The battlefield did not smite him, the earth carried him off."

¹ Hommel, Semiten, I. 460. Amiaud, I. Z K. 152 and 156.

² I. R. 2, 3. IV. R. 35, No. 6, T S B A. I. 43, 386.

What disposition the Assyrians made of their dead is a question by no means easy to answer, though the inscriptions settle beyond a doubt that they practiced burial. Denial of this last rite was considered a great misfortune. Against his rebellious vassal, the king of Lydia Asurbanipal (668-626 B. C.) directs the curse, "May his corpse be cast before his enemies, may they drag away his bones." To Nabû-bel-zikre, who had thrown himself upon his own sword, he "did not grant burial." The Bellino Cylinder of Sennacherib plainly speaks of cemeteries and mausoleums. Moreover, Sennacherib as well as Asurbanipal went to the trouble of disinterring the bones of the ancestors of their conquered enemies. Sennacherib destroyed the graves of the ancestors of the troublesome Merodach-Baladan; and Asurbanipal says of the Elamites (vi. 76): "The burial places of their former and latter kings, who did not fear Asur and Istar my lords, who rebelled against the kings my fathers, I pulled down, destroyed, and exposed to the light; their shades I left uncovered, of lamentations and libations I deprived them." But the whole matter is clearly put at the close of the Nimrod-Epic:—

"On a couch he reclineth drinking pure water,
He who was killed in battle —
(As) thou hast (often) seen it (and) I (too) have seen it —
His father and mother support his head,
And his wife standeth by his side.
But he whose corpse was left upon the field —
As thou hast seen it and I have seen it —
His shade findeth no rest in the earth.
Whose shade hath none that careth for him —
As thou hast seen it and I have seen it —
He is consumed in gnawing hunger,
(In vain) he craveth food,
What is cast in the street, he eateth."

From this passage we can understand the indignities practiced upon the dead bodies of enemies.

Where the Assyrians buried their dead is still a matter of doubt. So far no graves or cemeteries have been found in the northern kingdom, though a special search was instituted by Layard, Loftus, Place, and Rassam. In fact, Place was driven to the assertion that possibly the Assyrians committed their corpses to the river, like the modern Hindus. Later, however, it was discovered that graves abounded in lower Chaldea; as the home of the originators of Babylonian civilization, it would probably be looked upon, even through all the diversities of political fortune, as the most sacred spot upon earth, and so Mr. Loftus conjectured that lower Chaldea, and lower Chaldea only, was used as a burial-place for the entire Mesopotamian empire. Taking a tomb found by Mr. Taylor at Mugheir (the ancient Ur) as a type, we may say that the average Chaldean tomb was 5 feet high by 7 feet long, and 3 feet 7 inches wide. The tomb was of brick work and had no door. Once closed it was inaccessible. Walking sticks, objects of gold, clay vases, and numerous small objects were found in the tomb in addition to a water jar. In these tombs the Babylonians took especial pains to guard the corpse against the action of damp. And the body had a good chance to resist decomposition, being partially embalmed, placed in a water-tight coffin, and in a cemetery carefully drained. Later, terra-cotta coffins, in the shape of a jar, seem to have come into fashion. This theory, too, that lower Chaldea was the necropolis of the Mesopotamian empire, has been

doubted, and the age of the remains at Mugheir, Warka, and Tel-loh has been questioned. Very recently an important investigation has been undertaken in connection with this matter. (*Journal of Assyriology*, II. 403.) In September, 1886, the Royal Prussian Museum sent out an expedition to Chaldea, the funds being contributed by Mr. L. Simon, a merchant of Berlin, and two employees of the Museum were detailed for the work. They made an examination of the ruins of Surghul and El Hibba, situated on the great triangle between the Euphrates, Tigris, and Schatt-el-Hai. They spent from the 4th of January till February 26th in Surghul, and from March 29th to May 11th of the same year in El Hibba. Both places were cities of the dead, filled with the remains of buried and partly incinerated corpses. For some reason or other the incineration in these cemeteries was never complete. In some cases the entire skeleton was preserved. The ashes showed that the fires were not allowed to burn out, but were put out, and that the woods employed in burning were of the finest quality, terebinth, palm, and sandal-wood. Golden ornaments were found generally in shapeless masses, the result of fire; weapons, agricultural implements, and even toys for children. Axes of stone were also found. Only one seal was discovered, and it is supposed that they were as a rule destroyed by fire. Bones of sacrificial animals, dates, and fishbones were found in the tombs. Some tombs were discovered in which there had been merely interment without the least trace of incineration. The body was covered with clay and surrounded with remains which plainly showed that the dead was supposed to require food and drink. In addition to these articles many of the graves contain small idols, human and animal figures of clay.

The exploring party consider it quite clear that we really have in Surghul and El-Hibba the ruins of an ancient Babylonian fire necropolis, and that the bodies brought there came from different portions of the empire. Thus the theory of Mr. Loftus would be confirmed. The results of the German expedition can hardly be considered certain, however, until a fuller report, together with photographs of the objects found, shall have been published. However that may be, the fact that both the Assyrians and the Babylonians did bury their dead is established beyond all doubt. But their tombs present no such aid for a study of their religious history as do those of Egypt — there is not a word to express the longings, the hopes, the aspirations of the departed spirit.

Of the funeral ceremonies, too, we have some inkling. The body was carefully prepared for burial. Hired mourners and music accompanied the corpse to the grave; libations were offered to the departed spirit, and spices were placed on the bier, while in agreement with the Israelitish custom, the mourners wore torn garments, and alms were distributed during the season of mourning. In a short inscription of Asurbanipal we find, "During the wailings of those who brought offerings to the kings my predecessors, I put on a torn garment; to gods and to men, to dead and living, I did favors."

The inferences to be drawn, then, seem to be as follows: The Assyro-Babylonians believed in a future life. Reward and punishment, however, were, as a rule, awarded in the flesh. Death was the great leveler, and all went to the same place, a dark, damp, and uncomfortable abode.¹

¹ What is generally recognized to be a pictorial representation of Hades is found on a bronze plaque acquired by M. Péretié at Hama in Northern Syria. Clermont-Ganneau thought that it represented the four divisions into which

Even this, however, was denied those whose remains did not receive proper burial. For some few of the favorites of the gods, on the other hand, a happier fate was reserved. They were translated to the isles of the blessed, and seem to have continued enjoying the same sort of existence that they had in the upper world. The spirits of Hades "were clad like birds, in feathered garments;" but when Nimrod sees his ancestor Samas-napistim, he remarks:

"Thy appearance¹ is not changed; like me art thou.
And thou thyself art not changed; like me art thou."

But this life in the fields of the blessed was a very exceptional thing. It is awarded in the poems to but a very few heroes, and is arrogated in an incantation to the priests, enchanter, and magicians. At the close of the deluge story we read:

"Thereupon, Bel, having made his resolve, came into the ship.
He took my hand and led me out.
He took out my wife and caused her to bend down at my side.
From now on Samas-napistim and his wife shall be like the gods."

Resurrection was known. When Istar was sprinkled with the waters of the source of life she was cured of her ills. Tammuz annually burst the bonds of death. Moreover, yielding to the entreaties of Nimrod, "the earth opened and the soul of Ea-bani came forth like a zephyr." The friends are overjoyed at meeting, and Nimrod asks Ea-bani to relate what adventures he has encountered, which request the latter refuses on the ground of painful reminiscences. It was this possibility of resurrection, as remarked above, which furnished the occasion of the relation of the Descent of Istar and a portion of the Nimrod-Epic. Marduk is called the merciful lord who loves the resurrection of the dead; Gula is the lady who makes the dead live, and Nebo is the god "who lengthens days and awakens the dead." Resurrection was but sparingly employed, however, and seems to have vested finally in Allat, the queen of the underworld, though the other gods were continually endeavoring to break her spell.

To attempt to trace the historical development of these somewhat contradictory views of the Babylonians concerning life after death, as set forth above, would, in the present state of our knowledge of the date of the religious texts, be a useless task, leading to no results which could in any way be considered certain.

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the Assyrians divided the Universe: heaven, atmosphere, earth, and Hades. Among the designations for the underworld in Babylonian texts are: *Su'ātu* (Sheol), *Qabru* (the grave), *Kātu* (Cutha—because Nergal was divinity of both Cutha and Hades); *bit mûti*, "the house of the dead;" *Kur-nu-gia* (akkadian), Assyrian *ersû lâ târat*, "land whence none return," etc. The principal deities of the underworld were Allat and Nergal (Akkadian *ne-uru-gal*, "lord of the great city," that is, Hades), and a host of demons (Anunaki), their satellites; the favorite messengers of Allat were *Namtâr* 'plague' and *Asakku* 'consumption' (?)

¹ Assyrian *mînâtu*, the same word as Hebrew מין in Genesis, "species," usually translated "kind."

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

American Statesmen. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. By THEODORE ROOSEVELT. 16mo, pp. viii, 370. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1888. \$1.25.

This is full of pregnant remarks and quotations. Morris, whose mother was a Gouverneur, had a little too much of the Frenchman to be a leader of the first rank in our country, but enough to make him uncommonly interesting among our solid but somewhat ponderous sires. His judgment was as sound as theirs, but his temper was rather too fiery and uncertain to be quite suited to the American genius. The "straight thinking," which Matthew Arnold condescends to ascribe to us, is thoroughly illustrated by Gouverneur Morris, and especially commends him to his fellow-New-Yorker. It is not ideally lofty, nor deeply religious, but it is eminently sane, morally and intellectually. Mr. Roosevelt tells us that the Constitution, in its final form, has been drawn up by Gouverneur Morris. A sufficient monument for any man. The sober dignity and lucid precision of its style show that his French and English blood were well tempered for the result. Of course he could not have been so happy in the redaction if he had not had a good deal to do with the making of it. Roosevelt says that in the Convention he spoke even oftener than Madison, though he did not cleave the centre like Madison. Of two fundamentals he saw one: that we must be a nation; he did not see the other, that we must be a democracy. "His keen, masterful mind, his far-sightedness, and the force and subtlety of his reasoning were all marred by his incurable cynicism and deep-rooted distrust of mankind. He throughout appears as *advocatus diaboli*; he puts the lowest interpretation upon every act, and frankly avows his disbelief in all generous and unselfish motives." Of course, then, his merits in the draft of the Constitution would lie on the national rather than on the democratic side. It is a pity that his proposition was not accepted, allowing Congress to repeal state laws; though perhaps, after all, it would only have forced disloyalty the sooner into rebellion. Slavery given, no political machinery could have finally averted "the irrepressible conflict." It is singular what a short-sighted contempt he had of the West, and how lightly he regarded its vital necessity, the control of the Mississippi. He wanted some provision that should always give the East a numerical superiority in Congress. "The futility of his fears, and still more of his remedies, was so evident that the Convention paid very little heed to either."

It was Morris who secured reeligibility to the President. And if, instead of thoroughly reforming the President's official patronage, we take the short cut of limiting him to one term, we may easily find, at some time or other, that we have tied our own hands, to our sorrow. Morris was, of course, opposed to the beggarly salaries which our farmer-republic insists on giving its judges, and which we could easily save a thousand times over out of the wastefulness of our taxation. Indeed, if we merely provided that no veteran of 1812 shall be deemed to have left more than five widows, that would suffice.

Laboulaye has pointed out to the impracticable egotism of his countrymen, that when our Constitution was drawn up everybody was dissatisfied with it, and everybody supported it. Morris, according to Madison, was illustrious even among his fellows for this frank willingness to surrender opinions which he could not carry through.

After his great, though by no means supreme, work in the Convention, he spent nine years in Europe. There his eminence at home, his wealth, his fine looks and easy manners, his familiarity with French, which was the ancestral language of his mother, and his sound yet brilliant mind, made him a great favorite in the highest circles. Even in England, the brother-in-law of a duchess, with such claims of his own, could not well be overlooked. "He kept a full diary during his stay abroad, and was a most voluminous correspondent; and his capacity for keen, shrewd observation, his truthfulness, his wonderful insight into character, his sense of humor, and his power of graphic description, all combine to make his comments on the chief men and events of the day a unique record of the inside history of Western Europe during the tremendous convulsions of the French Revolution." Like most genuine Anglo-Saxons, he regarded the leaders in the Revolution with horror and anger. The slow hideousness of the *ancien régime* was converted into a quick intensity of hideousness in the Revolution, more easily apprehensible, and sweeping away, as Frederic Myers has well said, great ideals which France once had, and which she has not regained. Morris does not, like Burke, extenuate and gild the past, but does not hold himself bound any more to extenuate the diabolical moral ugliness of the present. Mr. Roosevelt remarks that he was not bound to know how it was going to work in the end. Indeed, do we yet know?

"The sentimental humanitarians," says Mr. Roosevelt, "who always form a most pernicious body, with an influence for bad hardly surpassed by that of the professionally criminal class, of course thrived vigorously in an atmosphere where theories of mawkish benevolence went hand in hand with the habitual practice of vices too gross to name."

Morris himself says enough to make us sorry that we cannot quote it all. He writes in his journal, and very nearly the same thing to Washington: "The literary people here, observing the abuses of the monarchical form, imagine that everything must go the better in proportion as it recedes from the present establishment, and in their closets they make men exactly suited to their systems, . . . but as it happens, somewhat unfortunately, that the men who live in the world are very different from those who dwell in the heads of philosophers, it is not to be wondered at if the systems taken out of books are fit for nothing but to be put back into books again."

Morris "enjoyed his stay in Europe to the utmost, and was intimate with the most influential men and charming women of the time; but he was heartily glad to get back to America, refused to leave it again, and always insisted that it was the most pleasant of all places in which to live."

Madame de Staël avows that it was to her the most cruel of griefs to live away from the charms of Paris society. Gouverneur Morris, whom she pronounced to have "l'air très imposant," and to whom she seemed very willing to make love, saw this same society on the other side. "Much has been written about the pleasure-loving, highly cultured society of eighteenth-century France; but to a man like Morris, of real ability and with an element of sturdiness in his make-up, both the culture and polish looked a little like veneering . . . the silent, decorous dullness of life in the dreariest country town is not more insufferable than, after a time, become the endless chatter, the small witticisms, the mock enthusiasms, and vapid affectations of an aristocratic society as artificial and unsound as that of the Parisian drawing-rooms in the last century." Yet, for a while, all this was delightful to Morris, fresh from the New World.

During the Reign of Terror, Morris, then our minister to France, showed himself as courageous, and ready to protect those who took refuge with him, as Mr. Washburne afterwards.

It is a pity that for a few years after the fall of Federalism, Gouverneur Morris went almost wild with partisan madness, and traversed his own record in the most scandalous way. He became almost a North-eastern Secessionist. But he recovered his political sanity in his last years. The friend of Washington and of Jay could be trusted, on the whole, had he not given abundant credentials of his own.

Charles C. Starbuck.

ANDOVER.

VIRGIL'S *ÆNEID*, Translated literally, line by line, into English Dactylic Hexameter, by Rev. OLIVER CRANE, D. D., Corporate Member of the American Oriental Society. 4to, pp. xxxviii, 258. New York: The Baker & Taylor Co. 1888. \$1.75.

The translation of Virgil seems never to have had the same fascination for American scholars and men of letters as for their British kinsmen. We have had a very creditable amount and kind of scholarly editing of the text, but very little attempt at sustained translation. Specimen work, school and college exercises, occasional bits in newspapers and magazines—these have been till lately almost the only evidence of our desire or ability to present Virgil in an English dress. More recently there have been several formal and serious endeavors, yet so few that we can readily enumerate them. In 1872 the artist-poet, Mr. Christopher P. Cranch, published the *Æneid* in English blank verse, "a serious attempt," as the author terms it, made it would seem for its own sake, and so a truly literary production. In 1879 the Hon. John D. Long, the lawyer-legislator and governor, published the *Æneid*, also in blank verse. Like all the other translations here mentioned this was the recreation of a busy man, the work of an enthusiastic amateur. Many of its flowing lines were written in the Massachusetts House, while prosy members lengthened out debate, and the Speaker laid aside the gavel for the pen. The same year appeared a rhythmic-prose translation by Capt. Henry Hubbard Pierce, of the Army, a work produced in leisure hours in camp and barracks. Mr. E. Richardson, a Rhode Island manufacturer, issued in 1883 the first six books of the *Æneid* in ten-syllable iambic couplets. The first six books of the *Æneid* in dactylic hexameters, by George Howland, superintendent of schools in Chicago, and previously Principal of the High School, appeared in 1881, and the remaining six books in 1884. John A. Wilstach, a counselor-at-law in Indiana, published, with a long preface and numerous notes and other apparatus, a complete translation of the works of Virgil in 1883, imprint 1884, a work recalling in its spirit the enthusiasm of the Irish Dr. Henry. To these is to be added the work before us.

It will suffice for personal interest to know that Dr. Crane is a Presbyterian clergyman, residing in Morristown, N. J., a graduate of Yale in 1845, a man well acquainted with the lands of the *Æneid*, and that this work has been in hand for twenty years, begun as an experiment without thought of publication, and continued as the recreation of otherwise weary hours, amid other cares and duties, as opportunity allowed.

The preface is a very excellent part of the book. A hasty sketch of the earliest attempts at turning Virgil into English leads naturally, with the mention of Stanyhurst, to a discussion of the English hexameter,

which is defended at some length with much force and dignity as a legitimate English metre, in spite of all the ridicule it has encountered, and all its acknowledged difficulty. A statement of the estimation in which the *Æneid* has been held introduces a careful enumeration of its marked characteristics and an analysis of its charm. The method and aim of "this tentative yet difficult effort" are modestly stated, and finally acknowledgments are made in a list of names which show the writer's valuable acquaintance rather than the amount of his personal and literary obligations.

Translation is a work of peculiar difficulties and limitations. On the one hand it is hardly more dignified than the clever solution of an intricate puzzle; on the other, it is hardly less arduous and meritorious than the creation of new literature. There is some ground for the contempt heaped upon it, chiefly by those who could not possibly succeed in it, as being merely an exercise of an ingenuity almost mechanical. No doubt translation is most useful and most interesting to the man who indulges in it, and the delighted readers are few out of all proportion to the effort expended for their benefit. To reproduce thoughts in a rough way is easy enough, if the thoughts be first fairly apprehended. But to reproduce form, style, rhythm, the logical and æsthetic synthesis of ideas — this is supremely difficult, and raises translation to an art.

Dr. Crane has attempted not only to reproduce the epic narrative, its sentences and thoughts, not simply to reproduce them in poetic forms, but he has sedulously tried to translate line for line, to render every word, to omit nothing as too refractory, and to add nothing merely for embellishment, nothing except under sheer metrical necessity. This is realism in translation such as has never been attempted on any large scale before, and the author perhaps prides himself, not on his success, as he well might, but on his courage and adventure, a courage which is not valor, and an adventure which is wellnigh Quixotic. A path ought not to be attractive simply because it is tortuous, narrow, thorny, and steep. It may be a great feat, but it cannot be great art to translate Virgil line for line, as it would not be to do it word for word, or syllable by syllable. The wonder is that one who appreciates so fully the Virgilian diction, rhythm, refinement, and poetic elegance, who has such mastery of words and verse, should care much for linear measurement. Nothing in bronze can be the true replica of a work in marble, though the copy be exact and perfect in every dimension. No more can a translation into another tongue be a reproduction of the original. Virgil in English is impossible, no doubt, and the most that can be done is to reproduce as perfectly as possible the impression which Virgil makes, not by Latin methods, but by English methods, not by Virgil's methods so much as the translator's own. Painting may give as grand and noble portraiture as sculpture, and poetry may rival them both, but each is supreme in its greatness within its own domain, and in virtue of its own peculiar resources, and each fails when it essays to do precisely what the other easily accomplishes. Pope's *Iliad* was more truly Homeric than it could have been had Pope been dragged at Homer's chariot-wheel. Dr. Crane's excellent translation is impaired by the adherence to an imperfect standard of perfect translation. If we mistake not, the metrical requirement has forced him to use more epithets unauthorized by the text than would have been necessary had he disregarded lines, and aimed to give Virgil's thought with so much of Virgil's form as English speech and English idiom permit. All who value translation, and especially those who know most about it, will give hearty welcome to this patient, scholarly, and faithful work.

For an illustration of Dr. Crane's version, and for comparison, we sub-join, without comment, a famous passage from Virgil, — Dido's curse, *Æneid* iv., 615–629, — Crane's translation, and also the Right Hon. Sir Charles Bowen's, whose *Eclogues* and *Æneid* (I–VI.) appeared in London just at the end of last year. It will be seen that Justice Bowen omits the unaccented final syllable of the hexameter, and introduces rhyme, a novelty of metre which it would be interesting to discuss, did space permit.

VIRGIL.

"At bello audacis populi vexatus et armis,
finibus extorris, complexu avulsus Iuli,
auxilium imploret, videatque indigna suorum
funera; nec, cum se sub leges pacis iniquae
tradiderit, regno aut optata luce fruatur;
sed cadat ante diem, mediaque inhumatus arena.
haec precor, hanc vocem extremam cum sanguine fundo.
tum vos, o Tyrii, stirpem et genus omne futurum
exercete odiis, cinerique haec mittite nostro
munera. Nullus amor populis, nec foedera sunt o:
exoriare aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor,
qui face Dardanios ferroque sequare colonos,
nunc, olim, quocumque dabunt se tempore vires:
litora litoribus contraria, fluctibus undas
imprecor, arma armis; pugnent ipsique nepotesque."

CRANE.

"Yet, may he, wasted by war and the arms of a resolute people,
Banished afar from his confines, and torn from embrace of Iulus,
Sue for assistance, and honorless burial see of his kindred;
May he, too, when to the terms of an unjust peace he shall yield him,
Never enjoy his domains, nor the coveted light of a long life,
But may he fall ere his day, and unburied lie out on the mid strand.
This is my prayer: I pour out this final appeal with my life-blood.
Then, O ye Tyrians, follow his line and the whole of his future
Race with aversion, and this as an offering down to my ashes
Send; with the nations let amity never exist, nor alliance!
Rise thou out of my moldering bones some future avenger,
Who shall pursue with the torch and the steel the Dardanian settlers,
Now and hereafter, whenever the might shall accrue for the issue;
Shores unto shores, and surges to surges, and armor to armor,
Counter I pray; may they fight with each other, themselves and descendants!"

BOWEN.

"Harassed in war by the spears of a people daring and wild,
Far from the land of his fathers and torn from the arms of his child,
May he in vain ask succour, and watch his Teucrian band
Dying a death untimely! And when this warrior proud
Under the hard conditions of peace his spirit has bowed,
Neither of monarch's throne nor of sunlight sweet let him taste;
Fall ere time overtakes him, and tombless bleach on the waste.
This last prayer as my life ebbs forth I pour with my blood;
Let not thy hatred sleep, my Tyre, to the Teucrian brood;
Lay on the tomb of Dido for funeral offering this!
Neither be love nor league to unite my people and his!
Rise! thou Nameless Avenger from Dido's ashes to come,
Follow with fire and slaughter the false Dardanians home!
Smite them to-day, hereafter, through ages yet unexplored,
Long as thy strength sustains thee, and fingers cling to the sword!
Sea upon sea wage battle forever! shore upon shore,
Spear upon spear! To the sires and the children strife evermore!"

PHILLIPS ACADEMY, ANDOVER.

C. F. P. Bancroft.

HISTORY OF PRUSSIA UNDER FREDERIC THE GREAT, 1740-1745. By HERBERT TUTTLE, Professor in Cornell University. Crown 8vo. With Maps. Vol. II, 1740-1745, pp. xxiv, 308. Vol. III, 1745-1756, pp. xii, 334. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

Noticing the commendations, and deserved ones, given to these two volumes in Prussia, we are surprised that the Prussians have taken so much offense at Lord Macaulay's essay on Frederic the Great. Professor Tuttle's two histories seem to us to portray the same character as Macaulay's paper, only in soberer colors and with more detail. Both authors describe him as a man of much enlightenment, emancipated by his free-thinking from many cruel prejudices to which the established Christianity was bound, a lover and advocate of justice as between man and man, and gladly submitting his own private relations to it, though the present author brings out this latter trait more fully and favorably. Professor Tuttle says of the measures taken by the eminent Coceji, with the heartiest concurrence both of Frederic William and of Frederic: "They formed the revised constitution, as it were, of a judiciary which has been honorably distinguished for learning, for integrity, and — what is more surprising under an absolute government — for an independence superior alike to the threats and to the blandishments of power."

On the worser side of Frederic's character, Professor Tuttle's representations do not seem to differ essentially from Macaulay's. Both represent him as a man of dubious private conduct, and of a profane temper, to whom the most sacred convictions of his people were a matter of private scoffing, and were treated with no great courtesy by him anywhere. They both describe him as cynical and distrustful to the last degree, though Professor Tuttle allows him more credit than Macaulay for the strength of his individual friendships, and of his family affections. In his government Tuttle does not, like Macaulay, call him a tyrant, but certainly describes him as one. His administration was not capricious; it was uniform, thoroughgoing, and fearfully grinding. His yoke lay heavy on the necks of his people, and, if possible, heavier on the necks of those through whom he governed his people. It crushed individuality, and gave him a submissive but sullen and most unhappy body of subjects. Nor does he seem to have meant it as a way of transition to a higher order of things, though this has come about.

Professor Tuttle, however, thinks that Frederic was not, perhaps, very much to blame for the extreme rigor of the system of caste which he maintained, according to which the peasant, the artisan, the merchant, the noble, must remain immovably in their respective classes. The noble, for instance, though he were sinking into beggary, must not engage in trade, or in manual labor. "A hard, stern, illiberal and unjust system of policy sacrificed society to the state, the classes to society, and each individual to his own class. But it may be doubted whether in Prussia, as Frederic found it, any other method would have been possible. For here, as in many other features of the Prussian system, he was the heir rather than the founder. The principles, the outlines, the established traditions, were already present when he ascended the throne; and he may have reasoned, justly enough, that his own interests required him to continue the structure as his fathers had begun it. He had his own ends to pursue; and if he had violently overturned the entire internal fabric of society, he would have postponed indefinitely the day of external action."

His external action has had momentous issues. It has resulted in the revival of the German Empire, in a true vitality, and under a Protestant headship. But it is hard to lay much of this to the credit of Frederic's intentions. Many a man, before and since Sennacherib, has been used for great ends, of whom, nevertheless, it might have been said: "Howbeit he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so." Frederic cared little for Germany, less for Protestantism, but enormously for himself. Yet, after all, Frederic was a great man, a king, a German, and dwelling in Germany. The instinct of his people told upon him. He could Gallicize his speech and his taste, but his inner man was Teutonic in spite of himself. Professor Tuttle reminds us that he was remotely descended from the great Coligni. But Macaulay, passing over so slight an intermixture, describes him, and rightly, as "a prince of German blood on the side of father and mother, and marked by the fair hair and the clear blue eye of Germany." Carlyle describes his eyes as having the greater depth of "azure-gray." His Dutch and Danish ancestry of course left him as Teutonic as ever. He was not a conscious, but he was an unconscious organ of the German spirit, and Germany may well venerate him accordingly.

Frederic's seizure of Silesia was a thoroughly perfidious thing. He knew it to be such. "Ambition, interest, the desire of making people talk about me, carried the day." In the act, he violated the good faith of a neighbor, the loyalty of a Hohenzollern, and the chivalry due from a man to such a woman as the one whom he robbed. Maria Theresa appears to full advantage, as a woman and a king, in these pages, pure, loyal, fervently, but, for a female Catholic, not slavishly devout, ambitious, but of a high and legitimate ambition.

"A thousand claims to reverence clos'd
In her, as mother, wife, and Queen."

Her administrative capacity and her industry were immense, and her forecast large. The intensity of her just resentment against her piratical neighbor kindled awful flames of war over the whole globe, while he, having appropriated the plunder of two perfidious wars, was inclining to live at peace. But it is not strange that the Empress-queen should have viewed him as an incarnate Mephistopheles, whom it was righteous to pursue to the very end.


Of course not much can be said about German literature in connection with Frederic the Great. But Professor Tuttle gives an exceedingly interesting account of the modest but patriotic Berlin poets, who, under the very shadow of Voltaire, were quietly working towards the day of great things.

There is a great deal of instructive by-play between George the Second and his nephew, who so cordially disliked each other. It is astonishing what power this English monarch had, half a century subsequent to the Revolution, to trail his three kingdoms after his miserable Electorate. The Salic law never did a better thing than when it eut adrift this occasion of evil inspirations from the British crown in 1837.

Professor Tuttle shows throughout the two books the large statesmanship of view apparent in his too little regarded essay on Parties in the "Atlantic Monthly."

Charles C. Starbuck.





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I have read the advance sheets of this story with more emotion and admiration than I have felt for any novel for a very long time. The figures of John Ward and his wife are among the most nobly imagined and most powerfully drawn figures in modern fiction. — ARLO BATES, in the *Providence Journal*.

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
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